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ABSTRACT 
Eye tracking investigation of the pragmatic language comprehension abilities of children 
with autism 
SEPTEMBER 2020 
KRISTINA A. CURRO 
B.A. UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: 
Professor Mary V. Andrianopoulos 
Professor Adrian Staub 
Autism is a disorder of the comprehension and use of pragmatic language. 
Children with autism often display heterogeneous patterns of language ability even 
when language is considered a strength. This real-time analysis is a partial 
replication of Sedivy et al. (1999) who found evidence for incremental processing 
of pragmatic language in real-time with adults. This investigation focused on 
prosodic focus and scalar adjective comprehension in children with and without 
autism. Results show that children with autism successfully interpret prosodic 
focus when interpreting intersective adjectives but show processing delays in 
interpreting scalar adjectives. Implications for pragmatic language processing 
differences between children with autism and those without are discussed. 
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CHAPTER ONE: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
In the last decade the incidence of autism has increased to nearly 1 in 54 children 
in the United States, causing great strain on families, local schools, and society as they 
strive to meet the needs of these individuals (Maenner et al., 2020) . Individuals with 
autism often face varying degrees of communication difficulties, ranging from a lack of 
verbal communication to full verbal capabilities but with difficulty with appropriate use 
of language (such as conversational turn-taking). Since communication relies on an 
exchange between a speaker and a listener, difficulties with pragmatic language often 
result in difficulties with social interaction. These difficulties with pragmatic language 
can have negative effects on the quality of life of people with autism (Moroney, 2015) 
and on their families (Vasilopoulou & Nisbet, 2016).  
As a consequence, families seek expert guidance to determine the best ways to 
help their loved ones, which often requires resources and a commitment to extensive and 
intensive therapy. A key component of comprehensive therapeutic intervention includes 
services from a speech-language pathologist (SLP). SLPs are charged with assessing the 
communicative abilities of their clients and providing intervention to address any 
communication deficits. As more children are diagnosed at increasingly earlier ages, 
researchers have focused on studying the developmental trajectory and long-term 
outcomes of individuals with autism spectrum disorders to support intervention efforts. 
Much of the therapeutic literature has focused on behaviors, with comparatively 
less emphasis on the cognitive and linguistic profiles of autistic people. Fortunately, 
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cognitive and linguistic research has strengthened the theoretical explanations for autism 
and provided the beginning of linguistic and cognitive profiles of autism that include 
strengths as well as areas of need when describing the whole autistic person.  
Since research in these areas is relatively new, there are still gaps in knowledge 
regarding the linguistic abilities of autistic people, particularly in the area of pragmatic 
language. This is reflected in therapists’ anecdotal observations that the language abilities 
of people with autism vary greatly. A better understanding of the pragmatic language 
abilities of this growing population will better inform the assessment and intervention 
techniques of the therapists who work directly with families and patients to improve their 
quality of life.  
Pragmatic Language 
Pragmatics is the study of how language use and context contribute to meaning. 
For example, how one interprets the phrase, “It’s wonderful to see you!” will depend on 
the context. The speaker could be expressing sincere delight or one of annoyance at your 
arrival. How do we move from the literal to the implied meaning? How do we make a 
guess about how the speaker feels? 
When two conversational partners engage in discourse they tend to operate 
according to a set of rules. What these rules are, whether or not the speaker chooses to 
abide by them, and how the listener interprets the utterance in context lie at the center of 
the study of pragmatic language. For example, consider the following sentence: 
(1) What lovely weather we’re having!
If the listener understands English, it is possible to understand this utterance based 
on semantics and syntax alone. However, what if the utterance were said with “sarcastic” 
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intonation? Now the listener must take into account prior knowledge about the speaker, 
the current state of the weather, and any additional information the speaker might have 
referenced previously in the conversation. The listener must integrate this information 
with the literal meaning to arrive at the speaker’s intended meaning. For example, it is 
entirely possible that the speaker says this sentence while it is raining, and if the area was 
currently experiencing a drought the speaker might nonetheless be genuine in expressing 
his happiness about the weather. Or, it is also possible that the speaker is unhappy with 
the weather, particularly if the listener knows it has been raining for the past ten days, and 
the speaker produced the utterance with a “sarcastic” intonation. In both examples the 
listener merges prior knowledge and context with the literal meaning of the utterance to 
arrive at the speaker’s intended meaning. 
In the case noted above, the speaker and listener cooperate according to “Gricean” 
principles of conversation. Paul Grice was one of the first linguists to formally 
distinguish between logical meaning and pragmatic meaning in language (Grice, 1989; 
Noveck & Reboul, 2008). He proposed a divergence from logical definitions of operators 
such as “and,” “or,” and “some” to a pragmatic interpretation of the same terms that are 
found in natural language. Logical interpretation of such terms results in an inclusive 
definition. For example, the logical interpretation of “cake or cookies” includes “possibly 
both cake and cookies.” However, a pragmatic interpretation of “or” in this case would 
not include “possibly both,” because the listener would assume that if the speaker had 
really meant “possibly both,” they would have used the strong term “and,” and instead, 
by selecting “or,” the speaker had meant to imply that the listener could have only one 
dessert. Therefore, natural language interpretations of “and” or “or” usually result in an 
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interpretation of these terms that incorporates speaker intent. To do this, the speaker 
implies some non-logical meaning by virtue of the context of the utterance, thereby 
generating an implicature. This implicature cancels the logical interpretation of the 
operator and instead invokes a pragmatic interpretation.  
Grice proposed a Cooperative Principle: discourse is a cooperative effort between 
speakers and listeners and “a person’s contribution to the discourse should be as required 
by the conversation, at the point at which it occurred, by the accepted exchange in which 
one is currently engaged” (Grice, 1989, p. 26). This principle is composed of four 
categories of maxims that can be followed or broken for a particular effect. They are: 
1) Maxims of Quantity:  
a) Make your contribution as informative as is required.  
b) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
2) Maxims of Quality:  
a) Do not say what you believe to be false. 
b) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.  
3) Maxim of Relation: Be relevant.  
4) Maxims of Manner:  
a) Avoid obscurity of expression.   
b) Avoid ambiguity.  
c) Be brief (avoid unnecessary verbosity).  
d) Be orderly. 
Returning to our example of sentence (1) above, we can see how abiding by or 
violating these maxims produces different interpretations of the utterance. If the speaker 
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utters the phrase while it is pouring out and presuming that the region is not currently in 
the throes of a drought, the speaker might have been perceived to have violated the 
Maxim of Quality: plainly the weather is not wonderful. The listener generates an 
implicature and reconciles the conflict between logic and pragmatic interpretations of the 
utterance by interpreting the speakers’ true meaning as sarcasm. 
Implicatures can be generated in a number of ways, but all rely on context. For 
example, prosody (the rise and fall of the voice during speech) can change a statement to 
a question by changing the context of an utterance. Consider the following utterance:  
(2) There’s cake in the pantry.  
This can be understood to be a statement, a question, or an exclamation, 
depending on the prosodic contour used in the utterance. Prosody can also be used to 
chunk objects together in a list. For example, in the phrase “chocolate cake and cookies,” 
a pause may be inserted between “chocolate” and “cake” to imply three items in the list, 
or omitted, to suggest that there are only two desserts to choose from.  
Although prosody is used in a variety of ways, such as asking questions or 
differentiating nouns from verbs (e.g., CON-tract vs. con-TRACT), this review of 
prosody will primarily address prosodic focus, which creates prominence in the discourse 
and marks information as important or new. “Focus” is the term used to describe the 
prominence status of an entity in the shared attention of the speaker and the listener. It 
allows the speaker and listener to shift their attention among various entities in order to 
engage in a conversation. Gundel (1999) identified three main types of focus: 
psychological, semantic, and contrastive.  
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An entity can be in psychological focus if the attention of both conversational 
partners is focused on that entity because of its salience at a particular point in a 
conversation. This could be achieved linguistically, but it may also be achieved in other 
ways, such as with visual context. For example, a person might say, “James looks just 
like his father, doesn’t he?” In this case, the pronoun “he” refers to “James.” However, a 
person could also bring a referent into psychological focus without specifically naming 
him. If two people are looking at a photo and one person says, “He looks happy here, 
doesn’t he?” the referent for the pronouns is invoked via the photo. 
Focus can also be used to describe the part of a sentence that is prominent either 
syntactically or prosodically. Information in a sentence that answers the relevant wh-
question receives syntactic prominence (Cutler & Fodor, 1979). Syntactic focus then 
results in semantic focus by virtue of its importance in the structure of the sentence. 
However, semantic focus can be marked with a pitch accent (prosody) to communicate a 
meaning different than the syntactic interpretation of the utterance. In addition to 
prosody, semantic focus could be marked with particles, word order, or a combination of 
some or all of these. For the purposes of this discussion, I will discuss the use of prosody 
to create semantic focus.  
To create semantic focus on information that otherwise wouldn’t receive focus 
due to syntax, the speaker can employ prosodic contours. For example, consider the 
phrase, “I have plans to leave.” The speaker may stress the word “plans” by applying a 
pitch accent, meaning that she has some blueprints to leave for someone and marking the 
word as a noun. Alternately, she may instead put stress on “leave,” meaning that the 
speaker is planning on leaving. In each case, the speaker uses prosody to create focus on 
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a particular word, changing the sematic focus of the sentence, and ultimately changing 
the syntactic structure and the meaning of the utterance (Roach, 2009).  
Focus can also be used to draw a listener’s attention to information considered 
important by the speaker. This is often referred to as “contrastive focus” or “prosodic 
focus” and can be used when a speaker wishes to draw the listener’s attention to 
information that may not otherwise have semantic focus. A speaker may choose to 
employ contrastive focus to highlight important information when they wish to convey 
some sort of implied meaning, to mark that a new topic is being introduced, or to draw 
the listener’s attention to some sort of contrast. The primary use of contrastive focus is to 
impose a contrast, often with a pitch accent or prosody. In the sentence, “Give me the 
RED scissors,” the adjective receives focus when the speaker emphasizes the adjective 
prosodically, drawing the listener’s attention to the color, even though it is in a syntactic 
position to receive semantic focus.  
Along with prosody, word choices can also reveal the intention of the speaker and 
draw a listener’s attention to some entity. For example, imagine that a man named Bill is 
visiting his friend Susan. Susan offers her friend some chocolate. She might say to him, 
“Please, have some chocolate.” If Susan had really meant that Bill could have all of the 
chocolates, she probably would have said, “Please, eat all of the chocolate,” and he could 
enjoy the entire bowl of chocolates on the table. However, since Susan chose to say 
“some” and not “all,” Bill presumes that he cannot have all of the chocolates in the bowl, 
despite the fact that the logical meaning of “some” includes “and possibly all.” Terms 
such as “some” are called scalar terms: “some” is bound on each end by “some, and not 
all” and “some and possibly all.” The use of the more restrictive term “some” causes the 
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listener to make a pragmatic inference about the speaker’s meaning, despite the fact that 
the logical meaning of the term “some” includes the terminal end of the scale (“all”). 
Linguists have proposed that in order to arrive at this interpretation, listeners must 
generate a scalar implicature that licenses the more restrictive meaning of the term, 
thereby allowing the listener to arrive at the pragmatic interpretation of the utterance. 
Prosody and scalar implicatures are two methods of providing a context that 
changes the literal meaning of an utterance. Each requires the listener to incorporate that 
context when arriving at the ultimate meaning of the utterance to generate an implicature. 
When does this occur? Are implicatures generated incrementally with reliance on local 
processing of contextual information, or holistically sometime after the conclusion of the 
utterance, thereby requiring global processing and integration of background knowledge? 
Methods of investigation 
In general, experimental methods used to investigate language processing involve 
either post-perceptual tasks or real-time measures. Post-perceptual experimental tasks 
often involve a participant hearing a sentence or a story and then being asked questions 
about what they just heard. In contrast, real-time experimental measures assess language 
processing as it occurs, rather than asking the participant to make a judgment about the 
utterance and can be paired with post-perceptual measures to provide more information 
about the nature of ongoing language processing rather than just the end result of the 
processing.  
Post-perceptual experimental tasks consist of asking the participant to judge an 
utterance that is either heard or read, perhaps while looking at a visual display. The type 
of utterance can vary from single words, to sentences, to longer stories. Participants 
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might be asked to define a word, decide whether an utterance is true or false, or to listen 
to a story and then answer questions. These are commonly referred to as truth-value 
judgment tasks (TVJT). For example, a participant hears the utterance, “Some of the 
giraffes have long necks.” The participant is then asked whether they agree or disagree 
with the statement and their answers are categorized as either logical or pragmatic. The 
stimuli are manipulated experimentally to test various psycholinguistic concepts, such as 
the computation of scalar implicatures (e.g., Guasti et al., 2005).  
Post-perceptual tasks such as TVJTs are useful as they require little to no 
infrastructure, such as lab space or specialized equipment, thereby giving experimenters 
the opportunity to conduct the experiment with a wider variety of participants by 
presenting the experiment online, or in person at local schools or clinics. When 
participants justify their answers, their responses can lend important insight into their 
reasoning and allow experimenters to look at developmental trajectories for computing 
scalar implicatures.  
However, there are some limits to post-perceptual experimental tasks. The 
participants can recruit other abilities to complete the task that aren’t necessarily related 
to language processing, or at the very least, aren’t the language processes that researchers 
are hoping to study. If the participants have cognitive difficulties it might be hard for 
them to remember and follow directions. If the participant provides a wrong answer, it’s 
impossible to tell where in the task the breakdown occurred. In summary, post-perceptual 
judgment tasks are an important method for investigating language processing, albeit 
with some limitations to the types of conclusions that can be drawn.  
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By contrast, real-time measures record some aspect of behavior while a 
participant is processing language. Behaviors measured include eye movements and 
fixations, electrophysiological recordings of brain activity (ERP), or recording blood-
flow to various parts of the brain via functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). 
Most of the psycholinguistic literature uses eye tracking and ERP to investigate cognitive 
and linguistic processing due to relative ease and lower costs. Eye tracking experiments 
generally fall into two categories: visual world eye tracking and eye tracking during 
reading. In visual world eye tracking a person’s eye movements are recorded as they look 
at a scene and listen to instructions or a story. Reading studies also employ eye tracking 
to examine language comprehension with print. In this review, I report on the visual 
world paradigm and its use to measure spoken language comprehension.  
In a typical visual world real-time eye tracking experimental task, the 
experimenter might present children with some toys on a table and an utterance such as, 
“Put the frog on the star in the basket,” and the participant is asked to move one of the 
objects according to the directions (see Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill, & Logrip, 1999), or the 
participant may simply listen to a sentence or short story about a visual scene (e.g., 
Kamide, Altmann, & Haywood, 2003). While they are doing so, their eye movements and 
fixations are recorded, either by videotaping their face looking at the board and hand-
coding the location of their gaze (called “looking while listening,” or LWL), or by an 
eye-tracker which records fixations, durations, and saccades automatically with a high 
degree of resolution. Real-time measures allow researchers to examine language 
processing as it occurs over the course of an utterance and, via experimental 
manipulation, reveal how listeners interpret various kinds of linguistic concepts in real 
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time. In addition, they don’t necessarily require participants to understand complex 
instructions or formulate responses, which makes them particularly well suited to use 
with younger participants or disordered populations who may have cognitive limitations 
that would make post-perceptual measures such as TVJTs, longer stories, or complex 
instructions difficult to interpret.  
Despite the advantages, there are some limitations. Real-time measurements 
usually require some sort of specialized equipment: in the case of eye tracking, at the 
very least video and audio recording equipment, and preferably an eye tracker and 
dedicated computers in lab space are required. Although trackers are becoming more 
portable, the experimenter can only run one participant at a time. LWL experiments don’t 
rely on eye trackers and can be completed with video cameras and at a relatively lower 
cost, but the analyses require a good deal of time for hand-coding each participant’s eye 
movements. Real-time measures can provide detailed information about the time-course 
of language processing, and when combined with post-perceptual judgment tasks, can 
provide a robust understanding of how participants process language. This makes eye 
tracking particularly well suited for measuring visual attention. Changes in visual 
attention allow investigators a method to measure linguistic processing by comparing 
fixation location and times between two conditions.  
Timing of language comprehension 
Scientists have debated whether language comprehension occurs during the 
utterance or until some amount of information is accrued. Each has its benefits and 
difficulties: if language processing is incremental it does not overburden short-term 
memory, but it must have some way of dealing with ambiguity from moment to moment. 
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If the language processor waited until it had enough information in order to arrive at an 
interpretation that resolves the ambiguity, it can avoid having to deal with uncertainty in 
the moment, but in that case short-term memory must store a relatively large amount of 
information.  
Incremental comprehension of language has been shown in how we process so-
called “garden-path” sentences. In these sentences, a listener or reader has one 
interpretation of the sentence active but must revise that interpretation when new 
information is encountered. A classic example demonstrates how the meaning of a 
sentence can drastically change as new information is encountered: 
3) The horse raced past the barn fell. 
4) The horse that was raced past the barn fell. 
Sentence 3 is significantly more difficult to understand. As the sentence unfolds, 
we presume the structure of the sentence is subject –verb phrase – prepositional phrase. 
However, when we encounter the verb “fell,” we must restructure the sentence to 
accommodate the verb at the end of the utterance. The new sentence structure is subject-
relative clause-verb phrase. In contrast, sentence 4 is much easier to understand because 
the words “that was” creates the necessary syntactic structure to incorporate the verb 
“fell” at the end of the sentence. That Sentence 3 is more difficult to understand than 
Sentence 4 has been attributed to the parsing system making an incorrect guess as to the 
syntactic structure and then needing to revise that structure. This incremental processing 
not only occurs for syntax but also for semantics. Listeners incorporate semantic 
information, visual information, and world knowledge in order to arrive at a meaning of 
an utterance.  
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One way scientists have measured the incremental processing of language is with 
the use of eye tracking. A computer tracks fixations across a visual scene as a listener 
follows a series of directions or listens to a short vignette. For example, while looking at 
a photo of a boy in a room with a cake and other various distractor objects such as a cup 
or a ball, participants heard a narrator say, “The boy will eat the cake,” or “The boy will 
move the cake.” In the first instance, the verb “eat” greatly restricts the possible objects 
that could come in the direct object; “eat” presumes that the target object will be 
something edible, such as cake. In contrast, when the verb is “move”, any of the objects 
could be moved, and so it is difficult to guess what the target object might be. Altmann 
and Kamide showed that eye movements were not only tightly bound in real time to the 
spoken sentence, but that listeners would fixate on the target object “cake” much sooner 
when the verb restricted the possible direct objects to “edible objects,” indicating that 
listeners use linguistic and visual context to restrict the domain of possible post-verb 
direct objects (Altmann & Kamide, 1999; see Huettig, Rommers, & Meyer, 2011 for a 
comprehensive review). This tight correlation between eye gaze and language 
comprehension makes eye tracking an excellent investigative tool: it is relatively easy to 
determine how listeners understand language in real time by analyzing their fixations on 
objects in a visual scene, particularly when the stimuli are ambiguous in some way.  
Unlike the example above, where the visual and syntactic environment makes it 
possible for the listener to predict what the target object could be, there are cases where 
syntactic and semantic information alone is insufficient to determine the referent because 
the visual context makes it difficult to determine what the speaker may be talking about. 
For example, intersective adjectives are those that have a stable central meaning, such as 
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colors or material. When someone labels a ball “red,” they refer to an object in the array 
that shares that property. The listener does not require the noun to understand what the 
meaning of “red” is in this particular context; the meaning is fixed. In addition, adjectives 
can be combined to describe an object in more detail. An object described as “large blue 
square” leads the listener to identify the object in the array that possesses all of those 
qualities, or an object that has the combined features. Ambiguity can be created by 
manipulating the context. If two objects in the scene share an adjective phrase such as 
“large blue,” then the listener must wait until the noun in order to determine which object 
the speaker refers to. Alternatively, perhaps a previous instruction (e.g., “point to the red 
square”) has created a particular context that the listener uses when interpreting a 
subsequent instruction (“Now point to the blue square”).  
Context may be created in a variety of ways, but it is easiest to create context for 
an utterance either linguistically and/or visually. Linguistic context can be manipulated 
with the use of prosody to invoke a contrastive focus. When a speaker says, “Point to the 
BLUE square,” it creates a heightened contrast between “blue” and some other subset of 
objects that implies NOT the red squares. This focus on the adjective might signal to the 
listener that they made a mistake in pointing to a red square, or that the speaker is 
highlighting important information: “The color is important, so I’m drawing your 
attention to it.” Linguistic context can also be created with word choice. If a speaker 
refers to an object by some feature, such as “tall,” he creates contrast between the 
intended object and some other “not tall” object, because otherwise he could have just 
used the noun without the adjective.  
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When a speaker invokes some sort of comparison among items (such as children 
vs. non-children or tall vs. short glasses), the listener generates an implicature, which is a 
guess as to what the intended meaning of the speaker might be. This intended meaning 
goes beyond the literal interpretation of the utterance and is the result of the listener 
merging knowledge and context with the semantic and syntactic meaning to arrive at the 
speaker’s intention. For example, a speaker would not emphasize the height of the glass if 
they didn’t have to; therefore, there must be some reason why they did. That reason (to 
bring the listener’s attention to the height of the glass) is the result of the implicature.  
However, there are some adjectives that require the noun in order to be fully 
understood. Adjectives such as “tall” are difficult to understand until the listener 
encounters the noun it modifies: A “tall” three-year-old child is a very different type of 
“tall” than a “tall” giraffe. Furthermore, if a person were asked to name members of the 
group of “tall” objects, most people would not include “three-year-old children.” Yet the 
sentence, “Billy is a tall three-year-old!” is perfectly acceptable. Here, the adjective is 
meaningful only when the listener knows the comparison set invoked by the noun; in this 
case, “three-year-olds.” This comparison set encompasses objects along a continuum, or 
scale, that occurs between the lower and upper bound of that scale, much like the scalar 
term “some.” This could occur when they hear the noun, or when they have sufficient 
context. If a listener sees an object on a table that is relatively taller than the rest, they 
may reasonably conclude that the speaker is referring to that object when they hear the 
adjective “tall.” If the objects only vary by height, the adjective “tall” is subsective, 
meaning that it identifies a subset of all the glasses on the table that meet the relative 
definition of “tall” which falls along some scale. Manipulating context provides one 
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method of investigating how listeners process intersective adjectives (such as color) or 
scalar/subsective, adjectives (such as “tall”). By measuring the eye movements of 
participants while they hear utterances about objects being talked about, experimenters 
can determine when and how context plays a role in language comprehension. 
The previous examples are but two aspects of language that are encompassed in 
pragmatic language. As previously noted, pragmatic language bridges the gap between 
literal and intended meanings by studying the unspoken rules of conversation, how 
knowledge and context affect utterance interpretation, and how speaker intent is 
conveyed to the listener. To be successful in utilizing language pragmatically, one must 
have knowledge of social rules for communication. But what happens to language 
comprehension when a conversational partner has difficulty incorporating context into 
their understanding of an utterance? Individuals with autism have marked difficulty with 
non-verbal pragmatic language that is often distinct from verbal language ability (e.g., 
syntax and semantics). Therefore, using experimental methods such as eye tracking to 
explore of the nature of pragmatic language processing in individuals with autism can not 
only inform linguistic theories, but also better describe the abilities of autistic people. 
Autism Spectrum Disorders 
Autism is a spectrum of pervasive developmental disorders characterized by 
impairments in three areas: social communication, difficulties with reciprocal social 
interaction, and unusual patterns of repetitive behavior. Diagnosis requires behavioral 
observations by a trained psychologist, but the behaviors measured are relatively broad. 
A diagnosis of autism is given to an individual if that person meets the diagnostic criteria 
found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder – Fifth Edition (DSM-
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V) (American Psychiatric Association, 2011). The criteria are divided into three main 
areas: social communication, language ability, and exclusion diagnoses. They are: 
I. A total of six (or more) items from (A), (B), and (C), with at least two from 
(A), and one each from (B) and (C). 
A. Qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at 
least two of the following: 
1. Marked impairments in the use of multiple nonverbal 
behaviors such as eye-to-eye gaze, facial expression, 
body posture, and gestures to regulate social interaction 
2. Failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to 
developmental level 
3. A lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, 
interests, or achievements with other people, (e.g., by a 
lack of showing, bringing, or pointing out objects of 
interest to other people) 
4. Lack of social or emotional reciprocity  
B. Qualitative impairments in communication as manifested by at 
least one of the following: 
1. Delay in, or total lack of, the development of spoken 
language (not accompanied by an attempt to compensate 
through alternative modes of communication such as 
gesture or mime) 
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2. In individuals with adequate speech, marked impairment 
in the ability to initiate or sustain a conversation with 
others 
3. Stereotyped and repetitive use of language or 
idiosyncratic language 
4. Lack of varied, spontaneous make-believe play or social 
imitative play appropriate to developmental level  
C. Restricted, repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests 
and activities, as manifested by at least two of the following: 
1. Encompassing preoccupation with one or more 
stereotyped and restricted patterns of interest that is 
abnormal either in intensity or focus 
2. Apparently inflexible adherence to specific, 
nonfunctional routines or rituals 
3. Stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g., hand 
or finger flapping or twisting, or complex-whole body 
movements) 
4. Persistent preoccupation with parts of objects 
II. Delays or abnormal functioning in at least one of the following areas, with 
onset prior to age 3 years: 
A. Social interaction 
B. Language as used in social communication 
C. Symbolic or imaginative play 
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III. The disturbance cannot be accounted for by Rett’s Disorder or Childhood 
Disintegrative Disorder. (p. 75) 
At the heart of the diagnostic criteria is difficulty with aspects of pragmatics, but 
research has shown great variability in the degree of impairment. For example, some 
studies have shown that people with autism have difficulty attributing mental states to 
other people, while other studies have noted that children with autism are able to do this 
(Frith, 2012; Papp, 2006). This may be due to the behavioral nature of making the 
diagnosis. Behaviors exhibited by a person may be the end result of a wide variety of 
cognitive processes. As such, the diagnosis only summarizes the behavioral aspects of a 
particular individual but does not provide any information regarding the cognitive 
abilities of individuals with autism. 
Researchers have attempted to reconcile the broad behavioral and linguistic 
diagnostic criteria with the variable presentation of symptoms often seen clinically. To do 
so, they have developed theories regarding the cognitive abilities of individuals with 
autism. These theories attempt to identify the mechanisms disrupted or altered in 
individuals with autism. A sound theoretical model that explains the behavioral and 
cognitive abilities of autistic individuals will aid in the development of cognitive 
phenotypes that will allow researchers and clinicians to better understand how individuals 
with autism experience the world (Charman et al., 2011).  
 Cognitive Models for Autism  
There are three major cognitive theories of autism: “Theory of Mind” (TOM), 
“Weak Central Coherence Theory” (WCC), and “Executive Function” (EF). TOM and 
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WCC have been the focus of numerous research studies, while EF has received 
comparably less attention in the literature. 
Theory of Mind 
Theory of Mind (TOM) is the ability to ascribe independent mental states to 
entities other than ourselves in order to predict behavior (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). A 
person who has theory of mind understands that other people might have different 
knowledge than they do. There are three types of questions commonly used to assess 
various levels of TOM: first-order belief attribution, second-order belief attribution, and 
third-order belief attribution (Martin & McDonald, 2004). First-order belief attribution 
requires the listener to predict a character’s action based on that character’s knowledge. 
For example, a story to test first-order belief attribution might be, “Ann saw the cookies 
on the counter and not on the shelf in the pantry. She is now hungry and would like a 
snack. Where will Ann look for the cookies?” An accurate response requires a prediction 
conveying explicit information about the location of the cookies. A person capable of a 
first-order belief would respond “on the counter.” 
In a second-order belief task, the listener must predict the actions of a character 
based on information that may be different than the information the listener may have. 
For example, “Ann is hungry and would like a cookie. She thinks the cookies are either in 
the cabinets or on the table. Where do you think they are? {Child answers, “I think they 
are in the cabinet.”}. That’s a good guess, but Ann thinks they are on the table. Where 
will Ann look for the cookies?” This task requires the listener to suppress their own 
thoughts about where the cookies might be and use what they know about Ann’s thoughts 
about the location of the cookies to correctly answer the question.  
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The third-order belief attribution task is commonly referred to as the Sally-Ann 
story. In this story, Sally and Ann are enjoying some cookies from a tin on the kitchen 
table. Ann leaves the room, and Sally moves the cookies from the tin on the kitchen table 
to the cupboard and then leaves the room. When Ann returns to the kitchen she thinks she 
would like another cookie. The listener is then asked where does Ann look for the 
cookies? The correct response should be “on the kitchen table,” as that’s where Ann 
knew the cookies to be when she left the room. An individual with autism might answer 
“in the cupboard,” since that is where he saw Sally put the cookies, thereby 
demonstrating difficulty distinguishing between belief states of different characters in a 
story and their own.  
Research has shown that children with autism tend to have difficulty with these 
types of tasks (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985); however, performance can be improved for 
some children with ASD when the perspective of the protagonist is made more explicit, 
such as asking the child, “Where will Ann look for the cookies first?” (Eisenmajer & 
Prior, 1991). In the investigation of pragmatic language, TOM has been used as the 
theoretical basis for numerous experiments (Chevallier, Noveck, Happé, & Wilson, 2011; 
Chevallier, Wilson, Happé, & Noveck, 2010; Happé, 1994; Martin & McDonald, 2004; 
Papp, 2006). However, experiments focusing on older children and adolescents on the 
spectrum report mixed results, with some higher-verbal children with autism performing 
the same as typical peers on TOM tasks, at least in experimental conditions (Scheeren et 
al., 2013). Further details about the mixed results in TOM experiments will be discussed 
later in this review. Overall, TOM continues to be a popular theoretical basis for 
explaining the pragmatic language deficits observed in individuals with autism, despite 
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the fact that it does not account for the cognitive profile of individuals with autism, nor 
does it address some of the relative cognitive strengths of people on the spectrum, such as 
those seen in savants. 
Weak Central Coherence Theory 
The Weak Central Coherence Theory (WCC, sometimes called simply “central 
coherence” or CC) is a cognitive theory of autism that suggests that children with autism 
have difficulty with gestalt reasoning and cognitive flexibility. This leads to splinter skills 
such as the ability to notice and remember details but difficulty integrating details into a 
larger context (Happé & Frith, 2006). WCC was originally proposed to explain the 
cognitive profile of individuals with autism, which TOM does not address. Uta Frith first 
suggested that the core deficit in global processing resulted in a deficit in extracting form 
and meaning. Currently, proponents of WCC believe that the deficits in global processing 
result in a cognitive bias towards superior detail processing. The theory focuses on the 
underlying mechanisms that may result in deficits: WCC proponents no longer look to 
the theory to address the core deficits seen in autism, but instead see cognitive bias as a 
facet of cognition that co-exists with other difficulties such as social deficits. Therefore, 
WCC provides a framework to explain the local and global cognitive abilities of people 
on the spectrum, without focusing solely on the deficits. 
Happè and Frith reviewed the experimental literature that supports WCC. In 
summary, they reported that people with autism show a general preference for local 
processing over global processing across a variety of cognitive domains. Children with 
autism are able to successfully complete tasks that benefit from local processing 
strategies across several domains. For example, with regards to music processing, data 
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show that children with autism have superior memory for pitches, enhanced local 
processing of music, and reduced interference from melodic stimuli than typically 
developing peers (Happé & Frith, 2006).  
Local processing preferences were also observed in other cognitive tasks as well. 
The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and the Stroop Task are two cognitive assessment 
activities used to determine how well a person can solve a difficult problem given a set of 
arbitrary rules. Successful completion of these tasks requires global reasoning, such as 
being able to shift attention, and the ability to incorporate new information and discard 
old rules. 
The Wisconsin Card Sorting Task requires participants to sort cards according to 
some unspoken rule that is learned based on a system of feedback from the test 
administrator. Then the rule is changed and the participant must intuit the new rule based 
on the feedback (correct or incorrect sorting of the cards). Individuals with autism have 
shown difficulty in shifting between rules during the card sorting task, suggesting that 
they have difficulty in shifting sets, inhibition, cognitive flexibility, and attention (Happé 
& Frith, 2006).  
The Stroop Task calls for participants to look at words printed in different colors 
and then name the color of a word rather than read the word itself. It requires the 
participant to attend to less salient stimuli (the color) and ignore more salient stimuli (the 
word). Children with autism perform the same as typically developing peers, indicating 
selectively preserved executive functioning (Ozonoff, 1997; Adams & Jarrold, 2009, as 
cited in Kissine, 2012).  
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With regards to language, children with autism show a reduced susceptibility to 
the perceptual illusion known as the McGurk effect, which involves visual interference to 
ambiguous auditory stimuli. Instead, they demonstrated a preference for relying on 
auditory stimuli (Happé & Frith, 2006). Children with autism also have difficulty with 
accurate homograph reading when compared to typical peers (Frith & Snowling, 1983). 
Narrative comprehension is also negatively affected, even when overall language ability 
is robust (Colle et al., 2008; Nuske & Bavin, 2011).  In summary, the WCC literature 
claims that children with autism exhibit good local and poorer global processing of 
stimuli across a range of cognitive domains. 
Often TOM and WCC are presented as at odds with one another, but some 
suggest that they are complementary theories that help describe symptoms along a 
continuum of functioning: TOM attempts to address the social pragmatic difficulties of 
people with autism while WCC attempts to provide a broader cognitive explanation of 
autism (Best et al., 2008). Does this information processing cognitive style extend to 
other cognitive domains as well? 
Executive Functioning Theory  
The Executive Functioning Theory of Autism (EF) claims that deficits seen in 
autism are the result of difficulty with higher order goal-directed behavior. This includes 
inhibition, set shifting, goal setting, working memory, and planning, among others (Russo 
et al., 2007). Difficulties with these behaviors result in the observable behaviors that 
characterize ASD. Proponents of EF claim that these deficits account for the rigidity and 
perseveration characteristic of the disorder (Frith, 2012) and that language deficits are 
secondary to decreased executive functioning. Tasks typically employed to examine 
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executive functioning include the aforementioned Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, The 
Stroop Task, and a Go/No-Go testing paradigm. 
In the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, individuals with autism have shown 
difficulty in shifting between rules, which according to WCC suggests that they have 
difficulty in shifting sets, with inhibition, with cognitive flexibility, and with attention. 
EF proponents agree with this interpretation. However, individuals with autism seem to 
have some skills that are preserved or better than typical children, such as the ability to 
focus on a less-salient aspect of the stimulus when completing the Stroop Task. 
Performance of children on the spectrum while completing the Stroop Task was 
comparable with typically developing peers, which suggests that inhibition of automatic 
processes is spared in children with autism older than age six (Eskes et al., 1990; Russell 
et al., 1999). Therefore, it appears executive functioning must be preserved in some way.  
In a Go/No-Go paradigm participants are taught to respond when a stimulus is 
shown. For example, when they see a triangle, they must push a button on the right, and 
when they see a circle, they push a button on the left. The rules are then changed, and 
participants must inhibit the old, learned responses and use a new set of responses to the 
same visual stimuli (for example, pushing the right button when they see a circle). During 
this task, individuals with autism showed marked difficulties when they were asked to 
shift to a new set of rules, but once the rules were learned they were able to overcome 
perseverative responses and respond correctly. This is in contrast to previous research 
conducted within a WCC framework, which claimed children with autism had difficulty 
with inhibition. Instead, children with autism had difficulty in set shifting, rather than a 
difficulty in overall inhibition per se (Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994; Robinson et al., 2009). 
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EF proponents suggest that a disordered pattern of executive functioning exists for 
individuals with autism. Conflicting results previously reported in the literature can be 
accounted for by examining executive functioning as most of the earlier studies did not 
account for executive function abilities. They also claim that executive function profiles 
can differentiate between autism and other developmental disorders such as attention 
deficit disorder (ADD or ADHD) (Hill, 2004). In short, EF aims to explain the broader 
pattern of behaviors found in autism by examining executive functioning abilities, which 
then lead to strengths and weaknesses in information processing. 
Many experimental tasks reported in the literature utilize these theories as the 
basis for their investigations, with a much greater focus on Theory of Mind and Weak 
Central Coherence Theory than on Executive Function Theory. It is interesting to note 
that there is overlap in the interpretation of experimental results between WCC and EF 
theories, with each claiming that a particular experimental result supports their theory. 
Perhaps this points towards an evolution in the theoretical approaches to experimental 
design, from a very specific focus on a particular deficit in social cognition (e.g., TOM) 
to a broader cognitive profile (e.g., EF), which accounts for strengths as well as deficits.  
Pellicano conducted one of the only studies to date that attempted to find 
relationships among these three theories. Thirty-seven children with autism participated 
in a longitudinal study examining cognitive abilities over the course of three years. At 
each time point, participants were assessed in general cognitive ability, theory of mind 
ability, executive function, and central coherence. Results showed that EF and WCC 
abilities were predictive of later TOM ability. However, there was no relationship 
between early TOM skills and later executive control. In addition, there were no links 
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between executive functioning and central coherence, which suggests that WCC and EF 
are independent in the case of autism (Pellicano, 2010). The relationship between early 
WCC and EF abilities with later TOM abilities may provide some insight into the early 
conflicting results in the literature as to the nature of cognitive abilities of children with 
autism since studies constructed with a narrow theoretical focus only addressed those 
particular cognitive abilities. 
In summary, TOM, WCC, and EF should not be seen as competing accounts of 
autism, but rather part of a broader attempt to describe the abilities and difficulties of 
individuals with autism. However, one cannot consider cognition without also 
considering the neural substrates that give rise to those cognitive abilities. Could there 
also be neuroanatomical differences that could help explain the difference in function 
between ASD and typical cognitive abilities? Also, could neuroanatomy and neural 
function provide some explanation for the constellation of symptoms in autism? In the 
next section I will report on the neuroanatomical and structural differences between 
individuals with ASD and typical controls.  
Autism and Brain Function 
Better understanding of the neurological underpinnings of autism could help 
clinicians, families, and people with autism identify individuals at risk early, develop 
more targeted interventions, and provide some anatomical explanation for the 
constellation of symptoms. It may also reveal some objective measure that can be used 
early in life to identify infants at risk for developing autism. If diagnosis could be made 
before behavioral symptoms emerged, preventative therapies could be implemented to 
assuage future deficits in social and language abilities. So, is there a “location” for 
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autism? Or, is there some pattern of neural functioning that may explain autism 
symptoms? I will explore the literature regarding the brain regions implicated in autism 
and their possible effects on cognitive function. 
One method of measuring brain function is the use of functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI). In fMRI studies, participants engage in a task while their 
brain activity is measured over a period of time. fMRI is relatively good at detecting the 
location of brain activity but not particularly accurate at capturing the temporal nature of 
those changes.  
In the past ten years, functional studies have revealed a number of surprising facts 
about brain function and structure in neurotypical participants with regards to social 
cognitive tasks, such as determining how someone might feel in a particular situation or 
determining whether someone’s knowledge is different than one’s own. Brain areas that 
are recruited when considering social cognitive tasks are generally situated along the 
right superior temporal gyrus (STG) and include brain areas immediately adjacent to it 
such as the posterior temporal cortex (perceiving the form of human bodies), posterior 
superior temporal sulcus (interpreting motions in terms of goals), the temporal-parietal 
junction (reasoning regarding mental states), ventral-medial prefrontal cortex (implicated 
in empathy), and the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (triadic relations between two minds 
and an object, shared attention and cooperative goals) (Saxe, 2006).  
In particular, typical populations recruit two areas of the brain that are uniquely 
involved in pragmatic language and social cognition tasks: the right temporal-parietal 
junction (rTPJ) and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) (Van Overwalle, 2009). Of these 
two areas, the rTPJ appears to be exclusively engaged when performing a Theory of 
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Mind task and determining another person’s thoughts, and it is not engaged when 
participants are asked to attribute other types of information to another person, such as 
subjective feelings (Lombardo, Chakrabarti, Bullmore, & Baron-Cohen, 2011). In 
contrast, the mPFC is utilized when engaged in tasks such as determining how another 
person feels (Saxe, 2006). Social cognition requires coordination and interaction among a 
number of brain regions, with the rTPJ and the mPFC areas of particular importance.  
Are there differences in neuroanatomical structures between typical and autistic 
brains? Redcay (2008) reviewed literature focusing on neuroanatomical studies of 
individuals with autism. She notes the role of the superior temporal gyrus (STG) in 
understanding complex, socially significant input across different modalities. This 
includes not only speech, but also movement and sequences, particularly if they are 
related to complex, socially important contexts. She claims that volumetric and activation 
differences in the STG between neurotypical and autistic populations argue for a 
“location for autism.” O’Connor (2012) examined the same literature and came to the 
conclusion that the evidence regarding differences in sizes of various regions is equivocal 
due to measurement and methodological differences. She states that instead the 
neuroanatomical differences between the two groups extend far beyond the STG and 
incorporate many more systems than just one area of the cortex, therefore arguing against 
a “location” for autism and arguing for systematic differences rather than a singular 
location of difference. 
There is some research that supports the notion of widespread anatomical and 
functional differences, rather than a narrow location for autism. Research shows that 
autistic groups have more diffuse white matter tracts in the superior temporal gyrus and 
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in the brainstem (Noriuchi et al., 2010) and decreased gray matter density in those same 
areas (David et al., 2014). These differences suggest that local connections might be 
overdeveloped while long-range connections (found in white matter tracts) would be 
underdeveloped. Since the superior temporal gyrus and the brainstem are utilized in 
visual attention and auditory processing, it is possible that visual attention and low-level 
auditory attention would be relatively strong abilities: increased gray matter density may 
indicate increased low-level attention, and decreased white matter tracts may result in 
less top-down interference or decreased integration of information with other areas of the 
cortex. This would provide neuroanatomical support for WCC and EF theories, which 
state that individuals with autism tend to focus on local processing of information at the 
expense of global processing. 
David et al. (2014) sought to determine if people with autism demonstrate 
difficulty with visual integration of stimuli alone, as opposed to when stimuli are 
integrated when processing social information. Fifteen adults aged 24-45 years with high 
functioning autism or Asperger’s Syndrome and fourteen typical matched controls 
participated in the study. The experiment consisted of two tasks: perception of global 
motion presented as a visual motion discrimination task, and perception of social motion, 
presented as two circles chasing each other to varying degrees. Results showed that 
during purely visual motion integration tasks, activation in the brains of individuals with 
autism did not differ from activation in typical peers. By contrast, when processing the 
social movement stimuli, individuals with autism did show decreased brain activity in the 
right temporal-parietal junction in the STG. Researchers argued that deficits in social-
perceptual tasks cannot be accounted for by deficits in visual-spatial integration alone, 
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but that social cognition is selectively impaired independently of visual-spatial 
integration. Therefore, David argues that processing differences in the STG do not 
manifest themselves across modalities. That is, neural activation in the brains of autistic 
participants when processing social pragmatic information is different than that of 
neurotypical peers and is different than the activation of other types of temporal 
information. 
Lombardo et al. conducted an fMRI study to determine if neuroanatomical 
biomarkers could be linked to later behavioral outcomes in children with autism. The 
study consisted of four groups of very young children aged 12-48 months: children with 
autism and good language ability (ASD-good), children with autism and low language 
ability (ASD-poor), children with a language disability or non-autism developmental 
delay (LDD), and a typically developing control group (TD). Longitudinal behavioral 
data were also collected every six months for four years to determine if fMRI data alone 
could predict future behavioral and language ability or if some combination of fMRI and 
early behavioral measures would correlate with later outcomes. The fMRI data were 
collected during natural sleep while participants were exposed to three types of speech 
stimuli: complex forward speech, simple forward speech, and backward speech. Results 
showed that fMRI data at age 12 months was correlated with future language ability and 
autism severity. The ASD-good, LDD, and TD groups all showed broad activation during 
language input perception in the left perisylvian temporo-parietal areas including the 
superior temporal gyrus and sulcus, as compared to resting state measures. The ASD-
poor group, however, showed hypo-activation in those same regions as compared to the 
other groups, with little lateralization to the left hemisphere, and instead more broadly 
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distributed activation across both temporal lobes. These broad pattern differences are in 
contrast to Redcay and the “location for autism” hypothesis, and instead support the 
diffuse differences postulated by O’Connor. In addition to activation comparison, 
analyses were performed to determine if activation patterns differed among groups. There 
were significant differences in the pattern of activation of the ASD-poor group versus the 
others, but no significant differences found among the TD, ASD-good, and LDD groups. 
Additional analyses also showed that the clinical intake measures (expressive and 
receptive language, IQ, and autism measures), when combined with fMRI data regarding 
activation of the superior temporal cortex, were sufficient in predicting language 
outcomes in each of the groups at the conclusion of the study (Lombardo et al., 2015). 
Lombardo and colleagues claim to have found neuroimaging biomarkers that, when 
combined with clinical measures, can account for language performance outcomes later 
in life. This may provide guidelines for early diagnosis and treatment for children at risk 
for autism. Overall, these results suggest that language ability, and not necessarily 
diagnostic category, may account for the variability in performance seen in earlier 
studies. 
As previously noted, behavioral studies focusing on WCC show a preference 
among those with autism for local processing over global processing. Is there also 
neuroanatomical evidence of a preference for local processing in functional imaging 
studies when interpreting pragmatic language? There is a very small but emerging body 
of literature in this area. In an fMRI study with French participants, Hesling and 
colleagues (2010) measured the brain activity of high-functioning children with autism 
and IQ matched controls. Participants performed a number of receptive and expressive 
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prosodic tasks culled from the French version of the Profiling Elements of Prosody in 
Speech-Communication (PEPS-C) (Peppé & Wells, 1999). The PEPS-C is a clinical tool 
designed to assess prosody perception and production. The experimental tasks focused on 
communicative functions that required either top-down or bottom-up processing of 
prosodic contours. A top-down task might be differentiating between a statement and a 
question or chunking groups of items in a list, whereas a bottom-up task might require 
being able to hum a prosodic contour in the absence of linguistic context. In addition, 
participants listened to a 90-second long connected speech stimulus with high degrees of 
prosodic information. Researchers found that children with high-functioning autism had 
difficulty with both activation and deactivation of cortical areas involved in perceiving 
prosody with linguistic meaning as compared to IQ matched controls but performed the 
same as the control groups in matching non-linguistic prosodic contours. This implies 
that the acoustic perception of the contours is not impaired per se, but the interpretation 
of the linguistic meaning of prosodic contours is. Specifically, the left supra-marginal 
gyrus is recruited more in high-functioning autism than in controls. This is interesting as 
this area is recruited at the start of the phonological loop, implying that perhaps the 
autistic group relied more on working memory for comprehension than controls. In 
addition, there was less deactivation in the right anterior cingulate, the left precuneus, and 
the left middle frontal gyrus in autistic participants as compared to controls. Overall, 
results suggest a different network of activation for processing and producing prosodic 
speech. These differences correlated with behavioral measures on prosodic production 
and comprehension (Hesling et al., 2010).  
46 
Pantelis, Byrge, Tyszka, Adolphs, and Kennedy (2015) used fMRI in an effort to 
better understand brain activation of adults with autism and typical controls when 
processing more complex pragmatic information. In their study, researchers presented 
clips from the popular satirical TV show The Office to adult participants while their brain 
activity was recorded via fMRI. Participants were not asked to make overt judgments or 
answer questions about the video clip; they were only asked to watch. This allowed the 
researchers to assess processing in real time rather than rely on post-perceptual answers 
to questions, which may recruit additional cognitive resources. They found that overall, 
autistic participants had significantly less activation in the rTPJ and the right superior 
temporal sulcus (rSTS), but there weren’t significant differences in activation between 
groups in other brain areas. This supports the findings in Lombardo et al. but with more 
natural stimuli. However, since researchers did not ask participants about their 
impressions of the clips one cannot determine if these differences result in interpretations 
that are different than those of typical peers. Although the literature is thin on this topic, 
early results seem to support a difference in neurological processing between autistic and 
control groups and that differences are found across the cortex, and not necessarily in one 
location. 
Functional and behavioral studies focusing on brain structure and function have 
found significant differences in the structure of key areas of the brain important in speech 
perception and social interaction that have an effect on the development of language and 
social competency. Despite this, there is not enough research to allow researchers to draw 
a direct line from brain structure and function to behaviors. Continuing the investigation 
into activation patterns first reported by Lombardo and colleagues (2015), particularly in 
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the realm of higher cognitive functions such as receptive and expressive language, could 
provide more information to clinicians and researchers as they develop a phenotype 
system for classifying the cognitive abilities of people with autism. 
The evidence suggests that individuals with autism have different 
neuroanatomical structures than typically developing peers, although the exact nature of 
those differences and the implications for behavioral manifestations are still being 
debated. Of course, neuroanatomical studies are far too complicated and expensive to be 
performed for diagnostic purposes. 
Therefore, diagnostic teams must continue to rely on behavioral observations to 
make diagnoses. It is particularly interesting to note that the majority of the criteria in the 
DSM-V are concerned with expressive language, whereas any consideration of language 
comprehension is minimal. Criterion II.B only mentions “[l]anguage as used in social 
communication,” and while social communication certainly includes pragmatic language, 
it is not explicitly stated. The only criterion to mention language comprehension does so 
indirectly, in I.B.2: “marked impairment in the ability to initiate or sustain a conversation 
with others.” Even this, however, is insufficient. Marked impairment in initiating or 
sustaining a conversation may be caused by a wide variety of language difficulties, such 
as struggles in word finding, semantic or syntactic difficulties, attention difficulties, 
anxiety, and other issues. Moreover, the broad expressive language criteria in an autism 
diagnosis do not distinguish between individuals who may have autism and those who are 
non-verbal but exhibit other difficulties with expressive language, such as Childhood 
Apraxia of Speech. Given that expressive language, pragmatic language competency and 
social interaction are components of several diagnostic criteria for autism, it is crucial 
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that researchers find ways to better describe the language abilities of children on the 
spectrum so that appropriate interventions may be developed and administered. The 
following section will focus on pragmatic language comprehension and the ways in 
which it intersects with social-pragmatic competence.  
Pragmatic language comprehension in children with autism 
Post-perceptual judgment tasks and general pragmatic language 
comprehension 
One of the first studies to investigate how children understood the thoughts and 
feelings of characters (based on TOM) was conducted by Happé (1994). These stories 
were referred to as “Strange Stories,” because the characters say or do things that they do 
not mean literally. Groups of children with autism, mental handicaps, and typical 
development, as well as typical adults, read short stories which required them to 
understand the characters’ motivations. Stories varied with regards to which aspect of 
TOM they were designed to address (lie, white lie, joke, pretend, misunderstanding, 
persuasion, appearance/reality, figure of speech, sarcasm, forgetting, double-bluff, or 
contrary emotions) or by an outcome that could best be explained by a physical or 
mechanical cause. For example, a character in a story may be helping her friend buy a 
dress. When the friend asks the character what she thinks of the dress, the character says, 
“It’s a pretty dress.” The participants were then asked if what the character said was true 
and then why the character did what they did. Different justifications of the character’s 
response were coded for the varying degrees of pragmatic inference required to make 
such a justification. For example, if the justification included a reference to mental state 
(“He was just joking”) this was coded as a pragmatic inference about character 
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motivation, whereas responses that addressed physical state or a non-mental event were 
coded as physical state responses, such as “the dress was fancy.” 
Results showed that children with autism had significantly more difficulty with 
stories that required the reader to understand that the characters were joking, lying, or 
persuading and that these differences varied within the autism group by ability on other 
TOM tasks. Happé cautioned that the numbers were too small to draw conclusions as to 
why this might be, but this study was one of the first to illustrate the difficulties children 
with autism might have regarding making pragmatic judgments and that there was 
variability within the autistic group. 
In an update to Happé’s Strange Story experiment, Kaland et al. (2005) 
administered the same stories to children ages 9-20 with Asperger’s Syndrome and 
normal intelligence or to children with typical development. Their results supported 
Happé’s earlier findings: that even with normal IQ, children with Asperger’s Syndrome 
still have difficulty justifying mental state responses in the stories and using context to 
make those judgments, despite having normal to excellent verbal ability. 
Loukusa et al. (2007) continued to look at how children with autism are able to 
use context when understanding pragmatic language, but did so from the perspective of 
Relevance Theory (see Sperber & Wilson, 2001) and with a developmental course in 
mind. In short, Relevance Theory is a Neo-Gricean theory of pragmatic language that 
states listeners use inferential processes in communication by using context to reach 
conclusions about some utterance in relation to the communicative partner. That is, a 
person must make some sort of automatic evaluation of the relevance information has in 
any particular context in order to establish a social purpose to the communication. In their 
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experiment, Loukusa and colleagues employed a similar paradigm to Happé, but instead 
of written stories Finnish children were shown pictures and given verbal explanations of 
the picture. Participants were then asked a question about the story and to justify their 
answers. The questions varied from picture to picture and they targeted varying levels of 
contextual processing. The question types included reference, enrichment (whereby the 
children had to enrich the meaning of an utterance based on contextual information), 
implicature (the child had to connect world knowledge to the verbal and/or visual 
context), routines (utilizing contextual information in everyday routines), and feelings 
(addressing the feelings of a character in the scenarios). A picture for routine might show 
a child getting out of bed, pushing covers off the bed, and still wearing his pajamas. The 
participant is asked, “What time might it be?” The correct answer would be “morning” 
while an incorrect answer might be “noon”. Participants were divided into younger high-
functioning autism/Asperger’s Syndrome (HFA/AS) with an age range of 7-9 years, older 
HFA/AS with an age range of 10-12 years, and a typically developing control group with 
an age range of 7-9 years. Researchers were interested in comparing responses between 
younger HFA/AS and older HFA/AS, and whether their performances differed from 
those of the typical controls. As predicted, results showed that both younger and older 
children with HFA/AS performed worse than the typical controls, with younger children 
with HFA/AS showing greater variability. However, the authors also noted that the 
performance of the older children with HFA/AS fell between that of the typical controls 
and that of the younger children with HFA/AS, bringing into question the notion that 
children with ASD were disordered, suggesting that they were perhaps instead delayed. 
In addition, both groups of children with HFA/AS had difficulty explaining their answers. 
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This study shows that using context to make inferences is not limited to reading stories or 
to story-telling paradigms, but that even with visual supports children with HFA/AS still 
have difficulty answering inference questions, indicating a cognitive difference when 
making gestalt, story-based pragmatic inferences. Whether the difficulty is due to a 
disorder or a delay remains an open question. 
As in the Strange Stories paradigm, Møller-Nielson, Callasen, Mortensen, 
Gottlieb, and Smith (2002) asked participants to listen to stories and answer questions 
about them. However, these new stories were more contextually complex than Happé’s 
Strange Stories as they embedded Theory of Mind tasks into naturalistic stories. First, 
they asked participants to answer questions that require an inference into the physical or 
mental state of some event or person in the story. Then, at the end of each story, the 
participants were asked to answer questions that required understanding of the following 
aspects of pragmatic language: lie, white lie, figure of speech, misunderstanding, double 
bluff, irony, persuasion, contrary emotions, forgetting, jealousy, intentions, empathy, and 
social blunders (Kaland et al., 2002). Researchers measured reaction time as well as the 
number of prompts required of the participant to answer the question. They hypothesized 
that children with autism would have more difficulty with inferential language tasks and 
with understanding the pragmatic language implications of mental state verbs, but not 
more difficulty with integration of prior knowledge, or presuppositions. 
Results showed that children with autism were able to make inferences about 
physical states just as easily as typical peers. They were also able to integrate prior 
knowledge in order to make an inference. However, overall performance correlated with 
verbal IQ, resulting in variability within the group. Although some may argue that 
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deficits were a result of general intelligence, the authors countered this argument with the 
other experimental measures: Children with autism required significantly more prompt 
questions in order to answer mental inference questions and they had longer response 
times. The authors agreed that it was unclear whether this was due to increased 
processing demands or the result of a cognitive style that differed from that of typical 
peers (Kaland et al., 2002). These findings suggest that children with autism require 
increased time and more prompts to interpret social communication that requires the 
rapid integration of context, linguistic input, and prior knowledge, even when the 
eventual answer is correct.  
These studies examined gestalt reasoning of longer narratives. What about more 
specific types of pragmatic linguistic phenomena? Rather than testing a broad range of 
TOM tasks such as those targeted in the Strange Stories, some researchers have focused 
on more specific linguistic tasks that required pragmatic judgment such as mental state 
words, figurative language, pragmatic speech acts, and inferences required for coherence 
(Dennis, Lazenby, & Lockyer, 2001).  
Dennis et al. were interested in how children with autism used and understood 
pragmatic inferences when interpreting multiple meanings of words and mental state 
words both in isolation and in context. They presumed that children with autism would be 
able to make some, but not all, of the inferences required to understand mental state 
words, and that performance would be dependent on the context of the word. They also 
presumed that linguistic and inferential demands would have an effect on the 
performance of the autism group, as compared to their typical counterparts. In other 
words, as the complexity of the inferencing increases, children with ASD will have 
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increased difficulty. Eight children with high-functioning autism or Asperger’s Syndrome 
(AS) and eight matched controls (NT) (mean age 9;9, all with IQs at average or above) 
listened to utterances in structured clinical tasks (administration of subtests of the Test of 
Language Competence – Expanded Edition, by Wiig & Secord, 1985) and were asked to 
point to a picture that best matched the utterance. The subtests were selected to measure 
vocabulary, ambiguity, presupposition, implication, social scripts, metaphors, and speech 
acts. Children were given a series of very short vignettes, usually two sentences long, and 
asked to judge the truth-value of follow-up statements or state what the intention of the 
speaker was. Vocabulary and ambiguity were considered non-inferential language tasks, 
in that to be successful in understanding these utterances the child does not have to make 
a pragmatic judgment to infer speaker meaning. Presupposition, implication, scripts, 
metaphor, and speech acts were considered inferential tasks, as they do require various 
levels of inference of speaker meaning. The researchers asked four research questions: 
Do children with ASD have more difficulty than their typically developing peers in 
performing inferential tasks overall? Can the ASD group make some of the inferences 
required to understand mental-state verbs (such as presupposition) but perhaps not be 
able to understand the implication of those verbs? Do high-functioning children with 
autism have difficulty understanding social scripts, speech acts and figurative language? 
And lastly, does the performance of the ASD group vary in accordance with the 
intentional and linguistic demands of the task?  
Results showed that the ASD group had significantly lower scores on the subtests 
requiring inferencing and the effects sizes increased as the task required more 
inferencing. For example, the effect size for presupposition (that is, identifying 
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information that is presupposed with the use of a mental state verb) was the least and the 
differences were not statistically significant, indicating that children with ASD were 
closer to their neurotypical peers when judging the truth-value of a statement that 
presupposed some state to more complex speech acts having larger effect sizes, with 
metaphor (the ability to interpret idioms) and production of speech acts (intentional acts 
done by a speaker to influence the mental state of the listener) showing the largest effect 
sizes. Researchers concluded that children with autism demonstrated more difficulty 
creating inferences than their typical peers and that the difficulty varied with the 
inferencing demands of the task (Dennis et al., 2001). 
In these studies researchers showed that children with autism have difficulty 
making post-perceptual inferential judgments about pragmatic language in clinical tasks 
and that this difficulty is present despite “normal” IQ. However, given the post-
perceptual nature of these studies and the broad cognitive systems these tasks might 
recruit, it is difficult to determine the timing of comprehension. For example, there was 
no mention of control for prosodic contours that may have been used during the reading 
of the stories. Could a speaker’s prosodic contours have had an effect on performance in 
the task? Perhaps children with autism are able to understand pragmatic language 
components such as prosody and inferences in the moment, but that delayed or abnormal 
global processing (as evidenced in the neuroanatomical literature and the delayed 
reaction times noted in Kaland et al., 2002) impedes final realization in their answers. 
This leaves a few unanswered questions: Can children with autism perceive and 
utilize prosody during comprehension? Can they use visual context to interpret speaker 
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meaning? The following section reports on the experimental literature that focuses on 
more specific aspects of pragmatic language; in particular, scalar inferences and prosody. 
Post-perceptual judgment tasks, scalar inferences, and prosody 
Pragmatic language comprehension requires more than just the gestalt ability to 
demonstrate Theory of Mind by answering first-, second-, and third-order belief tasks. 
Understanding speaker meaning does require the knowledge that other people have 
thoughts different than our own, but it also requires rapid integration of context and 
world knowledge at the word or sentence level. As previously noted, terms like 
“some/all” or “short/tall” are scalar terms that cause the listener to make an inference 
about speaker meaning. These scalar inferences, along with prosody, are two linguistic 
phenomena that influence how a listener interprets an utterance yet are realized at the 
local level and in a relatively short span of time. They can provide some interesting 
insight into the level at which the breakdown of social pragmatic comprehension occurs. 
Scalar inferences like these require the listener to understand what the speaker 
could have said (but did not) and then generate a supposition about the speaker’s intended 
meaning. As previously noted, scalar inferences can be made when a listener hears a 
speaker use the weaker term on a scale. For example, if a friend says, “Have some of the 
cookies,” the use of the term “some” rather than the strong term “all” must have been 
deliberate. That is, if my friend had meant that I could have some, and maybe all of the 
cookies, then she would have said, “Have all of the cookies.” Therefore, when my friend 
invites me to enjoy “some cookies,” I may take one or two, but not the entire plate. This 
pragmatic interpretation is the result of a scalar implicature, and it is different than the 
logical interpretation of the terms where the use of “some” includes “all.” 
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Scalar implicatures are context dependent; they can be calculated by evaluating 
the utterance against some standards that rational speakers employ during conversation, 
and they are cancellable. Some categories that can invoke scalar inferences are scalar 
quantifiers (such as “some/all”), scalar rankings (“junior/senior”), or scalar adjectives 
(“tall/short”). Most scalar inferencing research has been conducted on scalar quantifiers, 
with less attention on scalar ranking or scalar adjectives, and most of it has been 
conducted with adults rather than children.  
Pijnacker, Hagoort, Buitelaar, Teunisse, & Geurts (2009) found that adults with 
high-functioning autism and Asperger’s Syndrome were able to make pragmatic 
inferences with scalar terms as well as their typical peers. In this study, scalar terms such 
as “some” and “or” and their stronger cognates, such as “all” and “and,” were used in 
phrases to talk about members of categories to create four conditions. True universal 
statements are those that are judged as true for all members of the category, such as “all 
sparrows are birds.” Underinformative statements are those where the weaker term in the 
scale (e.g., “some sparrows are birds”) can be understood in two ways: if the participant 
says that the statement is true, then they understood “some” in the logical sense. If the 
participant says the statement is false, they have understood “some” in the pragmatic 
sense. False universal statements are those such as “all birds are sparrows.” And finally, 
true existential statements are those such as “some birds are sparrows.” Individuals 
between the ages of 18 and 40 years with high-functioning autism or Asperger’s 
Syndrome and their age- and verbal IQ-matched peers were asked to read and then judge 
whether or not statements containing scalar terms such as “some” and “or” were true. 
Results showed that individuals with Asperger’s were just as able to interpret the scalar 
57 
terms pragmatically as their typical peers with rates of logical interpretations that did not 
differ between the groups. Individuals with high-functioning autism were more likely to 
make logical interpretations of the terms, and the rate of logical responses increased as 
verbal IQ decreased. There was no such correlation with logical responses in the 
Asperger or typical groups. In addition, the high-functioning autism group took longer to 
read the sentences and longer to respond, indicating that the task was more difficult for 
them. There was no difference in reading or response times between the Asperger’s and 
typical groups. These results suggest that understanding scalar terms might rely more on 
overall language ability rather than pragmatic language ability. This is particularly 
interesting, as a main deficit in autism is the use of language in social situations. This 
may be due to adults having more cognitive resources to successfully interpret scalar 
terms. Or, perhaps they have learned the meaning of these terms due to experience. The 
next question one might ask would be regarding the developmental course of interpreting 
scalar terms.  
Chevallier, Wilson, Happé, and Novek (2010) adapted Pijnacker and colleagues’ 
study and included adolescents with autism. They investigated how children with autism 
utilize scalar implicatures when performing a post-perceptual truth judgment task of 
“and” and “or.” For example, participants were shown two pictures, one of a horse and 
one of a goat, and then heard the statement, “There is a horse or a goat.” The connector 
“or” would either be said in a neutral tone or with a pitch accent, with the implication that 
“or” produced with a prosodic focus would license the interpretation of “or” to mean “not 
both,” whereas “or” said with neutral prosody would entail the interpretation of “one or 
both.” Participants then judged whether or not the statement is true (that is, perform a 
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truth-value judgment). In the neutral condition, either a “true” or “false” response would 
be correct: if participants answered “true,”, then they understood the utterance via the 
literal, semantic meaning. If, instead, they answered “false,” then they accessed a scalar 
inference about the pragmatic meaning of “or” (that only one of the two pictures should 
be visible). Researchers predicted that children with autism would have more difficulty 
licensing the scalar inference due to a difficulty accessing the pragmatically licensed 
meaning of “or” even when it was stressed. 
However, they found that there were no differences in the rate of pragmatic 
inference between the groups; children responded in similar fashion regardless of the 
group they were in. However, when verbal IQ was used to create groups and the rate of 
response was analyzed, they found a correlation between verbal IQ and the rate of 
pragmatic inference responses only in the autism group.  
In addition to examining the rate of pragmatic responses to the “or” condition, 
Chevallier and colleagues looked at whether response time was correlated with diagnostic 
group (autism/typical), verbal IQ, or response type (pragmatic responders vs. literal 
responders). They found no differences in the response times among those comparisons. 
In summary, despite the hypothesis that children with autism would have increased 
difficulty licensing a pragmatic interpretation of “or” in a truth-value judgment task, they 
were able to do so at similar rates as their typical peers (Chevallier et al., 2010).  
Similar to the findings of Pijnacker et al. (2009), this suggests that perhaps this 
kind of “pragmatic judgment” relies on verbal ability (as measured by verbal IQ) rather 
than pragmatic language competency. That is, the task itself was a truth-value judgment 
task: participants were asked, after listening to a sentence and looking at pictures, to 
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decide whether or not a statement was true. This may allow adults and adolescents with 
autism extra time to utilize other cognitive resources than those a typical child may use to 
arrive at the correct answer. One might expect to find a difference in response times 
between the groups; however, that was not reported. This could be due to the nature of 
the post-perceptual judgment task, allowing the participants just enough time to arrive at 
the right answer, even if the response times were not statistically different. It is also 
possible that adults and adolescents with autism have learned an alternate route to arrive 
at the correct response and they are able to use that route in the same amount of time as a 
typical child would.  
In a follow-up investigation to Chevallier et al., Su and Su (2015) investigated if 
there is a developmental course to the comprehension of logical terms, and if there are 
differences in acquisition of logical terms between typical and autism populations in 
Mandarin Chinese. In their study, 28 children (younger group n = 14 ages 4;2 to 8;5, 
older group n = 14 ages 9;4-15;2) with ASD and 28 age- and verbal IQ-matched typical 
controls were asked to complete a TVJT. Rather than having the children interact with a 
researcher (which may have confounded response times and results due to anxiety on part 
of the participant in having to interact with an unfamiliar adult), the experiment was 
presented on a computer and children provided their response orally (with two 
exceptions: one typed out his response on a computer and another wrote it on a piece of 
paper). The experimental tasks were presented as short stories about characters 
possessing objects in the guise of a game orchestrated by Santa Claus. First the 
participants saw a picture of children with objects and heard a statement such as, “Some 
of the children found sea snails.” Participants were then asked to say whether this was 
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true. The scalar terms “some,” and “every … or” were embedded in sentences such as the 
one above while children looked at a picture, creating six conditions. Then, Santa would 
reward the children in the picture for finding objects, and the participants then judged a 
sentence such as, “Some children found a sea snail,” or “Every child got a sea star 
(starfish) or a shell.” In the “some” underinformative condition, the picture showed four 
children with shells and the participants heard, “Some of the children got shells.” In this 
case, the logical interpretation would lead to a “true” judgment. In the “every” and “or” 
underinformative conditions, participants would see a photo of the children, each of 
whom had a sea star and a shell. The participants would accept the statement “Every 
child got a sea star or a shell” if they interpreted the utterance logically as “one, and 
possibly both,” and would reject the statement if they interpreted the utterance as 
pragmatically underinformative, as “one, but not both.” 
Results showed that there was a significant difference in judgment (reported as 
percent correct) based on diagnostic group, age, and condition, as well as an interaction 
between diagnostic group and condition and age and condition. Participants in the 
younger TD group were significantly less likely to render logical judgments in the some-
underinformative condition versus the some-true and some-false conditions. They were 
also less likely to render logical judgments in the every-or-underinformative condition 
than in the every-or-false conditions. Although they were less likely to also do so in the 
every-or-true condition, the significance was marginal and overall the performance of 
children with autism was not statistically significant from their typical peers, indicating 
that they were able to generate scalar implicatures for terms such as “some/all.”  
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In summary, these two studies have shown that children with autism were able to 
interpret scalar terms such as “some/all” in a similar manner as their typical peers. Age 
and verbal IQ seem to be important factors when determining performance, and not 
autism diagnosis, at least when understanding scalar quantifiers. These narrow 
investigations into logical and pragmatic interpretations of scalar quantifiers show that 
perhaps the deficits found in ASD actually mask some relative strengths in pragmatic 
language abilities, at least when interpreting scalar terms. 
Although to my knowledge there are no studies that assess how children with 
autism interpret focus stress, previous research has shown a facilitative effect of focus 
with typical adults and children (Ito et al., 2012; Weber, Grice, et al., 2006). So, what is 
known about how children with autism comprehend prosody, in general?  
There is a small body of literature that has used behavioral and language 
assessment measures to assess the more general receptive and expressive prosodic 
abilities of children with autism. Two studies employed similar paradigms to examine 
this domain. McCann, Peppé, Gibbon, O’Hare, and Rutherford (2007) conducted one of 
the first behavioral assessments in an attempt to quantify the nature of the receptive and 
expressive prosodic abilities of children with autism. A battery of language assessments 
was administered to thirty-one children in the United Kingdom, and results showed that 
children with autism had difficulty with expressive prosody (as in using prosody to 
imitate questions, for example), but that it was tightly correlated with receptive language 
ability. In addition, Peppé, Hare, and Rutherford (2007) employed clinical measures to 
determine the nature of expressive and receptive prosodic language in children with 
62 
autism, and also found that receptive and expressive prosodic language abilities 
correlated with each other and with overall language ability.  
Ploog, Banerjee, and Brooks (2009) conducted an experiment to determine if 
individuals with ASD could discriminate different prosodic contours. They were 
interested in whether difficulties with expressive prosody were the result of a decreased 
ability to perceive the contours. In this experiment, children classified as having 
moderate- to low-functioning autism were compared to typical peers on their ability to 
differentiate between two types of prosodic contours: those used to mark statements and 
those used to mark questions. To do this, stimuli were presented in a game format in 
which the children, seated in front of a computer, were taught to click on different 
rewards based on the prosodic contour of the sentence. Stimuli consisted of sentences 
either uttered as a statement (with flat intonation) or as a question (with rising 
intonation.) The game paradigm helped reinforce desired behaviors, kept the attention of 
the participants, and provided investigators with a method for examining the perceptual 
abilities of children with ASD who did not have the language ability to answer complex 
questions or interpret linguistically complex stimuli. Participants then heard utterances 
and maneuvered a cartoon bird to one pile of nuts or to another. When the bird was facing 
a pile, they heard either the statement sentence, which would be reinforced with a short 
video clip, or a question sentence, which would not be reinforced. The experimental 
design allowed the participants to be successfully rewarded if they were able to 
distinguish prosodic contours marking statements and questions, or distinguish the literal 
content of the two sentences.  
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Results showed that children with autism and lower language abilities were just as 
able as typical peers to distinguish between sentences by prosodic contour as well as 
between sentences with different lexical content but the same prosodic contours. This 
suggests that children with autism can perceive differences in prosodic contours in 
linguistic contexts. This contradicts the previous findings of McCann and colleagues and 
Peppé and colleagues, who found that language ability and prosodic interpretation were 
tightly correlated.  
Chevallier, Novek, Happé, and Wilson (2011) asked participants to extract 
speaker state based on the prosodic information in the utterance. The authors classified 
the stimuli based on the amount of “mind reading” required to identify them. The stimuli 
were organized into five levels: manners of speech (such as shouting), physical states 
(such as tiredness), basic emotions (such as anger or fear), social emotions (such as 
shame or embarrassment), and speaker’s attitude (such as irony). These levels progressed 
from basic detection of acoustical information (e.g., sound level) to more complex 
Theory of Mind tasks (such as being able to understand how context and speaker internal 
state leads to a feeling of embarrassment on the part of the speaker). Three experiments 
were conducted to determine whether children with autism differed from typical peers in 
the processing of the stimuli: experiment one assessed their ability to identify the manner 
of speech used in an utterance, and experiments two and three sought to identify what 
compensatory measures children with autism might use in order to complete these tasks.  
In experiment one, listeners heard a statement such as the following, “Ben hears a 
big noise from his neighbor’s house. He says: What is that noise?” Participants are then 
given two choices: “Ben is scared. There might be a burglar in his neighbor’s house” and 
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“Ben is angry. He doesn’t like it when his neighbors are too noisy” (Chevallier et al., 
2011). The stimuli vary in the manner in which Ben utters his question, and participants 
must choose the reason for Ben’s reaction. Along with accuracy, reaction times were 
measured. The authors hypothesized that children with autism would have lower 
accuracy rates and slower reaction times. 
However, results showed that both typical children and children with autism 
showed similar patterns: the more inferencing required to identify the speaker’s state, the 
slower the reaction times and the lower the accuracy; there was no effect of group on the 
performance measures. The authors presumed that people with autism were able to 
recruit additional processing techniques in order to arrive at accuracy rates that were on 
par with typical peers. The question remained as to what kinds of compensatory routes 
may have been employed, or if processing was similar to peers.  
To test this, they employed a dual processing task, with the theory that increased 
processing demands would slow down the compensatory processing that children with 
autism might employ when detecting emotional states in spoken language, and that these 
alternate processing abilities would be correlated with verbal ability. Children were asked 
to listen for the presence of the suffix “-ing” in a short story containing emotional 
content, and they were then asked what they thought the emotional content was. 
Although the “-ing” task was presented to the participants as the primary task, the 
emotional identification was the actual experimental task and “-ing” identification the 
distractor. Contrary to their hypothesis, results showed no difference between children 
with autism and their peers and that there was no correlation between performance on the 
task and verbal ability for either group. 
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In the third experiment the researchers modified the dual processing task to make 
it even more difficult. Listeners were asked to listen for the number of times the “t” 
sound was heard in the story, and then asked about the emotional content. As in the 
previous experiments, the pattern of responses was the same and there was no difference 
between children with autism and their typical peers.  
The results reported above show that the ability to interpret prosodic contours is 
correlated with language ability rather than with a diagnosis of autism. It is worth noting 
that this particular task is a forced-choice task, thereby providing considerable structure 
for the response. Participants only have to decide between two answers, rather than 
generate an answer on their own. The high success rates reported in this experiment may 
have had to do with the structured nature of the response rather than innate ability. 
What about children with relatively high language abilities and a diagnosis of 
autism (commonly referred to as high-functioning autism, or HFA)? Diehl, Bennetto, 
Watson, Gunlogson, and McDonough (2008) adapted a post-perceptual psycholinguistic 
task to examine how well children with autism understand prosody used for chunking 
information together. In this experiment, children were shown a board with a variety of 
objects and shapes on it. They were then given instructions for moving the objects around 
the board. For example, the sentence, “Put the dog in the basket on the star,” can be 
interpreted in several different ways: the speaker could be referring to a dog that is not 
currently in the basket and instructing the listener to put that dog into a basket that is 
currently on a star (“Put [the dog in the basket][on the star.]”) (brackets indicate phrases 
chunked together by using prosody). This is considered noun phrase (NP) attachment 
because the prepositional phrase “in the basket” is attached to the noun “dog,” identifying 
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the target as the dog that is in a basket. Alternately, if the speaker chunks the information 
differently it may mean that the participant is supposed put the stuffed dog into the basket 
on a star (“Put the dog [in the basket on the star].”) This is considered verb phrase (VP) 
attachment because it attaches the phrase “in the basket on the star” to the verb “put,” 
indicating the location that the dog should be placed. In addition to the “prosody” 
condition just described, participants heard sentences with unambiguous syntax in which 
the prosody was not informative, as in “[Put the dog in the basket that’s on the star.]” As 
a control, researchers presented a condition that had both syntactic and prosodic cues 
(syntax + prosody), such as, “[Put the dog that’s in the basket] [on the star].” In this way, 
researchers could compare the performance of the groups across a variety of informative 
conditions. However, it is worth nothing that in the third condition, prosody information 
was always congruent with syntactic information; that is, there was no condition where 
prosody was incongruent with the syntactic information. Filler items included directions 
such as, “Count the number of stars on the board.” Accuracy was measured by the 
number of correct movements towards the target, although “correct movement” was not 
defined. There was no main effect for group (HFA and typical), but there was an effect of 
sentence type, wherein each group had more difficulty with the prosody-only condition as 
compared to the other two conditions. In addition, both groups were marginally better in 
the syntax + prosody condition than in the syntax-only condition, perhaps indicating that 
the presence of congruent prosody made it easier to interpret the instructions correctly 
even when the syntax was unambiguous.  
There was an interaction between group and sentence type, wherein HFA children 
demonstrated more difficulty in the prosody-only condition than the typical children. 
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However, HFA children performed similarly to typical peers on the syntax-only and 
syntax + prosody conditions. Comparisons were made between NP and VP attachment 
sentences for each group to determine if these effects are the result of some inherent 
difficulty based on group, or due to VP attachment bias (Trueswell et al., 1993), which 
was also observed in piloting data in this study. Researchers found that participants in 
both groups performed better on VP attachment type sentences in the prosody-only 
condition. They also found an interaction between group and attachment type: the HFA 
group was significantly worse on trials with NP attachment, but performed similarly as 
typical controls in VP attachment trials. In the syntax-only condition, participants in both 
groups showed a preference for VP attachment but there was no group by attachment 
interaction. In the syntax + prosody condition, there was no main effect of attachment 
type nor was there an interaction between group and attachment type.  
Because the age range of the participants was relatively broad for the purpose of 
exploring a developmental course of prosodic comprehension, post hoc analyses were 
conducted to examine the relationship between the experimental task and age. There was 
a marginal effect of age in the prosody-only condition, but no effects were seen in the 
syntax-only or the prosody + syntax conditions. Because of the interaction between group 
and attachment type in the prosody-only condition, analyses were conducted between NP 
and VP attachment types. Analyses showed that there was a marginal correlation between 
NP attachment and accuracy with HFA participants, but it failed to reach significance. 
There was no correlation between age and performance in either group in the VP 
attachment trials. These limited results should be cautiously interpreted, and larger-scale 
studies should explore this in greater detail. 
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In summary, investigators found that children with HFA had greater difficulty 
correctly interpreting sentences with NP attachment when prosody was the only 
disambiguating information available. When syntax was available to disambiguate the 
sentence, HFA children and typical controls performed at about the same rates of 
accuracy across attachment types. However, the nature of the instructions themselves 
may have biased the results somewhat. Verbs like “put” in the sentence, “Put the dog in 
the basket on the star,” require a NP or prepositional phrase (PP) construction. This 
would make VP attachment more frequent than NP attachment and could mean that the 
increased accuracy in VP attachment trials is due to frequency effects and a possible 
corresponding developmental delay, and not necessarily due to disordered processing on 
the part of the HFA participants. Since VP bias is a concern, it is possible that HFA 
participants might have difficulty cancelling the VP bias to allow for the NP 
interpretation. This could support the Weak Central Coherence theory of autism as it 
indicates difficulties with gestalt reasoning hindering the ability to revise the overall 
meaning of the sentence. On the other hand, it could be simply the result of a 
developmental delay in being able to use prosody to disambiguate the sentence, rather 
than some inherent deficit in comprehending prosody or a preference for local 
attachment. More evidence is needed in order to tease apart each of these explanations. 
The study did not detail the exact kind of prosodic contour used in order to create 
the chunking effect in the stimuli. There are no acoustic details that describe how the 
three conditions differed from each other, and it would be informative to know exactly 
what kinds of prosodic contours the participants heard, and the types and lengths of 
pauses used in the chunking of the sentence. In addition, all that is known is how children 
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ultimately reach their final interpretations of the instruction, and not the time-course of 
interpretation.  
The post-perceptual judgment tasks discussed above present conflicting evidence 
of the abilities of children with autism when it comes to pragmatic language processing. 
This is confounded by the different types of prosody and pragmatic language investigated 
in each study, the variety of theoretical frameworks used to frame experiments, the 
classification and selection of individuals with autism for these studies (low vs. highly 
verbal, for example), and the possible cognitive and linguistic demands of the tasks 
themselves that may have a developmental course. 
Although post-perceptual experimental tasks provide important information about 
the language abilities of the participants, they fail to distinguish between local and global 
processing of language in real time, as they measure only the outcome of the processing. 
Real-time tasks, such as eye tracking, may reveal different patterns of processing for 
children with autism, even though the given answer ends up being the same at the end of 
the task. In this way, researchers can begin to investigate whether children with autism 
process pragmatic language in a manner that is different than that of their typical peers. 
Real-time measures and general pragmatic language comprehension 
As noted previously, real-time measures of language processing include 
electrophysiological methods (such as ERP); the use of eye tracking and visual world 
paradigms; and “listening while looking” (LWL) which uses video recordings and human 
coders to determine the location and latency of eye gaze. Research using these techniques 
to investigate the pragmatic language processing of children is relatively new. These real-
time measures provide greater detail about how children with autism process language 
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and might provide researchers and clinicians with additional information about the ways 
in which their processing differs from that of typical peers. This increased granularity 
might help explain how language processing is affected by autism, even in areas of 
pragmatic language that currently appear to be similar to typical peers when investigated 
using post-perceptual judgment tasks, and they might provide insight into some of the 
variability seen in performance within the population of individuals with autism. Eye 
tracking research presumes that eye movements are closely related to spoken language 
comprehension (Cooper, 1974; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995; 
cf. Huettig et al., 2011) and its relative ease makes it a useful tool when researching the 
language processing abilities of special populations such as autism (Boraston & 
Blakemore, 2007; Nelson, 2012).  
Eye tracking experiments have been conducted to examine a variety of cognitive 
tasks that are correlated with the TOM abilities of children with autism, including joint 
attention (see Navab, Gillespie-Lynch, Johnson, Sigman, & Hutman, 2012; Swanson & 
Siller, 2013), observation of social scenes (Grossman et al., 2010; Klin et al., 2002; 
Norbury et al., 2009; Rice et al., 2012), and watching movies and cartoons (Riby & 
Hancock, 2009). However, these experiments examined broad language comprehension 
abilities, not necessarily specific aspects of pragmatic language, though a subset of 
studies has done so. 
One of the first papers to report the use of eye tracking to examine the language 
processing abilities of adolescent children with autism focused on how context influences 
spoken word comprehension (Brock et al., 2008). Researchers studied adolescent boys 
(average age 15;0 years) split into three groups by diagnosis: those with autism (ASD); 
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those with specific language impairment (SLI); and those with no diagnosis (typical). 
They were shown four pictures on a computer screen while recorded words were played 
through headphones. Listeners were asked to push a button if they saw a picture on the 
computer screen that matched the thing being talked about in the recorded sentence. The 
sentence was either contextually constrained at the verb or was contextually ambiguous. 
The display pictures varied by phonological onset (words that began with the same 
phoneme were considered to be phonological competitors) and the conditions 
manipulated whether the target object was present or absent in the visual scene. For 
example, listeners were shown pictures of a pill, a hammer, a hamster, and a medal, and 
were instructed to push a button if they heard a word that matched one of the pictures. 
The contextually constrained sentence was, “Joe stroked the hamster quietly,” where the 
verb “stroked” constrains the possible target nouns to animate objects (in this case, the 
hamster). The contextually ambiguous sentences was, “Joe chose the hamster 
reluctantly.” In this sentence the verb “chose” could apply to any of the four objects. In 
particular, “hammer” is also a possible target since it shares the same phonological onset 
as “hamster”—the target noun is not disambiguated until the second syllable in 
“hamster.” Half of the time the target object was not present in the visual scene. 
Researchers analyzed eye movements to determine if looks to the phonological 
competitor (hamster) varied across conditions and between groups.  
Accuracy was close to ceiling, indicating that the participants were attending to 
the sentence. Anticipatory eye movements to the target in sentences with semantically 
constrained verbs were observed but there was no difference between groups, and there 
was no significant effect of language ability. Eye movements to the phonological 
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competitors were influenced by sentence type: fixations to the phonological competitor 
increased in target-absent condition, but there was an interaction with language ability. In 
constrained sentences, participants with poorer language ability spent more time fixating 
on the competitor. Group membership did not have an effect on further analysis, 
indicating that children with autism were just as capable of utilizing context to mediate 
eye movements as typical peers. Researchers concluded that children with autism do 
process spoken words in context but that it was language ability, and not the autism 
diagnosis per se, that had a greater influence in whether or not the children were able to 
suppress phonological competition when a phonological competitor was present in the 
visual scene. This finding does not support the Weak Central Coherence theory. 
In one of the few studies to use eye gaze analysis with younger children, Venker, 
Eernisse, Saffran, and Weismer (2013) conducted a LWL experiment with children 
between three and six years old, with and without autism. The experiment was designed 
to explore four main areas of inquiry: the nature of real-time comprehension of words; 
the relationships between individual offline language measures (scores from standardized 
language assessments) and fixation data; the relationship between latency and word 
types; and finally, whether LWL is a feasible paradigm for examining the language 
comprehension of children with autism. Looks were recorded via video camera and 
coded by hand for both latency and accuracy of fixation to target. Results showed that 
children were more likely to look at objects when they were named versus baseline but 
that there was a great deal of variability in the accuracy and latency of fixation to target, 
indicating heterogeneity in the group. Offline language measures and latency of fixation 
on the target were the only two factors to be highly correlated with accuracy. Words 
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learned earlier in life were fixated on faster. These two findings mirror results from 
experiments with typical children, suggesting that young children with autism do learn 
words in a similar fashion as typical children. These results indicate that children with 
autism do have the ability to use context to facilitate language comprehension at the 
sentence level and at least on a semantic level. The question remains whether this ability 
is also present in more specific aspects of pragmatic language processing as well, such as 
with scalar inferences and prosody. 
Real-time measures, scalar inferences, and prosody 
To the best of my knowledge there are currently no studies that report on the 
comprehension of scalar inferences, scalar rankings, or scalar adjectives with children 
with autism using real-time measures. However, there are a few studies that look at how 
children with autism process prosody. 
Prosody changes the literal meaning of an utterance so that the listener must 
determine what the speaker intended to convey outside the literal meaning. Since autism 
is a disorder of pragmatic language comprehension and use, investigating prosody 
comprehension in this population would further our understanding of the language 
abilities of people with autism. Reports of disordered receptive and expressive prosody in 
children with autism have been noted for quite some time (Shriberg et al., 2001), but 
experimental investigations using real-time measures with autistic children are few in 
number. 
Korpilahti et al. (2007) conducted one such study, using real-time measures to 
elucidate the nature of pragmatic language processing in children with autism, 
specifically emotional content. To investigate low-level prosody processing at the 
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neurophysiological level in individuals with autism, researchers conducted an event 
related potential (ERP) study to examine the detection of affective prosody. Auditory 
brain responses were monitored in thirteen boys with Asperger’s Syndrome and 
compared to the responses of fourteen neurotypical boys. In addition, the fathers of the 
boys in each group participated in the experiment. Participants heard utterances such as, 
“Anna! Give it to me,” with emotional connotations as implied by the prosodic contour. 
One contour implied a “tender” or caring tone and the other an angry tone. When 
compared to the typical controls, children with Asperger’s Syndrome (AS) demonstrated 
atypical brain activity with increased activity in the right hemisphere, suggesting that 
processing of prosodic contours, at least at the brain-response level, occurs in an atypical 
fashion. Similar patterns were also found in the fathers of boys with AS when compared 
to the fathers of boys in the control group. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
the message is lost or otherwise not processed, but only that it may be processed in an 
unusual way. It was not reported whether or not the participants could accurately describe 
the mood of the utterances. That said, other studies have reported that individuals with 
autism have difficulty reporting the emotional content of utterances (Chevallier et al., 
2011; Järvinen-Pasley et al., 2008; Peppé et al., 2007), and this study provides evidence 
of a neurological underpinning of abnormal processing of emotional content in 
utterances. 
LWL experiments have also been used to examine if children with high-
functioning autism use prosodic boundaries in chunking to disambiguate syntactically 
ambiguous sentences (Diehl et al., 2014). In this paper, the authors sought to tease apart 
some of the conflicting evidence reviewed above. Specifically, they sought to determine 
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if individuals with autism use prosody to disambiguate syntactically ambiguous sentences 
as their typical peers do, if individuals with autism use prosody as quickly as their 
typically developing peers do, if there is a developmental course to the use of prosody for 
disambiguation from childhood to early adolescence, and whether the prosodic 
comprehension abilities of children in both groups are affected by perseveration. 
To do this, they followed the procedure outlined in Snedeker and Yuan (2008). In 
that experiment researchers asked typical four- to six-year olds to follow directions, such 
as, “You can feel the frog with the feather.” Fixation patterns were recorded to determine 
whether children could utilize prosodic and lexical cues to resolve ambiguity. Snedeker 
and Yuan found that prosody strongly influenced the interpretation of the utterance. The 
current experiment recruited two groups of participants with autism (ASD) and without 
autism (TD: a younger group between the ages of 8-12 and an older group between the 
ages of 13-17. Participants were matched across full scale IQ, verbal IQ, and receptive 
language scores with no participant having a standardized score below 80. Participants 
were seated in front of a visual display containing four objects: a target instrument, a 
target animal holding a small version of the target instrument, a distractor instrument, and 
a distractor animal holding a small version of the distractor instrument. Prosody was 
manipulated to bias the listener towards one of the two possible interpretations of the 
sentence: A modifier reading (“[You can feel] [the frog with the feather]”) would invoke 
noun phrase (NP) attachment to the verb phrase (VP), meaning that the phrase “with the 
feather” would describe the frog, resulting in fewer looks to the target object (the lone 
feather) and instead to the target animal holding a miniature version of the target 
instrument. An instrument reading (“[You can feel the frog][with the feather]”) would 
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invoke a syntactic analysis with a verb phrase (VP) attachment or the prepositional 
phrase (PP), meaning that the participant could use the feather to feel the frog, and 
thereby increase looks to the target object (the feather). The two prosody types were 
presented in blocks. This was done to determine if perseveration causes children to be 
less accurate in their responses to the stimuli. Order of prosody type was counterbalanced 
across participants so that half of the participants heard the modifier reading first and half 
heard the instrument reading first. Target object and instrument were counterbalanced 
within blocks.  
Results were analyzed in two ways: the first analysis focused on the resulting 
linguistic interpretation as determined by the action performed, and the second set of 
analyses focused on the time-course of interpretation as determined by fixation location 
on the display. As expected, participants were more likely to perform an instrument 
action in trials where there was instrument prosody and much less likely to perform a 
modifier action, and vice versa: there was a main effect of prosody with teens where 
adolescents with ASD performed as well as TD peers. However, with younger children 
there was an interaction of diagnosis and prosody: children with ASD performed at 
chance in the second block of trials, indicating they had difficulty shifting their 
interpretation of the utterance from one block to the next. Reaction time analysis showed 
no effect of age or diagnosis, indicating that both groups performed at about the same 
speed.  
The time-course analysis was conducted on three major regions of the utterance: 
the “with window,” the “early PP window,” the “late PP window,” as well as the period 
where the child completed the action after the utterance. In Block 1, analyses revealed 
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that children with ASD were faster than their TD peers to fixate on the target instrument 
in the instrument prosody conditions earlier in the utterance (“with window”). However, 
in Block 2 there was an interaction between prosody and age in early trials, but children 
demonstrated a “reverse prosody” effect where participants who heard modifier prosody 
looked at the target instrument more often than those who heard instrument prosody. This 
implies that children rely on their experiences in the previous block to facilitate 
interpretation early on in Block 2 in the early “with window.” The effect disappears in 
analyses of later windows and as the children complete more trials. Accuracy increases as 
Block 2 continues for both groups. TD children eventually demonstrate patterns of 
fixations that reflect the prosody of the stimulus and ASD children have more difficulty 
with that revision, resulting in overall performance that is at chance. ASD children are 
not simply answering the same as they did in Block 1, but they have both correct and 
incorrect answers in Block 2, which brings their performance down to chance levels.  
Researchers concluded that children with ASD are just as able as their TD peers 
to use prosody to disambiguate syntactically ambiguous sentences, and can even do so 
faster than the TD group in the first Block. Their difficulty in Block 2 is characterized by 
a perseverance of old prosodic information from Block 1 persisting into the first few 
trials of block two, wherein they slowly revise their expectations. They also concluded 
that developmental differences were noted in both the TD and ASD group and were 
primarily responsible for the ability to shift interpretation of the ambiguous syntax. TD 
and ASD children initially misinterpreted the prosody at the start of Block 2, whereas the 
teens recovered quickly. Lastly, children with ASD had more difficulty overcoming the 
interference found in Block 2 as compared to their TD peers. 
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One point to note about the methods of analysis is that when participants used the 
small object on the target animal to perform the action, their responses were grouped with 
actions where the participants used the full-sized object. One would then expect the 
fixation counts to be altered, as one would presume that fixations to the target object 
would be reduced and fixations to the target animal would be inflated. The authors noted 
that the same analysis procedures were followed as outlined in Snedeker and Yuan 
(2008). In that paper, researchers dissuaded participants from using the small instrument 
to perform the actions and directed their attention to the larger objects during the practice 
trials. They then reported a small number of trials resulted in the participants using the 
small object to perform the action (4.8%) and therefore grouped small instrument and 
target instrument trials together for analysis, claiming it had little to no effect on the 
analyses. However, in the current paper, such details are omitted, which is particularly 
surprising since the 2014 paper is interested in the processing differences between a 
typical and disordered group. It would be beneficial to know if there were a percentage of 
trials where the smaller instrument was used and if there was a difference between 
groups. This might provide descriptive evidence of differences in pragmatic language 
processing between the groups. 
Overall, there is little evidence that shows children with autism have difficulty 
understanding prosodic aspects of language. Behavioral and clinical measures, which 
require post-perceptual responses, show that children with autism have some difficulty 
understanding inferences and that the difficulty varies based on the degree of inferencing 
required. Understanding scalar terms such as “and/or” depends on verbal ability, is not 
necessarily tied to autism, and these results were elicited with post-perceptual tasks rather 
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than real-time measures. The emotional content of an utterance, as imparted by prosody, 
was processed differently but there was no explicit measure of how the participants 
interpreted that information in the end. One of the only experiments to examine prosody 
comprehension only looked at chunking. To my knowledge there are no studies that look 
specifically at how children with autism interpret prosodic focus, nor are there studies 
that look at how children with autism interpret scalar adjectives in real time. There is an 
opportunity for researchers to use real-time measures, such as eye tracking, to examine 
the prosodic focus and scalar adjective comprehension abilities of children with autism. 
Fortunately, these two areas of pragmatic language have been examined using eye 
tracking in the typical adult population. 
Prosodic focus and scalar adjectives 
As previously noted, two aspects of pragmatic language have not been 
investigated with children with autism: prosodic focus and scalar adjectives. What is 
known about comprehension of these areas? Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers, and Carlson 
(1999) conducted a series of experiments to determine how adult listeners interpret 
contextually ambiguous instructions in real time. Specifically, they were interested in 
whether or not prosodic focus has an effect on latency to fixation on target and whether 
or not visual context has an effect on how listeners interpret instructions: does the listener 
suspend comprehension strategies until they encounter the head noun, or do they interpret 
an utterance in the moment with the information available to them? Is language 
comprehension incremental when the visual stimuli are less predictable, and do listeners 
utilize visual context to determine meaning? 
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Previously, Eberhard, Spivey-Knowlton, Sedivy, and Tanenhaus (1995) showed 
that listeners rapidly used prosodic, contextual, and linguistic cues to process ambiguous 
linguistic input. However, they used stimuli that were fairly easy to predict, with three 
adjectives used to describe the single target object (e.g., “smooth red circle”). Sedivy and 
colleagues (1999) aimed to replicate Eberhard et al.’s results with less predictable stimuli 
in Experiment 1A. To do this, the stimuli contained only one adjective, as compared to 
the three adjective stimuli used in Eberhard et al. The single intersective adjective varied 
in feature. The same object appeared in numerous trials, and different labels might be 
used to describe it so that listeners would have to rely on the linguistic and contextual 
information to determine the target. Half of the target instructions contained a color 
adjective, and half included an adjective that referred to the material or the shape of the 
object. Results showed that when participants heard the adjective, they considered all 
objects in the display that shared the qualities of the adjective. In conditions where the 
target object was disambiguated later in the utterance (the late disambiguation condition), 
participants were more likely to fixate on the competitor object in the display than non-
competitor objects.  
In Experiment 1B, focus stress was introduced on the adjective to determine 
whether it is necessary to create a contrastive interpretation of adjectival modifiers, or if 
use of an adjective was sufficient. To do this, participants saw a display with four objects: 
two objects comprising a contrastive pair, a third object that shared a feature such as 
color with one of the contrastive pair objects, and a distractor object (see the appendix for 
an illustration of the display). For example, a display may contain a contrastive pair of 
objects such as a red comb and a blue comb, and a blue ball (which shares the same color 
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as the blue comb. The speaker would tell the participant to touch the member of the 
contrastive set of objects that did not have the same color as the other object—in this 
case, the red comb. In this way, when the second instruction is heard, the listener will 
experience a period of ambiguity: will the speaker talk about the other member of the 
contrastive set (the blue comb), or the unrealted object that shares a feature (the blue 
ball)? In addition, the instructions were spoken with or without focus stress on the 
adjective. Given that the instructions were presented while the participant was looking at 
a visual display, one can reasonably assume that the object, as well as the adjective to 
describe the object, were in psychological focus (refer to Gundel, 1999). However, with 
the addition of focus stress on the adjective, it was possible that the speaker would invoke 
a Gricean Maxim of Relevance (Grice, 1989) thereby forcing the listener to generate an 
implicature about the intention of the speaker. Researchers predicted that latencies would 
be faster with focus than in the non-prosodic condition due to the listener inferring the 
speaker’s underlying motivation for applying prosodic focus to the adjective. In addition, 
the target object was manipulated so that in half of the trials the target was the member of 
the contrastive pair of objects, and in half of the trials the target was the non-contrast 
object of the same color. The referent manipulation was combined with the manipulation 
of focus stress, to create four conditions: focus-contrast referent, focus non-contrast 
referent, no-focus contrast referent, and no-focus non-contrast referent. Contrast stress 
was used on the adjective and followed a L+H* accent as denoted by ToBI notation 
(Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg, 1990).  
Experiments 1A and 1B were presented concurrently. In addition, Sedivy and 
colleagues held non-critical trials where no relevant contrast was present, where 
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modifiers signaled contrastive information, and where contrastive objects were present in 
the display but the adjectives used to refer to them were not related to the contrast 
between the objects. In this way, it would be difficult for participants to anticipate what 
the speaker might talk about in any given trial. 
Results of Experiment 1B showed that listeners were more likely to interpret 
modified nouns contrastively but that the presence of contrastive stress did not affect the 
latency to fixation on the target object. There was a main effect of referent, so that the 
participants were faster to fixate on the contrastive target object than to non-contrastive 
objects in the scene. In short, listeners prioritized visual context over prosodic context 
when listening to the instructions. 
In summary, both experiments show that listeners interpret spoken utterances 
incrementally. The addition of focus stress on the adjective did not decrease the latency 
to fixation. This may be due to a ceiling effect, whereby the focus stress does not provide 
any additional beneficial information to the listener and is discarded in the interpretation. 
In addition, the adjectives used are intersective and it is possible to determine the referent 
(or referents) based solely on the semantic information of the adjective itself.  
Experiment 1 demonstrated that the incremental comprehension of language 
occurred with highly predictable utterances. Does incremental comprehension of 
utterances continue when the utterances are less predictable? To explore this, Sedivy and 
colleagues conducted an additional experiment that used scalar adjectives. Experiment 2 
followed the same procedures as Experiment 1, except the displays contained objects 
described by scalar adjectives and the visual context of the utterance was manipulated. 
For example, participants would see a display with a tall glass, a short glass, a tall pitcher, 
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and a distractor object. As in Experiment 1, they would hear two instructions, but in this 
experiment the critical instruction was the first instruction. The participant would hear, 
“Pick up the tall glass and put it below the pitcher.” The scalar adjectives used in the 
instructions included each end of the scale (for example, tall/short). Filler trials included 
adjectives that did not invoke a contrastive set or adjectives that referenced some other 
aspect of the object (e.g., material) to minimize participants’ use of strategies upon seeing 
two objects that could be a contrastive set. Presence of the contrastive object was 
manipulated so that it was either present or absent. The typicality of the target object was 
also manipulated such that the target object was either a good exemplar of a “tall” glass 
or a poor exemplar, perhaps a glass that wasn’t particularly tall, but was taller than the 
contrastive glass. By doing so, the interpretation of the scalar adjective might differ based 
on whether or not the target object was a good exemplar and whether or not there was a 
contrastive object to compare it to. The fitness of the target object varied so that there 
were four conditions: good exemplar, poor exemplar, and the presence or absence of a 
competitor object (such as a tall pitcher). 
Experimenters were concerned that familiarity with the display would affect the 
typicality of the objects, as typicality is a function of a learned exemplar stored in 
memory, whereas contrast depends on the environment in which the object is observed. 
Therefore they hypothesized that typicality effects would be weakened and contrast 
effects strengthened with longer preview time. Half the participants were in the “long 
display condition”: participants were allowed to watch the display set-up and therefore 
had a high degree of familiarity with the objects. The other half of the participants were 
in the “short display condition” and were asked to keep their eyes closed during display 
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set-up. This resulted in a 2x2x2 manipulation of conditions (typicality, presence of 
contrast object, and preview times). 
Results showed that there was a main effect of typicality, with good exemplars 
resulting in shorter latencies to fixation to target than the poor exemplars. There was also 
a main effect of contrast where displays that included a contrasting object resulted in 
shorter latencies than those with no contrastive object, indicating that listeners interpreted 
the scalar adjectives pragmatically. Lastly, there was a main effect of display time: 
shorter latencies were calculated in conditions where subjects were allowed to preview 
the display, supporting the hypothesis that contrast is contextually bound. The 
interactions between factors were not significant. 
The proportion of trials that contained a look to the contrasting object (or to the 
location of the unrelated object in conditions with no contrast) was the dependent 
measure used. There was a main effect of display time, where participants looked at non-
target objects more frequently when they had a shorter preview time. There was also a 
main effect of contrast, where more trials contained a look to the contrast object when it 
contrasted with the target object. The effect of typicality was marginal by subjects and 
items. There was an interaction between contrast and display time, where contrast was 
more salient when participants had a longer preview time, and therefore were more 
familiar with the objects in the display. 
In the good exemplar/contrast condition participants fixated on the target earlier 
in the utterance than the other three conditions, indicating that participants were able to 
anticipate the target object early in the utterance and well before the head noun was 
heard. When the exemplar was poor but presented with a contrastive object, the 
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proportion of looks to the target did not rise until just before the onset of the noun, 
indicating that participants were not sure of the target noun given the visual context of the 
utterance, and inhibited guesses regarding the target object until they heard the head 
noun. When there was no contrastive object but the exemplar was good, participants were 
more likely to look at the target earlier, but also looked at the competitor, perhaps relying 
on the semantic information for interpretation rather than visual context. And lastly, in 
the poor exemplar/no contrast condition, participants relied on semantic information and 
looked at the distractor object earlier in the utterance than the target object until the offset 
of the head noun, implying that listeners incorrectly guessed the target object because the 
adjective better described the competitor object than the target object.  
In summary, Experiment 2 demonstrated that even when the adjectives rely on the 
noun for their interpretation listeners rapidly and incrementally interpret an utterance 
using visual context to inform comprehension. Listeners have a preference for 
understanding scalar adjectives and the modified noun as being part of a contrastive pair 
as demonstrated by earlier first looks to the target object. What was not clear is whether 
the eye tracking analyses included data from both the short and long preview time trials.  
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate a listener’s preference for interpreting 
adjectives contrastively and incrementally. However, the authors note that adjective + 
noun phrases prefaced with the definite article presuppose the existence of the object; one 
would not use “the” if the object was not relevant to the task. This presupposition may 
indicate to the listener that the information following is “old” information rather than 
“new” and that this marks the head noun as old information in the discourse. When the 
object is presumed to exist and is considered old information in discourse, this may 
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maximize the effect of the contrastive manipulation and that incremental interpretation is 
driven by the definite article and not the experimental manipulations per se. In 
Experiment 3, researchers sought to better understand the contextual effects of the 
experimental manipulations by using the indefinite article in the instructions by asking 
participants, “Is there a_____?” by decoupling typicality and contrast manipulations from 
the definite article.  
Results showed that the presence of a contrasting object greatly reduced typicality 
effects, indicating that listeners were able to adjust their interpretation of the adjective in 
real-time based on the visual context. Analysis of the percentage of “no” responses 
showed that there was a main effect of contrast and a main effect of typicality as well as 
an interaction, where stronger effects of typicality were seen in conditions with no 
contrast. Overall, the pattern of fixations was similar as those seen in Experiment 2, 
indicating that the presupposition of existence of the object did not affect the incremental 
nature of language comprehension. 
The results from this series of experiments show that listeners understand 
language as it unfolds and, at least in the case of prosodic focus and scalar adjectives, the 
generation of the implicature is not delayed. This lends support to the theory that 
language comprehension is incremental and is influenced by context even when 
pragmatic inferencing is required.  
It is important to note several limitations of this paper. The visual contexts in 
these experiments are tightly controlled and do not mirror “real world” listening per se. 
The listener is able to restrict his use of world knowledge to the set of objects before him, 
possibly speeding comprehension. In addition, Sedivy and colleagues note that these 
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experiments make use of conversational implicatures, and so their results illustrate that 
these kinds of pragmatic language comprehension can occur in real time, but that other, 
more complex types of pragmatic language comprehension (e.g., metaphors) might occur 
later. That is, the listener is not required to make the kinds of pragmatic guesses that she 
might be required to make during conversation when the referents are much larger in 
number, contextually situated in a time over the course of a conversation, and require 
rapid online processing of not only Gricean rules of conversation but also awareness of 
violations of these rules and adjustment of interpretations. This would support results in 
subsequent studies addressing the pragmatic language abilities of children with autism.  
Although Sedivy and colleagues report no evidence to support their hypothesis 
that contrastive stress, or focus, on the adjective might speed fixation to a target, this may 
be because they analyzed results from the onset of the head noun. Indeed, in a German-
language follow-up study, Weber, Braun, and Crocker (2006) found that focus does 
speed fixations to the target noun when measured from the onset of the adjective and 
when preview time of the objects is limited, indicating that listeners do make use of 
prosodic focus when focusing their attention on the target object.  
Despite the limitations of Sedivy et al.’s study, it is intriguing to consider how 
children with autism would perform on these same pragmatic language tasks. Do children 
with autism generate implicatures in a similar fashion? Is there some difference in how 
they process this information, even if they arrive at the correct answer? To better 
understand the pragmatic language abilities of children with autism, researchers should 
investigate how children with autism process prosodic focus or scalar adjectives, and 
whether their performance would differ from that of typical peers.  
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Summary of the Literature 
Autism is a disorder of social pragmatic language functioning with a basis in 
neuroanatomical function and variability in severity and ability. Pragmatic language 
research has shown that children with autism have difficulties with some aspects of 
pragmatic language, but they also demonstrate some surprising relative strengths. This 
suggests that perhaps not all pragmatic language tasks are equal. Scalar adjectives and 
prosodic focus require pragmatic inferencing in order to understand the speaker’s 
meaning, but to date no studies have been conducted with children with autism into these 
areas.  
The literature shows that children with autism have delayed reaction times. If 
children with autism demonstrate difficulty generating the necessary implicatures to 
understand prosodic focus on intersective adjectives and to understand scalar adjectives 
in ambiguous visual contexts, then the TOM theory of autism would suggest that this is 
due to an inherent difficulty with inferring the intentions of the speaker. These difficulties 
could also be explained by WCC, which would suggest difficulties with global 
processing and gestalt reasoning. This result would be agnostic regarding Executive 
Function Theory, as this task is not designed to test EF per se.  
If the differences demonstrated by children with autism include faster responses, 
then this would not support a TOM basis for this kind of language comprehension, but 
speeded responses could be a result of a relative strength in local processing as advocated 
by WCC. This would indicate that these aspects of pragmatic language do not require 
global processing in order to successfully understand the speaker, implying that some 
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types of pragmatic processing rely on linguistic knowledge rather than social pragmatic 
knowledge.  
If, instead, children with autism perform the same as typical peers, this would 
suggest that these inferences are generated locally and quickly, and do not require 
inferring mental states as suggested by TOM or gestalt reasoning as suggested by WCC, 
nor would it support EF as they would perform the same as successful as typical children 
who presumably have normal executive functioning ability. In short, this result would 
support the notion that these kinds of pragmatic inferences rely on linguistic ability and 
local processing rather than social-pragmatic ability and global processing. 
The research questions are:  
• Do children with autism comprehend prosody and scalar adjectives in 
ambiguous visual contexts while interpreting speaker meaning in real-
time? 
o H10: The response times for the trial and to fixate on the target for 
children with ASD do not differ from peers. 
o H1a: The response times for the trial and to fixate on the target for 
children with ASD do differ from peers. 
• Does language ability have an effect on response times for fixations? 
o H20: Children with lower scores on language tests do not 
demonstrate slower response times or fixation latency to target 
objects than those with higher scores. 
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o H2a: Children with lower scores on language tests do demonstrate 
slower response times or fixation latency to target objects than 




These experiments closely resemble those reported in Sedivy et al. (1999) and 
Weber, Braun, and Crocker (2006). In general, significant modifications to the 
experimental methods included the following: the use of images on a computer screen 
rather than real objects on a table as stimuli, the use of recorded stimuli as opposed to 
real-time spoken stimuli to control for speaker variation from trial to trial and to ensure 
standardization of the auditory input, and the use of colorized photos as opposed to either 
real objects (Sedivy et al.) or line drawings of objects (Weber, Braun and Crocker), and 
the recruitment of children with and without autism.  Further details regarding the 
creation of the stimuli and the modifications to the procedures follow. 
Participants 
The Institutional Review Board at the University of Massachusetts – Amherst 
granted approval for recruitment of participants. Thirteen children between the ages of 
nine and 12 with a clinical diagnosis of autism and 18 typically developing peers were 
recruited from the surrounding Western Massachusetts community via flyers and Internet 
postings. Participant exclusion criteria for the proposed study were: a) history of hearing 
loss; b) English as a second language after age three, c) severe language delay or 
disorder, d) color blindness, or e) cranio-facial abnormalities. Inclusion criteria were a) 
between the ages of 9;0 and 12;11, b) a diagnosis of autism or Asperger’s Syndrome, or 
be typically developing with no language delay, c) English as primary language, and d) 
normal hearing. Vision was normal or corrected with glasses. Parental consent and child 
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assent were obtained prior to participation in the study. Participants were compensated 
with a $50 gift card for their participation and verbally debriefed after their session was 
finished. 
Experimental procedures 
The investigation consisted of two main parts: an eye tracking task and language 
measures. Participants in both groups completed the eye tracking portion of the 
experiment first, then completed the language measures. Participants were offered the 
opportunity to take breaks at any time. The length of the sessions was, on average, 90 
minutes. 
Stimuli and experimental conditions 
A list of adjective and noun combinations was created by this author, reflecting 
the Sedivy et al. stimuli. Images were then created, either from searching the internet 
using the adjective + noun combination. Images used pictured the objects on a white 
background. All images were saved as jpegs and formatted so that they were 300x300 
pixels per inch, with the object in the center of the white field. 
To ensure that the images selected were good exemplars of the target adjective 
and noun combinations, a norming study was conducted with twenty undergraduates at 
the University of Massachusetts-Amherst. Participants were asked to select the best 
descriptor for each of the scalar adjective and noun combinations, and to rank whether 
they agreed or disagreed with the intersective adjective and noun combination. Figure 1 
in the appendices lists the results. Scalar adjective and noun combinations that were 
ranked either as the target phrase (e.g. short glass) or the neutral phrase (“glass”) were 
selected. Any combinations that had judgments that fell outside of those parameters were 
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evaluated and discarded if the judgments were not consistent or not considered true scalar 
adjectives. For example, “inflated/deflated” wasn’t considered a true scalar adjective, and 
“deep/shallow water” elicited many other descriptions, such as scuba diver or pool. For 
the intersective adjective and noun combinations, all of the presented combinations were 
ranked as “agree”, “disagree”, or “other”. All of the intersective adjective and noun 
combinations were ranked as agree at least 80% of the time, with most other ranking 
being a disagreement on the use of “glass” vs. “cup”, or a judgment on the color. It is 
worth noting that color perception was not controlled for in the norming study. 
Nonetheless, the photos judged in the norming study to be good exemplars of the target 
phrases were included in the study. This resulted in Experiment 1 containing stimuli 
representing combs, drinking glasses, spoons, balls, combined with the colors red, 
orange, yellow, blue, green, and pink. Experiment 2 stimuli were constructed from photos 
representing a three-step continuum of the following adjectives: tall/short, rough/smooth, 
narrow/wide, dirty/clean, big/small, shiny/dull, old/new. Then the appropriate adjective 
was combined with one of the following nouns: drinking glasses, rocks, book, pitcher, 
rocks, pillow, shoe, ball, plate, spoon, noodles, tape, marker. In addition, non-target 
instructions for Experiment 2 included adjective and noun combinations that were found 
in Experiment 1 as well as novel combinations. The final stimuli are listed in the 
appendix.  
This resulted in four conditions for each experiment, for a total of eight conditions 
overall. The stimuli were organized in a randomized, counterbalanced block design. 
Individual trials were balanced for scalar property/color, target, and position of the target 
of the instruction on the screen to minimize use of strategies (such as guessing where the 
94 
target object might be located or drawing inferences about the target color or property.) 
All of the trials for both experiments were controlled for location of the target and 
location of the distractor and/or competitor objects, with the chance of the target 
appearing in any one of the four quadrants was 25%. Each of the four lists contained six 
trials of each of the eight conditions, resulting in 48 experimental trials per list. Each 
participant saw one of the four lists, resulting each participant seeing the same eight 
practice trials and then 48 experimental trials that differed across lists.   
Visual Stimuli 
Visual stimuli consisted of a 3x3 grid with one picture at each of the corners and a 
fixation cross in the middle. The visual stimuli were created in Adobe Photoshop and 
saved as jpegs with a resolution of 72 pixels per inch. The overall dimension of the 
display images was 1024 x 768 pixels, the same resolution as the display monitor. Each 
display had four pictures (target, contrast object, distractor object, and a foil) in each 
quadrant with a fixation cross in the middle (see Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendix).  
Auditory Stimuli 
Auditory stimuli were recorded by the author in a sound-proof booth used for 
audiological testing and voice analysis using Audacity Software v. 1.3.13 at a sampling 
rate of 32000 Hz. Each instruction was saved as an individual file. For Experiment 1, 
prosodic contours were added to the neutral recording of the phrase in Praat (Boersma & 
Weenink, 2013). For Experiment 1 target instructions focus stress was added to the 
adjective by manipulating the fundamental frequency to approximate a L+H* prosodic 
contour (Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg, 1990). The target phrase was the same length 
between the stressed and unstressed versions of the instruction.  
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Eye tracking procedures 
Participants were seated comfortably in front of an SR Research Eyelink 1000 
using a desktop mount. Participants were seated on a chair at a table with the computer 
monitor approximately 50 cm away. The desktop mount was approximately 40 cm from 
the participant’s face. A black-and-white bullseye style sticker was placed on the 
participant’s forehead to monitor head position. Retinal and corneal infra-red reflections 
were used to calculate eye-fixation position relative to the computer screen. Participants 
used the computer mouse to click on the objects during the experiment. Monocular eye 
movements were recorded at 250 Hz and viewing was binocular. Participants completed 
a 9-point calibration procedure during which they heard a series of beeps and were asked 
to look at dots on the screen when they appeared. This procedure was completed twice: 
once for calibration and once for validation. When calibration met the standard criteria of 
the software, the experiment began. Participants’ eye movements were recorded while 
pre-recorded instructions were delivered via headphones. Eight practice trials were 
completed at the beginning to ensure participants could work the controls of the computer 
(a computer mouse with two buttons) and adjust the volume as necessary. Drift correction 
was conducted after each trial. 
Participants were instructed to listen to the stimuli and then click on the object 
mentioned. Each trial consisted of two instructions. After the conclusion of the trial, a 
fixation cross would appear in order to conduct the drift correction. Once the participant 
had focused on the cross, the next trial would begin. Both experiments were run 
concurrently; each served as filler for the other. 
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During the experiment time stamps for each trial were time-locked to the onset of 
audio stimuli. Fixation location and duration, saccade direction and duration, mouse-click 
location and time, and overall length of each trial were recorded. Eyelink DataViewer 
(SR Research, Missisagua, Ontario, CA) was used to generate a fixation report, and 
statistical analyses were conducted in R using R Studio version 1.0.143 and used to report 
the variables below. Analysis of fixations began at the onset of the adjective. Post-hoc 
analysis calculated the proportion of fixations on each of the four objects and a fifth 
“other” category to capture fixations on areas of the screen that were not objects. 
Accuracy was determined by location of mouse click and the location of the target object 
for each trial. Response time was measured from milliseconds from the onset of the trial 
to the mouse-click. 
Experimental conditions 
 The image was displayed for 250 ms before the onset of instructions. Experiment 
1 was designed to examine the effects of prosodic focus and visual context on real-time 
language comprehension. Stimuli for the intersective adjectives condition consisted of 16 
picturable nouns and six color adjectives. The instructions varied by the presence or 
absence of prosodic focus on the adjective and whether or not the target object was a 
member of the contrastive pair. For example, in Experiment 1, participants saw four 
objects: a red glass, a blue ball, a blue glass, and a distractor object. The first instruction 
was, “Click on the red glass”; then after a mouse click by the participant, the participant 
heard the second instruction, “Now, click on the blue [noun].” Prosodic focus on the 
adjective in the second instruction was either present or absent. In the “+ focus” 
conditions, listeners heard the second instruction with a Low-to-High (L+H*) rising pitch 
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accent on the adjective (Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg, 1990). In conditions where there 
was no focus (“- focus”), the adjective was spoken in a neutral prosody. In order to create 
prosodic focus neutral sentences were manipulated in the computer program Praat 
(Boersma & Weenink, 2013) to produce a second version of the sentence with L+H* 
prosodic contours on the adjective. This was done to ensure that words earlier in the 
carrier phrase would not carry prosodic cues that participants might use to anticipate 
contrastive stress on the adjective.  
The target object (“adjective noun” in the second instruction) varied across 
conditions. In the “+ contrast” conditions, listeners were asked to click on the object that 
was a member of the contrastive pair (in the previous example, this is the “blue glass”). 
In the “- contrast” conditions listeners were asked to click on the non-contrastive item 
(the “blue ball”). These manipulations resulted in four conditions for Experiment 1: + 
focus + contrastive target, - focus + contrastive target, + focus - contrastive target, - focus 
- contrastive target. Conditions for Experiment 1 are listed in Table 1 of the Appendix.  
Experiment 2 was designed to determine how listeners interpret scalar adjectives 
in four different visual conditions. It consisted of seven pairs of scalar adjectives 
representing relative ends of a scale (tall/short, wide/narrow, fat/thin, big/small, 
clean/dirty, new/old, shiny/dull) and appropriate picturable nouns for each pair. The 
audio instructions across all conditions in Experiment 2 were the same: The participant 
heard two instructions. The first instruction set up the contrastive pair by mentioning one 
of the objects (for example, “Click on the tall glass,”) and this was the critical instruction. 
The second instruction was not critical, and was counterbalanced in terms of the target, 
from the contrastive object (for example, “Click on the short glass,”) to a distractor object 
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(“Click on the big knife”.) The visual context varied in each trial. For example, 
participants saw four objects: a tall glass (target object), another glass that varied in 
height (contrastive object), a tall pitcher (competitor object), and some other object not 
related in form or scale to the other objects such as a pillow (distractor). Two conditions 
contained a visual contrast of the target object that had two instances of the object (e.g., 
two glasses of varying heights.) For example, the target “tall” glass was considered a 
“good exemplar” in the presence of the very short, contrastive glass. In the second 
condition, the “tall” glass was of a medium height, closer to the height of the short glass. 
This medium height glass is the “poor exemplar”. In the other two conditions, there was 
no contrastive object; the “short glass” was replaced with a distractor object (such as a 
book), and the listener only saw one glass along with a competitor object (such as a “tall 
pitcher”.) This resulted in four conditions: good target exemplar + contrastive object, 
poor target exemplar + contrastive object, good target exemplar and no contrastive object, 
and poor target exemplar and no contrastive object. The conditions for Experiment 2 are 
listed the appendix.  
Each participant was offered a short break after completion of the eye tracking 
portion of the experiment. Then, the participant completed the Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary Test – Fourth Edition (Dunn & Dunn, 2007), The Expressive Vocabulary 
Test – Second Edition (Williams, 2007), and the Non-Literal Language and Pragmatic 
Judgment subtests of the Comprehensive Assessment of Spoken Language (Carrow-
Woolfolk, 2008). Participants were given the choice between the PPVT and the EVT to 
begin, followed by the other vocabulary assessment. The CASL_NLL and CASL-PJ then 
followed. The language assessments were administered by two research assistants and 
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under the supervision of the primary author of this study. The caregiver completed the 
Children’s Communication Checklist – Second Edition (Bishop, 1998) and a pediatric 
intake form. When the language measures were completed, the participant and caregiver 
were debriefed as to the purpose of the study and compensated for their time.  
Clinical measures  
In addition to gathering eye tracking data, clinical measures were administered to 
assess general language ability, pragmatic linguistic reasoning, and functional language 
abilities. A pediatric intake form, one standardized caregiver measure, and four 
standardized language tests were administered. The pediatric intake form was 
administered to gather general health and background information about the participant, 
and therefore there is no validity or reliability to report. However, the remaining tests and 
measure are standardized, and the validity and reliability of each are discussed below. 
Language measures: validity and reliability  
One issue of concern for any study is the validity and reliability of the measures 
used. The researcher must be certain that these tools measure what they claim to measure, 
and that they do so reliability and with fidelity, otherwise interpretation of the results is 
impossible.  
Test scores are considered valid to the extent that they measure what they intend 
to measure. In order for an assessment to be useful, it must consistently differentiate the 
abilities of the test-takers. The reliability of an instrument refers to the consistency of 
scores obtained by the instrument when administered multiple times with no changes in 
the conditions. Because maturation is a condition that continually changes, different 
methods of calculating reliability have been constructed.  
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Validity determines how well a test measures what it claims to measure. Often 
validity is measured by examining the content validity (that whether the test samples the 
domain it claims to measure), construct validity (that the test measures the constructs it 
claims to measure), and criterion validity (that the test is significantly correlated with 
other measures). Internal reliability refers to the internal consistency of the responses of 
items in a test from a subset of examinees. Test-retest reliability is used to determine how 
much the individual’s normative score might change on re-testing over a short period of 
time. Published, standardized tests used with clinical populations are tested for validity 
and reliability.  
Eye tracking was utilized in these experiments to measure language processing in 
real time using the visual world paradigm (VWP). The validity and reliability of eye 
tracking, when used to measure spoken language comprehension, has not been 
extensively reviewed in the literature. Only one study, to my knowledge, addresses the 
reliability of eye tracking. Farris-Trimble & McMurray (2013) utilized a test-retest study 
design to determine the reliability of eye tracking across two administrations of word 
recognition and visual matching tasks. They found that fixation to target and the timing 
of fixations were strongly correlated and considered reliable across days. That is, given a 
particular stimulus, participants were reliable in the proportions of fixations to the target 
based on the linguistic input. Fixations at the earliest part of the trial (before 1000 ms) 
were considered to have the strongest correlation between administrations, with a 
reported correlation of 0.79, which is better than some of the clinical measures reported 
below. Correlations of fixations after 1000 ms fell significantly, possibly due to fixations 
being driven by cognitive processes other than language comprehension. Overall they 
101 
concluded that the visual world paradigm was sensitive and reliable enough to measure 
word comprehension abilities in real-time. Given that the current study aims to examine 
sentence comprehension in ambiguous linguistic and visual contexts and that 
interpretation of prosodic focus and scalar adjectives occurs locally rather than at the 
conclusion of the utterance, using the VWP is sufficiently reliable. 
The Comprehensive Assessment of Spoken Language (CASL) (Carrow-
Woolfolk, 2008) is an individually administered language assessment designed to 
measure the language abilities of children aged 3;0 to 21;11 and is part of a 
comprehensive assessment to determine whether an individual has a language delay or 
disorder. It is comprised of fifteen subtests that examine receptive language abilities in 
basic concepts, syntax, semantics, paragraph comprehension, morphemes, non-literal 
language, and pragmatic language. Various subtests are used to calculate a core 
composite score that is used to determine the overall receptive language abilities of an 
individual. Reichow, Salamack, Paul, Volkmar, and Klin (2008) found that the Pragmatic 
Judgment subtest is highly correlated with Adaptive Language Use as reported by 
caregivers on the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales. Although they did not find a 
significant correlation of scores on the Nonliteral Language subtest with the Vineland 
scores, the authors noted that small sample size and a stringent alpha level had to be used 
for analyses. Given that children with autism are often reported to have difficulty 
understanding non-literal language (Martin & McDonald, 2004), the Nonliteral Language 
subtest was selected for administration in this study, along with the Pragmatic Judgment 
subtest.  
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Content validity was confirmed by demonstrating an increase in raw scores across 
the developmental span and by performing a factor analysis that demonstrated that 
observed data fit the model used to construct the test (the reader is referred to the 
examiner’s manual for details regarding these calculations). Criterion validity is of 
particular interest since multiple measures of language ability should be correlated if they 
purport to measure the same construct. The CASL demonstrated a high degree of 
relatedness to several language and intelligence measures. Of particular interest to this 
study are the correlations with the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test – Third Edition 
(PPVT-3) (Dunn & Dunn, 2007) and the Expressive Vocabulary Test – Second Edition 
(EVT-2) (Williams, 2007). The CASL has high correlations with scores on the PPVT-3 
and the EVT-2, in particular with the Lexical/Semantic, Syntactic, and Expressive Index 
Scores. The lowest correlations were between the Nonliteral Language Test on the CASL 
and both the PPVT-3 and the EVT-2. Therefore, the CASL is a valid measure of 
language abilities. 
Internal reliability of the CASL was computed using the Rasch split-half method. 
The items in each test were divided into comparable halves and the Rasch ability estimate 
was calculated for each half and the scores correlated using a Spearman-Brown formula. 
Test reliabilities ranged from 0.64 to 0.94, indicating good internal consistency of the 
items.  
 To determine test-retest reliability, test authors administered the CASL 
twice to a randomly selected group of 148 examinees in three age groups. Changes in test 
scores could occur due to growth and maturation, changes in physical or emotional state, 
or random differences in performance. The interval between initial test and retest ranged 
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from seven to 109 days. Correlation coefficients were calculated and corrected using 
Guilford’s Formula. For examinees ages 8;0 to 10;11, the test-retest reliability 
coefficients ranged from 0.71 to 0.96 and the mean standard score changes ranged from 
1.6 to 6.0, indicating a minor practice effect. Overall, across all age ranges coefficients 
for the CASL ranged from 0.65 to 0.95, with mean standard score changes ranging from 
+0.4 to +6.6 points, again demonstrating a minor practice effect. 
The internal reliabilities of the CASL across the fifteen subtests are highly 
uniform. The test-retest study provided strong evidence of stability of the scores with 
only minor learning effects. Therefore, the CASL is a valid and reliable measure of the 
language abilities of examinees. 
The Expressive Vocabulary Test – Second Edition (EVT-2) (Williams, 2007) is a 
measure of expressive vocabulary. Expressive vocabulary has long been associated with 
verbal IQ and overall language ability in both typical and atypical child and adult 
populations (Smith et al., 2005) and has been used extensively in research as a measure 
of language ability. Therefore, the EVT-2 was selected to ensure that participants had at 
least average vocabulary abilities. 
 The validity of the EVT-2 was addressed with content and construct 
validity, with a particular focus on whether the EVT-2 adequately tests word retrieval and 
expressive vocabulary abilities. Content validity was demonstrated qualitatively by a 
detailed set of specifications for the development of the items used in the test by experts 
in the field of vocabulary and language development, as well as by looking at the 
statistical properties of individual test items during field-testing. Performance on this test 
across age ranges mirrored what is currently known regarding the progression of 
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cognitive abilities over the course of the lifespan. No quantitative methods for 
determining content validity were described. 
 The reliability of the measure was assessed in three ways: internal 
consistency, alternate forms, and test-retest. Internal consistency reliability describes the 
consistency of performance on different portions of the test. The higher the test’s internal 
consistency reliability, the more accurately performance on any one item predicts 
performance on other items. To do this, the author of the test examined the split-half 
reliability for each of the age groups across thirteen grade levels in the grade norming 
sample. Rasch ability scores from odd numbered items were compared with scores from 
even numbered items and controlled for differences between forms (form A and B). The 
split-half reliabilities were high across all groups ranging from 0.86 to 0.97 for all grade 
levels. The mean reliabilities by age were 0.94 on form A and 0.93 on form B. The mean 
reliabilities by grade were 0.93 on both forms. Therefore, this test demonstrates good 
internal consistency. 
 Alternate-form reliability was examined to determine if the two versions 
of the test were equivalent. Both forms were administered to 507 individuals in the 
norming population in a counterbalanced sequence across administrations. The 
correlation between the forms was high, ranging from 0.83 to 0.91. Overall the alternate-
form reliability is good. In my experiment, I will only use one form of the test in order to 
limit variability in responses and control for the variability introduced by having two test 
forms presented to different participants. 
 Test-retest reliability was conducted to determine if the results of testing 
would change when the test was re-administered one month after initial administration. 
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The test-retest correlations ranged from 0.94 to 0.97 across the age ranges. Overall, there 
is a high degree of reliability in the EVT-2 that ensures that test scores are precise and are 
influenced to only a small degree by measurement error. Extensive studies were 
conducted during the development of this test to determine whether scores on the EVT-2 
were correlated to scores on other measures. High correlations were observed with scores 
on the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals – 4th edition (CELF-4) (Semel et 
al., 2003) (r=0.67 to 0.80 across all age ranges and subtests) and the Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary Test (r=0.80 to 0.84 across all age groups). It is important to note that 
although the correlation ranges on the CELF-4 are broad, the authors of the test looked at 
scores from all subtests of this comprehensive language assessment, and therefore one 
would not necessarily expect an overly high degree of correlation between a test of 
“sentence completion” (which requires more language content knowledge than just 
vocabulary) and vocabulary alone, for example. 
The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test – Fourth Edition (PPVT–4) (Dunn & Dunn, 
2007) is a measure of receptive vocabulary ability. It was co-normed with the EVT–2, 
and therefore allows direct comparison of expressive and receptive vocabulary abilities. 
As with the EVT, prior research has shown that standardized scores on the PPVT–4 are 
highly correlated with verbal IQ measures for adults (Bell et al., 2001) and for children 
with and without learning disabilities (Hodapp & Gerken, 1999).  
 The validity of the PPVT–4 was determined by examining the construct 
and content validity of test items. Construct validity was determined by administering the 
test to populations with known diagnoses to determine whether the scores were consistent 
within diagnoses and were significantly different across groups. The authors also note 
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that construct validity can be supported by correlations with other tests. As noted above, 
the PPVT–4 is highly correlated with performance on the EVT–2 (r=0.80 to 0.84 across 
age ranges). It was also correlated with the CASL (r=0.37 to 0.77 across age ranges and 
subtests) and the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals – Fourth Edition 
(CELF–4) (r=0.67 to 0.79 across all age ranges and subtests).  
 Reliability of the PPVT–4 was assessed in three ways: internal 
consistency, alternate forms, and test-retest. Internal consistency reliability describes the 
consistency of performance on different portions of the test. The higher the test’s internal 
consistency reliability, the more accurately performance on any one item predicts 
performance on other items. To do this, the test authors examined the split-half reliability 
for each of the age groups across all age levels in the grade norming sample. Rasch 
ability scores from odd numbered items were compared with scores from even numbered 
items and controlled for differences between forms (form A and B). The split-half 
reliabilities were high across all groups ranging from 0.91 to 0.97 for all age levels. The 
mean reliabilities by age are 0.97 on form A and 0.96 on form B. This test demonstrates 
good internal consistency. 
 Test-retest reliability was conducted to determine if the results of testing 
would change when the test was re-administered one month after initial administration. 
Changes in scoring over time could occur due to growth and maturation, changes in 
physical or emotional state, differences in calculating basal or ceiling, or random 
differences in performance. The test-retest correlations ranged from 0.92 to 0.96 across 
the age ranges, with a mean of 0.93. Therefore, scores are likely to be stable across 
multiple administrations of the test. 
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 In summary, language ability can be reliably and validly measured by 
using the CASL, the PPVT–4, and the EVT–2 and were used to gather sufficient 
information regarding the language abilities of the participants (McGregor et al., 2012). 
 In addition to the language assessment tasks completed by the children, a 
communication survey was given to caregivers in order to develop a profile of pragmatic 
language abilities in a natural context. Although formal, standardized tests have been 
developed in an effort to assess pragmatic language, the very nature of the testing 
environment makes the natural assessment of pragmatic language difficult. Therefore, the 
caregiver checklist was used to gather additional information regarding the language 
abilities of the participants. 
 The Children’s Communication Checklist–2 (CCC–2) U.S. Edition 
(Bishop, 2006) was developed as a parent or caregiver rating scale. The 70-item 
questionnaire allows clinicians to rate aspects of communication such as speech, 
vocabulary, sentence structure, and social language skills of children and adolescents 
who speak in sentences, screen for general language impairments confidently, identify 
children with pragmatic language impairment, and determine which children may benefit 
from further assessment for autism spectrum disorders. The tool has a history of 
successfully differentiating between clinical and typical populations, but there is some 
overlap between specific clinical populations. That is, this checklist cannot diagnose a 
particular disorder, but does reliably differentiate between children with pragmatic 
language difficulties and those without (Bishop & Baird, 2001; Botting, 2004). 
The questionnaire examines both language structure and language use in a natural 
context as reported by a teacher or caregiver. This gives the instrument the added benefit 
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of screening language in natural contexts, rather than in the structured environment of 
formal testing. Areas of language structure assessed with this instrument are speech, 
syntax, semantics, and coherence. Pragmatic language areas assessed with this instrument 
include initiation, scripted language, context, non-verbal communication, social relations, 
and interests. These categories can then be used to derive sub-scores that provide 
diagnostic and clinical information regarding language use of the child as reported by a 
caregiver. 
The instrument was standardized in the U.S. across four major geographic regions 
(Northeast, West, South, and Midwest) using a sample that represented the U.S. 
population of individuals ages 4;0 to 16;11 according to the U.S. Census Bureau. The 
sample was also stratified by age, race and ethnicity, geographic region, and parental 
educational level. Inclusion criteria for the norming sample included individuals who did 
not have a hearing loss, who spoke English as their primary language, and who spoke in 
sentences. Data gathered also included any diagnoses that participants may have had, 
including SLI, autism, pragmatic language impairment, or no clinical involvement.  
The content of the CCC–2 was developed using established developmental norms 
for communication for children ages 4;0 to 16;11 and based on the literature regarding 
children with pragmatic language deficits. Group studies were conducted to determine 
whether the CCC–2 could correctly identify children with prior diagnoses of a pragmatic-
language deficit. One way to do this is by examining the Positive Predictive Power (PPP) 
and the Negative Predictive Power of the instrument. If the PPP equals 1, then there are 
no false positives. If the NPP equals one there are no false negatives. As the scores move 
away from the mean, one would expect the rate of PPP and NPP to increase. Indeed, that 
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was observed: at 1SD below the mean, 70% of children with SLI and 85% of the children 
who did not have SLI were identified; 72% of children with pragmatic language 
impairment were identified as such, and 85% of children who did not have a pragmatic 
language impairment were correctly identified; 89% of children with autism were 
identified as such, and 97% of children without autism were correctly identified. The rate 
increased at 1.5 and 2 SD from the mean. In short, there is sufficient NPP and PPP for the 
CCC–2 to be considered a valid measure of social-pragmatic language use. 
The author determined reliability of the CCC–2 by calculating test-retest 
reliability. Ninety-eight individuals from the original norming sample were selected and 
re-tested. The retest group was divided into three age ranges (4;0-6;11, 7;0-9;11, and 
10;0-16;11 years). A Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient was calculated for 
each age range. The correlation between the test-retest scores was r2=0.93. Therefore, the 
reliability of this test is judged to be high for the age ranges targeted in the current study. 
Although the CCC–2 has demonstrated reliability and validity as a tool for 
measuring language use, caution must be used when interpreting results. Norbury, Nash, 
Baird, & Bishop (2004) performed a validation study using the checklist to see how well 
it distinguished between children with SLI, autism, and no clinical involvement. They 
found that the instrument is successful at distinguishing between children with SLI and 
autism, but that there was significant overlap between the groups and that the instrument 
should be used as a screening tool, rather than in any diagnostic capacity. In the context 
of this study, the CCC–2 is employed to screen the language abilities of children on the 
spectrum so that results can be interpreted in the presence or absence of autism spectrum 
disorder. 
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 The caregiver completed the pediatric intake form, which collected the 
demographic, developmental, social, and educational history of the participant. There are 
no measurements of validity or reliability for this tool and it was primarily used to ensure 
the participant met the inclusion criteria for the study.  
Experimental Variables 
The variables for this experiment were: 
Experiment 1 variables: 
• Dependent variables 
o Response time 
o Time to first fixation on the target object 
o Time to first fixation on the distractor object 
• Independent variables 
o Presence or absence of prosodic contrast (e.g., red/RED) 
o Target object is member of contrastive pair or not (e.g., red ball/red comb) 
Experiment 2 variables: 
• Dependent variables 
o Time to first fixation on the target object 
o Time to first fixation on contrastive object  
o Time to first fixation on competitor object 
o Response time 
• Independent variables 
o Good/poor exemplar of target object (e.g., the good exemplar of a “tall 
glass”) 
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o Presence or absence of a comparative object (e.g., another glass to 
reference when the target is “glass”, or an unrelated distractor object) 
Behavioral measures for both experiments: 
• Standardized test scores on the CASL Nonliteral Language (CASL_NLL) and 
Pragmatic Judgment (CASL_PJ) subtests (to confirm autism diagnosis and 
pragmatic language ability) 
• Standardized test scores on the PPVT–2 (tied to receptive language ability) 
• Standardized test scores on the EVT–2 (tied to expressive language ability) 




Chapter 3 Results 
As previously mentioned, Sedivy and colleagues (1999) measured percentage of 
looks to the target object starting at the onset of the noun and used ANOVA to determine 
if the experimental conditions affected time to fixate on the target. However, there are 
issues with using means testing when comparing data from different groups, particularly 
when those data consist of repeated measures. Since ANOVA assumes that the data are 
independent, having participants see repeated examples of a single condition violates this 
assumption. In addition, ANOVA assumes homoscedasticity: that the random variation in 
the dependent/independent variable relationship is the same across all of the independent 
variables. This may not necessarily be true as different stimuli in each condition might 
vary in ways the researcher didn’t anticipate, or there might be inherent variability among 
members of a group. ANOVA also assumes the same number of measurements in all 
comparisons. In experiments such as this one, where there may be a different number of 
trials in each condition due to success/failure rates, this cannot be assumed.  And lastly, 
in fields such as communication disorders, researchers are usually very interested in the 
individual variations in performance among individuals and within and among groups. 
By collapsing data into a measure of centrality (such as mean or median) the granularity 
of individual performance is obscured. 
Therefore, to account for these limitations in the use of ANOVA and other similar 
mean-testing procedures, researchers have recently begun to use linear mixed-effects 
models (LMEM) to analyze non-independent data. LMEM can accommodate data that 
routinely violate ANOVA assumptions such as repeated measures, data that violate 
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homoscedasticity, and uneven data sets or data sets with missing data. It can provide a 
more robust understanding of performance for researchers, which can lead to better 
informed clinical practice with regards to highly heterogeneous groups such as children 
with ASD and avoid the issues with repeated ANOVAs and inflated Type-I and Type -II 
error rates. 
Generally, LMEMs contain fixed effects and random effects. Fixed effects are 
those independent variables that are usually examined for differences in the DV in 
traditional means-testing paradigms. For example, in this experiment, fixed effects are the 
experimental manipulations of the stimuli and the behavioral measures. However, 
LMEMs also contain random effects, which allow for variation in the data that were the 
result of repeated measures or group membership. For example, in this experiment, items 
were presented multiple times to different participants, each participant saw the same 
condition multiple times, and participants belonged to groups that might have inherent 
similarities (neurotypical and ASD).  
Unlike in regular linear models, linear mixed effects models allow both intercepts 
(that is, means) and slopes (the relationships between IVs and DVs) to vary between 
higher level units such as groups or stimuli in an experiment such as items.  Essentially, 
the variability in the intercepts and slopes are treated similarly to DVs. This allows for 
examination of how higher-level groupings might affect individual performances. For 
example, it is possible that some of the variability in the DVs are due to some inherent 
variability within a participant’s response when seeing the same item multiple times.  
In summary, LMEMs provide the researcher with a robust method of accounting 
for the variability both between and within groupings of items, participants, or other 
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variables. They can accommodate uneven data sets, and are more descriptive in terms of 
the variables that affect the dependent variables.  
 To construct the models, correlations among the behavioral measures were 
examined determine the best, maximally different measures to include in the models and 
reduce collinearity. Then, the structure of the model was determined per theoretical 
considerations and the variables of experimental interest. Lastly, the behavioral measures 
were added as a fixed effect to the base model, creating a second model, and the base and 
complex models were compared via ANOVA.  
Behavioral measures and correlations 
The behavioral measures collected were chosen to describe the language abilities 
of the participants as well as provide some confirmation of the parent-reported autism 
diagnosis. They also provided a way to categorize the abilities of all participants 
independent of group membership. Since children with ASD have a degree of 
heterogeneous abilities, these behavioral measures provide greater detail for analysis. The 
behavioral measures were analyzed to determine whether group differences might affect 
performance on the eye tracking task. The tests used to quantify language ability were the 
PPVT and the EVT. Pragmatic language ability was quantified via the CASL Pragmatic 
Judgment Subtest, the CASL Non-Literal Language Subtest, and the CCC-2 (and its 
corresponding subtests.) Scores from each group were first compared via two-tailed t-test 
(results are listed in the appendices). Then, correlations were explored; highly correlated 
scores most likely provided redundant information about participant performance and 
could be collapsed into aggregate scores for use in a mixed linear model. The procedure 
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for comparing language scores and correlations among them are described first; then, 
results for each experiment are presented separately. 
Scores on the PPVT were compared between groups to determine if there was a 
significant different in receptive language abilities that might affect language processing 
abilities, and therefore, outcomes on the eye tracking data. The density plot is presented 
in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Density plot of PPVT scores, by group 
Overall, visual inspection of the data revealed that individuals diagnosed with 
autism had greater variability in PPVT scores than the typical group. There was no 
significant difference in scores between neurotypical participants (M=121.05, SD = 12.5) 
and participants with autism (M= 111.41, SD = 12.4) (t(19)= -1.8668, p = 0.08), 
indicating that receptive language abilities were equal between the groups. 
Scores on the EVT were compared between groups to determine if there was a 
significant different in expressive language abilities that might affect language processing 
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abilities, and therefore, outcomes on the eye tracking data. The density plot is presented 
in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Density plot of EVT scores, by group 
Overall, visual inspection of the data revealed that individuals diagnosed with 
autism had about the same variability in the scores as the typical group. There was no 
significant difference in scores between neurotypical participants (M=107.5, SD = 12.5) 
and participants with autism (M= 113.77, SD = 12.4) (t(19)= -1.3159, p = 0.20), 
indicating that expressive language abilities were equal between the groups. In summary, 
there is no statistically significant difference in the language abilities of the two groups. 
Scores on the CASL Non-Literal Language Subtest were compared between 
groups to determine if there was a significant different in pragmatic language abilities. 
The density plot is presented in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Density plot of CASL Non-Literal Language scores, by group 
Overall, the typical group had greater variability in scores characterized as a 
negative skew of the data as compared to the autism group. Accordingly, there was a 
significant difference in scores between neurotypical participants (M=111.94, SD = 
15.07) and participants with autism (M= 100.08, SD = 12.2) (t(25)= -2.35, p = 0.027), 
indicating that non-literal language abilities were significantly different between the 
groups. 
Scores on the CASL Pragmatic Judgment Subtest were compared between groups 
to determine if there was a significant difference in pragmatic language abilities. The 
density plot is presented in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Density plot of CASL Pragmatic Judgment scores, by group 
Overall, typical individuals had a greater negative skew of the data, whereas 
autistic individuals had a more positive skew. Accordingly, there was a significant 
difference in scores between neurotypical participants (M=108.5, SD = 113.59) and 
participants with autism (M= 88.5, SD = 17.8) (t (18)= -3.4411, p = 0.0028), indicating 
that pragmatic judgment language abilities were significantly different between the 
groups. 
Overall, there were no significant differences in overall receptive and expressive 
language abilities between the groups, and a significant difference in pragmatic language 
abilities between the groups. 
In order to confirm group membership and to determine whether CCC-2 
composite scores were sufficiently different between groups a density plot was created to 




Figure 5: Density plot of CCC-2 composite scores, by group 
Overall, there was a significant difference in scores between neurotypical 
participants (M=108.06, SD = 13.05) and participants with autism (M= 80.17, SD = 5.31)  
(t(24)=-8.11, p ≤ 0.001), thereby confirming the parent-reported presence or absence of 
an autism diagnosis for both groups. 
Next, correlations among the CCC-2 subscales were examined to determine 




Figure 6: Correlations among CCC-2 subtest scores 
*= significant at the 0.1 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *** = significant at 
the 0.01 level 
The subtest scores on the CCC-2 were highly correlated so they were collapsed 
into aggregate Z-scores. In addition, correlation among the language measures was also 
investigated to identify those that were highly correlated. The results are presented in 




Figure 7: Correlations among PPVT, EVT, CASL, and CCC-2 scores.  
*= significant at the 0.1 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *** = significant at 
the 0.01 level 
Nearly all of the language measures were correlated. As expected, PPVT and 
EVT are correlated, as were the CASL subtest measures. In addition, the PPVT, EVT, 
and CASL measures were highly correlated with each other. The CCC-2 composite 
measure was also correlated with all of the other measures with the exception of the EVT, 
indicating that parental judgment of receptive language abilities reflects performance on 
standardized measures.  
Correlations among the language scores were investigated to determine if they 




Figure 8: Correlation of general language and pragmatic language measures 
*= significant at the 0.1 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *** = significant at 
the 0.01 level 
Overall, there was a high degree of correlation among the language measures, 
with the exception of the speech subtest of the CCC-2. This is not surprising as this score 
reflects a child’s ability to pronounce words correctly (which requires good motor and 
phonological control) and does not necessarily reflect language ability per se. Therefore, 
it was removed from further consideration as an independent component for analyses. 
In addition, the correlations among the pragmatic language measures (the 
pragmatic language subtests of the CASL and the CCC-2) were also investigated and are 
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presented in Figure 9.
 
Figure 9: Correlation among pragmatic language measures 
*= significant at the 0.1 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *** = significant at the 0.01 level 
 
The CASL Non-Literal Language (CASL_NLL) subtest was not significantly 
correlated with the other pragmatic language measures. However, this measure was found 
to be significantly different between the groups (t (25.87) = -2.3517, p = 0.02). Since the 
CASL_NLL subtest scores were not significantly correlated with any of the other scores 
on the CCC-2, the correlation between it and the other languages measures was 
investigated, to determine whether or not the CASL_NLL scores could be folded into the 
language scores for the model creation. 
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Figure 10: Correlation of language measures and pragmatic language measures 
*= significant at the 0.1 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *** = significant at 
the 0.01 level 
Overall the CASL_NLL scores were more aligned with vocabulary ability than 
with parental report of language, but because they were significantly different between 
groups, they were not folded into language ability, which was not significant between 
groups. 
Behavioral measures were converted to z-scores to allow for comparison among 
scores with varying scales, to center the dependent variables, and scores that were 
correlated were collapsed into aggregate z-scores: Language (PPVT, EVT, and the 
linguistic subtests of the CCC-2) and CASL_NLL. Components for the models were 
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selected based on the amount of correlation among the behavioral measures. Correlations 
were determined using the “Hmisc” (Harrell, 2017) and “psych” (Revelle, 2013) 
packages in R. Results showed a high degree of correlations among the language 
measures (PPVT, EVT, and the language subsections of the CCC-2), indicating that they 
could be collapsed into an average z-score for Language. Therefore, the fixed behavioral 
effects in the models were a combined language Z-score and the CASL NLL Z-score.  
This led to two possible combinations of variables to construct linear models: 
1. Create a Z-score of the CASL_NLL standardized scores and collapse the 
EVT,PPVT, and CCC-2 Language Subscores into an aggregate Language Z-
Score, resulting in two measures for comparison:  
a. CASL NLL   CASL_NLL Z-score 
b. EVT, PPVT, CCC-2  Language Z-score 
2.  Combine the CASL_NLL with the language measures based on their correlation: 
a. EVT, PPVT, CASL_NLL, and language subscales of the CCC2  
Language Z-score 
The first option was chosen to allow for more measures to be included and, 
theoretically, explain more of the variability in the dependent variables. 
Model and Variable Construction 
A base model (M1) was created that contained both fixed effects and random 
effects. Each fixed effect in the model results in a coefficient that represents the net 
change in the dependent variable. The fixed effects were the IVs that represented 
experimental conditions, and the random effects (intercepts) were for within-subject 
factors of condition to account for each participant seeing each condition more than once 
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and a random intercept for the between-subjects factor for each item in the experiment as 
each item was seen by multiple participants. In addition, random intercepts and slopes 
were included for participants (to account for some participants being randomly faster or 
slower than others) and groups (to account for individuals in each group who may also 
have varying performances.) Then, a second model was created which included the 
aforementioned fixed and random effects, as well as one additional fixed effect for one of 
the behavioral measures (language ability or the CASL-NLL scores.) Models were 
designed to be “maximal” with regards to the experimental conditions, as recommended 
by Barr et al. (2013). That is, the models contained components that were determined to 
be theoretically important for the analysis at the start of the experiment. 
Traditionally, multi-level models had been compared using ANOVA and the 
resulting Likelihood ratio tests (LRTs) and associated p values were used to determine if 
the addition of a fixed factor significantly improves the fit. There were some concerns 
with this approach, however. When fixed effects are included or excluded from a model 
based on the results of a LRT comparison of two models, a correction to the resulting p 
value must be made, but no current software currently has the capacity to adjust the 
values appropriately (Berk et al., 2013; as cited in Harel & McAllister, 2019.) 
Additionally, if repeated comparisons are made amongst several models there is a risk of 
an inflated Type I error. Therefore, using an information criterion, often reported as either 
the Akaike information criterion (AIC) or the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) is 
also recommended. Harel and McAllister report that these criteria include a penalization 
of the log likelihood in the model that is in accordance with the number of factors 
included in the model. Therefore, comparisons among multiple models using AIC or BIC 
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are considered “more fair” (Harel and McAllister, 2019) since the different number of 
factors between models is accounted for. When using AIC or BIC to compare models, the 
model with the lowest comparative value is selected; the overall value of the AIC or BIC 
isn’t of particular interest per se. Therefore, in an effort to make the best decision 
regarding the models, p values of the LRT comparison of M1 and each of the M2s, AIC, 
and BIC values were reported and used to determine the model that best captures the 
variability in the data. All models were created using the Tests in Linear Mixed Effects 
Models (lmerTest) (Kuznetsova et al., 2017) package in R (R Core Team, 2017). 
lmerTest calculates p-values via the Satterthwaite approximation for the degrees of 
freedom and the t-distribution. This approximation is better suited for this application 
than Wald tests (which is the default in most ANOVA computations), which does not 
account for the increased variability in estimating the random effects of a mixed-effects 
model. Since the Sattherwaite approximation does account for this and is the default 
method in this package (Harel & McAllister, 2019), lmerTest was used. The R package 
interactions was used to create the figures (Long, 2020). 
Experiment 1  
Data Preparation 
In Experiment 1 participants were asked to click on two objects. The first 
instruction set up the context for the second critical instruction (e.g. “Click on the blue 
ball. Now, click on the red ball.”) The second instruction varied in two ways: first, the 
target object was either the member of the contrastive pair (the red ball), or, the non-
contrasting, object (the red comb.) The distractor object varied by condition (either the 
red ball which is the member of the contrasting pair, or the red comb which is the 
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distractor object.) Secondly, conditions varied by the presence or absence of contrastive 
stress on the adjective.  
The dependent variables analyzed were response time, time to first fixation on the 
target, and time to first fixation on the distractor. Only trials where the participant 
correctly clicked on the target object were analyzed (N=670). Any trials that did not have 
a fixation on the area of interest (target object or distractor object) were excluded. Using 
a cutoff of three standard deviations above the mean for each DV trial that met or 
exceeded that value were considered outliers and excluded from analyses. Trials in which 
the participant fixated on the object of interest within 100ms prior to the onset of the 
adjective were removed, as the fixation could not have been informed by linguistic input. 
The resulting data were then used for model creation and analysis.  














Response time  n/a 3176.63 648.95 5123.5 12 n/a 658 
 
Time to target  0 696.55 493.15 2176 13 91 566 
Results 
In Experiment 1 I was interested in the fixed effects of prosody, target object, and 
the interactions of the two fixed effects, as well as the random intercepts for participant, 
item, and the nested effect of participants in each group. As previously stated, fixed 
effects in this model were group, prosodic contour, and target object. Random effects 
were included by-participant, by-item, and nested effects for participants in groups. The 
model component likelihood ratio tests were obtained using anova(). Because target and 
prosody were coded “0” for absence and “1” for presence, the absence of target and 
absence of prosody are merged with the intercept values. The dependent variables (DV) 
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investigated were response time, time-to-target, and the likelihood of fixating on the 
distractor. For the first two DVs, in R, the base model was 
lmer (DV ~ prosody + target + group + prosody:target + 
prosody:group + target:group + prosody:target:group + (1 | subject) + 
(1 | item) + (1 | group/subject))                  
To this base model, behavioral measures were added as fixed effects. 
Theoretically, the behavioral measures (BM) of interest were, in order of importance: 
language ability (tied to overall language ability rather than ASD diagnosis), and ability 
on the CASL_NLL (tied to non-literal language ability.) This resulted in models using 
these behavioral measures (BM) in an expanded model (M2) for comparison with the 
base model (M1): 
lmer (DV ~ prosody + target + group + BM + prosody:target + 
target:BM + prosody:BM + prosody:target:BM + prosody:target + 
prosody:group + target:group + prosody:target:group + 
prosody:target:group:BM + (1 | subject) + (1 | item) + (1 | 
group/subject)) 
In short, the model M1 was held constant while the behavioral fixed effects were 
changed in M2 to determine which factors best accounted for the variability in the 
continuous DVs.  
To examine the relationship between fixations on distractor, competitor, or 
contrastive objects in the visual scenes, trials were coded binomially for a fixation on the 
object (1) or absence of a fixation on the object (0) (noted as “binomialfixation” in the R 
code below.) In R, the logistic regression formula used to examine the log likelihood of 
the participants fixating on the distractor object required the use of the glmer() function in 
lme4() to estimate the log-odds of the outcome: 
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glmer (binomialfixation ~ group + prosody + target + 
group:prosody + group:target + prosody:target + group:prosody:target 
(1|subject) + (1|item) + (1|group/subject), family=binomial) 
The corresponding formula that incorporated behavioral measures: 
glmer (binomialfixation ~ group + prosody + target + BM + 
group:prosody + group:target + prosody:target + group:prosody:target + 
+ group : BM + prosody : BM + target : BM + group:prosody:BM + 
group:target:BM + prosody:target:BM + group:prosody:target:BM 
(1|subject) + (1|item) + (1|group/subject), family=binomial) 
In order to interpret the coefficients of the model which are reported in log odds, 
the probability of the outcome was calculated for significant coefficients: 
Probability=e(log-odds)/(1+e(log-odds)) 
Model selection and interpretation  
Response time 
Response time is the amount of time in milliseconds(ms) for the participant to 
complete the trial, starting at the start of the first instruction and until the second mouse 
click. Sedivy and colleagues did not measure response time. The means and standard 
deviations for each group by condition are reported in the table and boxplots below. 
Table 2: Experiment 1, response time(ms), descriptive statistics 
Group Condition Focus Target is 
contrast? 
N Mean SD 
ASD 1 + yes 12 3051.43 515.58 
ASD 2 + no 12 3210.63 563.50 
ASD 3 - yes 12 3159.08 585.72 
ASD 4 - no 12 3156.99 475.53 
Typical 1 + yes 18 3086.31 548.84 
Typical 2 + no 18 3179.88 570.69 
Typical 3 - yes 18 3128.79 538.41 




Figure 11: Experiment 1, boxplots of response time by condition and group 
Table 3: Experiment 1, comparison of models for response time 
Model AIC BIC AIC BIC LRT comparison LRT p value 
M1 10048 10097 - - - - 
M2 Language 10059 10153 -11 -44 M1/M2Language 0.34 
M2 CASL_NLL 10064 10158 -6 -24 M1/M2CASL_NLL 0.88 
       
Overall, none of the models containing a behavioral measure better explained the 
variability in response time. That is, pragmatic language ability, language ability, and 
non-literal language ability do not predict response times in Experiment 1. Therefore, the 
simpler model was used (M1).  
Table 4: Experiment 1, fixed effects and interactions for response time 





(Intercept) 3142 75.64 70.21 41.96 -- 
GroupASD -88.89 113.3 61.34 -0.79 0.44 
ProsodyYes 46.71 65.49 608.7 0.71 0.47 
TargetContrastiveObject -21.44 65.53 609.8 -0.32 0.74 
GroupASD:ProsodyYes 107.4 104.1 606.9 1.03 0.30 
GroupASD:TargetContrastiveObject -120.91 103.9 606.2 1.16 0.25 
ProsodyYes:TargetContrastiveObject -69.91 93.17 608.9 -0.75 0.45 
GroupASD:ProsodyYes:TargetContObject -205.72 148.6 607.2 -1.39 0.16 
Significance: ‘***’0.001, ‘**’ 0.01, ‘*’0.05, ‘.’ 0.1 
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With regard to response time, there was no main effect of group, the presence of 
the prosodic contour, or of the target object. In addition, none of the interactions were 
significant. Group membership, experimental condition, and the interactions among those 
IVs did not have an effect on the response time for the trials in Experiment 1.  
Time to target 
Time to target is the amount of time in milliseconds the participant takes to fixate 
on the target object from 100ms post onset of the adjective. The means and standard 
deviations for each group by condition are reported in the table and boxplots below.  
Table 5: Experiment 1, time to fixate on target, descriptive statistics 
Group Condition Focus Target is 
contrast? 
N Mean (ms) SD 
ASD 1 + yes 12 650.41 419.05 
ASD 2 + no 12 688.25 407.07 
ASD 3 - yes 12 744.20 384.45 
ASD 4 - no 12 671.23 429.90 
Typical 1 + yes 18 665.93 396.87 
Typical 2 + no 18 710.54 427.53 
Typical 3 - yes 18 558.35 417.89 




Figure 12: Experiment 1, time to target, by group and condition 
Table 6: Experiment 1, comparison of models for time to target object 
When the models were compared, general language and non-literal language 
ability did not provide additional information regarding variability in the data. Therefore, 
variability in response time must be due to overall effects of the experimental conditions 









Model AIC BIC AIC BIC LRT comparison LRT p value 
M1 8423 8479 - - - - 
M2 Language 8427.9 8519 -4.1 -14 M1/M2Language 0.18 
M2 CASL_NLL 8432 8523 -9 -44 M1/M2CASL_NLL 0.51 
Significance: ‘***’0.001, ‘**’ 0.01, ‘*’0.05, ‘.’ 0.1  
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Table 7: Experiment 1, fixed effects for time to fixate on target 





Intercept 758.8 50.7 79.9 14.96 -- 
GroupASD -79.87 77.96 96.19 -1.03 0.31 
ProsodyYes -46.40 58.96 518.6 -0.78 0.43 
TargetContrastiveObject -206.5 60.30 524.3 -3.42 0.001*** 
GroupASD:ProsodyYes 58.88 96.02 519.2 0.61 0.54 
GroupASD:TargetContrastiveObject 277.91 96.85 521.9 2.87 0.004 ** 
ProsodyYes:TargetContastiveObject 160.42 84.25 518.8 1.90 0.06 . 
GroupASD:ProsodyYes:TargetContrastiveObject -281.03 137.4 520.8 2.04 0.041 * 
Significance: ‘***’0.001, ‘**’ 0.01, ‘*’0.05, ‘.’ 0.1 
 
Sedivy and colleagues found a main effect of target object; participants fixated on 
the target object faster when it was a member of the contrastive pair than when it was not 
(F(1,11) = 66.285, p < 0.001). There was no effect of focus, which was contrary to their 
initial predictions. A follow-up investigation by Weber, Braun, & Crocker (2006) found a 
main effect of focus (F1(1, 23) = 4.89, p < 0.05) and a significant interaction between 
focus and referent (F1(1, 23) = 44.71, p < 0.001; F2(1, 31) = 11.83, p < 0.01) when 
fixation proportions were analyzed from the onset of the adjective, rather than the onset 
of the noun. Weber and colleagues concluded that focus aided fixation to the target when 
the target was a member of the contrastive pair, but hindered fixation when it was not. 
In the current experiment, there is a main effect for the target object: when the 
target object is a member of the contrastive pair participants fixated on it sooner than 
when it wasn’t. This replicates the findings from Sedivy et al., and not only confirms the 
effect but also demonstrates that children make this inference as adults do. In addition, 
while the main effect of prosody was not significant, we see that it was nearly so in the 
interaction with the contrastive object: When prosody was used and the target was the 
contrastive object, the time to fixate on the target was delayed. This is the inverse of the 
results from Weber et al. who found that prosodic focus had a facilitative effect on the 
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time to fixate on the target. It is possible that the inclusion of different groups of 
participants, the age of the participants, or the statistical methods used played a role in the 
marginal effect in this study. 
Indeed, group membership had a significant effect on these measures. There was a 
significant interaction between group and the target object. That is, when autistic 
participants fixated on the target object, they were slower to do so than their typical peers 
and their overall time didn’t differ much between the conditions. This may indicate that 
typical participants were able to use the visual information in the scene to infer the target 
object, whereas the ASD participants did not, or perhaps chose not to. 
However, and most importantly, there was a three-way interaction. ASD 
participants are faster when prosody is used and the target is the contrastive object than 
when prosody is absent and the target is not-contrastive, but typical participants are faster 
to fixate on the contrastive object when it is the contrastive object and prosody was not 
used, and slower when prosody was used, or when the target was not contrastive. That is, 
ASD participants demonstrated the speeding effect of prosodic focus when the target 





Figure 13: Experiment 1, Time to fixate on target, by group and condition 
In summary, it appears that typical participants are most likely to use the visual 
information to determine what the possible target might be, and that their latency to fixate 
on the target is facilitated by the lack of prosody. ASD participants, however, appear to 
not use visual context to mediate the interpretation of the utterance when there is no 
prosody used, but do demonstrate the facilitative effect of prosodic focus. These patterns 
might indicate some sort of strategy on the part of the participants, which will be 
explored in the discussion section.  
None of the behavioral measures, when added to the model, improved the fit of 
the model and therefore do not seem to influence the time to fixate on the target object. 
Fixations on distractor 
Due to the low number of trials with fixations to distractor objects, it is of greater 
interest as to whether or not a participant fixated on the distractor at all during a trial, 
137 
rather than the time it took for them to do so. Recall in this experiment, the distractor 
object is another object of the same color that is, ultimately, not the target object. It may 
be a member of the contrastive pair, or it may only share the color with the first object.  
Table 8: Experiment 1, comparison of models for log-odds to fixate on distractor object 
Model AIC BIC AIC BIC LRT comparison LRT p 
value 
M1 783.4 837.37 - - - - 
M2 Language 794.6 884.37 -11.2 -47 M1/M2Language 0.77 
M2 CASL_NLL 791.5 881.3 -10.9 -44 M1/M2CASL_NLL 0.44 
       
Overall, neither of the models containing a behavioral measure better explained 
the variability in response time. That is, language ability and non-literal language ability 
do not predict the probability of fixating on the distractor object in Experiment 1. 
Therefore, the simpler model was used (M1).  
With regard to log-odds to fixate on the distractor object, there was no main effect 
for group, of the prosodic contour, or of the target object. There was no effect of the 
interaction between group and prosody, group and target, prosody and target, or for the 
three-way interaction among group, prosody and target. Overall, both ASD and typical 
children were as likely to fixate on the distractor object regardless of the experimental 
condition. 
Table 9: Experiment 1, log-odds of fixating on the distractor object 
Fixed Effect Estimate Std. Error z-value p-value 
Intercept -0.75 0.22 -3.34 -- 
Group 0.07 0.35 0.19 0.85 
Prosody -0.41 0.32 -1.3 0.19 
Target -0.47 0.32 -1.47 0.14 
Group:Prosody 0.14 0.50 0.27 0.78 
Group:Target 0.05 0.50 0.09 0.93 
Prosody:Target 0.60 0.45 1.31 0.19 
Group:Prosody:Target -0.48 0.73 -0.66 0.51 
Significance: ‘***’0.001, ‘**’ 0.01, ‘*’0.05, ‘.’ 0.1 
 
None of the conditions had a significant effect on the likelihood of fixating on the 
distractor object. These findings are similar to those reported by Sedivy et al., who 
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measured the percentage of trials in which there was a look to the distractor object rather 
than the likelihood of fixating on the target. Despite the differences in measures, Sedivy 
did not find an effect for prosody or the target object, and the same was seen in the 
current study, albeit with the log-odds fixation rather than proportion of trials. Overall, 
there was no effect of experimental conditions or group on the log-odds of fixating on the 
distractor object. 
Summary 
In summary, for Experiment 1, both ASD and neurotypical participants completed 
experimental trials in about the same amount of time. The results of the time to fixate on 
the target object partially replicated Sedivy et al.’s findings that visual context mediates 
fixation patterns. There is a partial replication of the findings from Weber et al., who 
reported a facilitative effect of prosody on the time to fixate on the target, but this was 
true only for ASD participants. In fact, the typical group was fastest to fixate on the target 
when there was no prosodic focus. When prosody was used, both groups showed similar 
latencies. Finally, the likelihood of fixating on the distractor object was essentially the 
same across both groups and in all experimental conditions. None of the behavioral 
measures significantly contributed to the model fits, indicating that language ability and 
non-literal language ability do not appear to mediate the comprehension of prosodic focus 
in a visual-world experiment for either typical or ASD children. 
Experiment 2  
Data Preparation 
In Experiment 2 participants were asked to click on two objects. The critical 
instruction came first in the two-instruction trial (e.g. “Click on the tall glass. Now click 
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on [some other object in scene].”) The critical instruction varied in two ways: first, the 
target object was either a good exemplar of the target phrase (e.g. a tall glass) or a poor 
exemplar (e.g. the photos showed a glass that didn’t appear particularly tall.) Then the 
presence or absence of a competitor object was manipulated (for example, a “tall pitcher” 
would compete with the phrase “tall glass”, or the competitor would be absent from the 
visual display, replaced with a dummy object.) See the appendices for the stimuli used in 
the conditions. 
The dependent variables analyzed were response time, time to first fixation on the 
target object, the likelihood of fixation on the contrastive object, and likelihood of 
fixation on the competitor object. Only trials where the participant correctly clicked on 
the target object were analyzed. Trials containing a fixation on the object of interest 
within the first 100ms of the onset of the adjective were removed, as this indicates that 
the participant had planned on looking to the object before the instructions could have 
indicated to do so, leaving 660 trials for the final analyses. Trials that had DVs with 
values 3 standard deviations above the mean were also removed as they were considered 
outliers. Trials that had no fixations on the areas of interest were excluded for the time to 
fixate on the target. This resulted in the following number of trials available for analysis 
for response time and time to fixate on the target. 










100ms of adj (n) 
Trials 
final (n) 
Response time  n/a 3108.07 1419.97 7367.99 14 n/a 646 
Time to target  120 1304.34 754.93 3569.14 7 91 533 
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Model selection and interpretation  
In Experiment 2 I was interested in the fixed effects of the presence or absence of 
a contrastive object (i.e. another of the object to compare against), how “good” of an 
exemplar the target object was (i.e. if the target object was an obviously tall glass, or 
whether it was a shorter glass described as tall), the interactions of the two fixed effects, 
as well as the random intercepts for participant, item, and the nested effect of participants 
in each group to represent the inherent variability in participants, among stimuli, and 
within groups. The dependent variables (DV) investigated were response time, time-to-
target, likelihood to fixate on the contrastive object, and likelihood to fixate on the 
competitor object. Therefore, the base model used for continuous DVs was: 
lmer (DV ~ PresenceOfContrastiveObject (CO) + GoodExemplar (GE) + 
CO:GE + (1 | subject) + (1 | item) + (1 | group/subject)) 
As in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 a second model was created to incorporate 
the behavioral measures: pragmatic language ability, language ability, and non-literal 
language ability. This resulted in models using these behavioral measures (BM) in an 
expanded model (M2) for comparison with the base model (M1): 
lmer (DV ~ PresenceOfContrastiveObject (CO) + GoodExemplar (GE) + 
BM + CO:GE + CO:BM + GE:BM + CO:GE:BM + (1 | subject) + (1 | item) + (1 
| group/subject)) 
Response time 
Response time is the amount of time in milliseconds (ms) for the participant to 
complete the trial, starting at the start of the first instruction and until the second mouse-
click.  Sedivy and colleagues did not report response times, and Weber and colleagues 
did not examine scalar adjective comprehension in their experiment. The means and 
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standard deviations for each group by condition are reported in the table and boxplots 
below.  
Table 11: Experiment 2, response time, descriptive statistics 
Group 
Condition Contrast 
Present Exemplar N Mean SD 
ASD 5 + good 12 2951.11 929.63 
ASD 6 + poor 12 3049.60 993.86 
ASD 7 - good 12 2890.14 847.89 
ASD 8 - poor 12 2928.62 846.06 
Typical 5 + good 18 2843.43 808.28 
Typical 6 + poor 18 3156.43 919.80 
Typical 7 - good 18 2661.70 560.38 
Typical 8 - poor 18 3146.51 946.33 
 
 
Figure 14: Experiment 2, response time by group and condition 
Models were created as previously detailed. The results of the comparisons 
between the models are listed below. 
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Table 12: Experiment 2, comparison of models for response time 
Model AIC BIC AIC BIC LRT comparison LRT p value 
M1 10489 10547 - - - - 
M2 Language 10498 10592 -9 -45 M1/M2Language 0.56 
M2 CASL_NLL 10491 10585 -2 -38 M1/M2CASL_NLL 0.09 . 
Significance: ‘***’0.001, ‘**’ 0.01, ‘*’0.05, ‘.’ 0.1 
 
Comparison among the models revealed that neither of the models containing 
behavioral measures were significantly different from the base model, although non-
literal language approached, but did not reach, the 0.05 alpha level, and AIC and BIC 
values were smallest for M1. Therefore, the simpler model (M1) was used for analysis. 
Table 13: Experiment 2, fixed effects for response time 





(Intercept) 3193.72.6 126.6 85.08 25.43 -- 
GroupASD -237.3 170.0 79.46 -1.39 0.17 
Contrast Present Yes -0.75 111.5 592.7 -0.01 0.99 
Exemplar Good Yes -537.9 110.7 594.1 -4.85 <0.001 *** 
GroupASD:ContrastPresentYes 182.7 172.8 592.9 1.06 0.29 
GroupASD:ExemplarGoodYes 496.72 169.7 595.3 1.35 0.004 ** 
ContrastPresentYes:ExemplarGoodYes 210.19 154.8 592.3 1.35 0.17 
GroupASD:ContrastPresentYes:ExemplarGoo
dYes 
-343.9 240.8 594.2 1.43 0.15 
Significance: ‘***’0.001, ‘**’ 0.01, ‘*’0.05, ‘.’ 0.1 
 
Overall, there was no main effect for group, for whether or not a contrastive 
object was present, and there was no interaction between group and contrast, contrast and 
exemplar. In addition, there was no effect for the three-way interaction.  
There was a main effect for the goodness of the exemplar. Recall that in this 
experimental condition, the goodness of the exemplar was manipulated to either be a 
good exemplar (e.g. an obviously tall glass) or a poor exemplar (e.g. a picture of a glass 
that isn’t particularly tall.) This means that all participants were faster to respond when 
the exemplar was good. However, there was also an interaction between group and 
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exemplar: typical participants were faster to complete the trial when the exemplar was 
good whereas ASD participants’ response times were slower than typical participants.  
 
Figure 15: Experiment 2, response time by group and exemplar type 
The presence or absence of a contrastive object did not affect response time for 
either group, and none of the behavioral measures contributed to the model in a 
significant way. 
Time to fixate on target 
Time to target is the amount of time in milliseconds the participant takes to fixate 
on the target object (e.g. “tall glass”) from 100ms post onset of the adjective. The trials 
analyzed were those where the participant fixated on the target object at any point in the 
trial. The means and standard deviations for each group by condition are reported in the 
table and boxplots below. 
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Table 14: Experiment 2, time to fixate on target object, descriptive statistics 
Group Condition Contrast Exemplar N Mean SD 
ASD 5 + good 12 783.50 491.64 
ASD 6 + poor 12 895.02 673.75 
ASD 7 - good 12 875.51 691.57 
ASD 8 - poor 12 806.72 440.64 
Typical 5 + good 18 794.53 640.2 
Typical 6 + poor 18 610.26 439.25 
Typical 7 - good 18 681.27 447.49 
Typical 8 - poor 18 782.85 422.42 
 
 
Figure 16: Experiment 2: time to fixate on target, by group and condition 
The base model was compared to models containing behavioral measures. The 
results are presented below. 
Table 15: Experiment 2, comparison of models for time to fixate on target 
Model AIC BIC AIC BIC LRT comparison LRT p value 
M1 8158 8214 - - - - 
M2 Language 8164 8253 -6 -39 M1/M2Language 0.24 
M2 CASL_NLL 8164 8254 -6 -2 M1/M2CASL_NLL 0.26 
Significance: ‘***’0.001, ‘**’ 0.01, ‘*’0.05, ‘.’ 0.1 
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Comparison among the models revealed that neither the model containing 
language or non-literal language scores was significantly different from the base model. 
Therefore, M1 was selected for analysis.  
Table 16: Experiment 2, fixed effects for time to fixate on target 
Fixed Effect Estimate Std. Error df t-value p-value 
Intercept 768.22 69.17 122.4 11.1 -- 
GroupASD 41.90 102.45 127.9 0.41 0.68 
Contrast Present Yes -151.76 80.57 496.4 -1.88 0.06 . 
Exemplar Good Yes -97.14 80.31 501.4 -1.21 0.22 
GroupASD:ContrastPresentYes 247.06 124.95 494.2 1.97 0.048* 
GroupASD:ExemplarGoodYes 148.93 123.79 497.5 1.20 0.23 
ContrastPresentYes:ExemplarGoodYes 276.42 113.3 500.1 2.44 0.015* 
GroupASD:ContrastPresentYes:Exemplar
GoodYes 
-431.88 176.2 500.3 -2.5 0.0146 * 
Significance: ‘***’0.001, ‘**’ 0.01, ‘*’0.05, ‘.’ 0.1 
 
Sedivy and colleagues reported facilitative main effects for the presence of the 
contrastive object (F1(1,21) = 11.62, p < 0.01; F2(1,19) = 4.19, p < 0.06), for 
typicality (F1(1,21) = 4.58, p < 0.05; F2(1,19) = 8.46, p  < 0.01), and for the interaction 
between presence of the contrastive object and the goodness of the exemplar (F1(1,21) = 
3.3, p=0.08, F2(1,19) = 2.67, p < 0.1) as measured from the onset of the head noun.  
In this study, with regards to time to fixate on the target, there was no main effect 
of group or the goodness of the exemplar. The effect of the presence of a contrastive 
object approached, but did not reach, significance. These results contrast with Sedivy et 
al., who found a main effect. The lack of the replication of Sedivy et al.’s findings may 
be due to the inclusion of two different groups of participants, as evidenced by the three-
way interaction. There was no effect of the interaction between group and exemplar. 
There is an effect of the interaction between the goodness of the exemplar and the 
presence of a contrastive object. Sedivy and colleagues reported longer time to fixate on 
the target when the exemplar was poor and there was a contrastive object. However, in 
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the current study, this effect was found for typical participants, but not for ASD 
participants: the current results are mediated by the three-way interaction among 
exemplar, contrastive object, and group. When the contrastive object was absent, but the 
exemplar was good, typical participants were faster to fixate on the target. When there 
was a contrastive object present and the exemplar was poor, typical participants were 
faster to fixate on the target object. Both of these results are in accordance with Sedivy et 
al.s findings. However, it appears the main effects were lacking due to the performance 
of the ASD participants. They took longer in these same conditions and were just as fast 
as typical participants when the exemplar was good.  
 
Figure 17: Experiment 2, time to target by group and condition 
Overall, with regards to time to fixate on the target object, typical participants are 
faster to do so when the target object is a poor exemplar and there is a contrast object 
present (condition 6) and are faster when there exemplar is good and when there is no 
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contrastive present (condition 7) than ASD participants. Interestingly, the times are 
relatively the same for both groups when the exemplar is poor and when there is no 
contrastive object, and when the exemplar is good and when there is a contrastive object. 
ASD participants don’t show much change in their overall speeds across conditions.  
Fixation on competitor object 
As for the likelihood of fixating on the distractor object in Experiment 1, the log-
odds of fixating on the competitor object (e.g. a tall pitcher) was examined.  
Table 17: Experiment 2 comparison of models for likelihood fixate on competitor object 
Model AIC BIC AIC BIC LRT comparison LRT p value 
M1 7433.7 7471.3 - - - - 
M2 Language 7436.2 7490.6 -2.5 -18.7 M1/M2Language 0.07 . 
M2 CASL_NLL 7435.2 7489.6 -1.5 -18.7 M1/M2CASL_NLL 0.21 
Significance: ‘***’0.001, ‘**’ 0.01, ‘*’0.05, ‘.’ 0.1 
Although the model with language ability approached a significant difference 
with the base model, neither reached the 0.05 alpha requirement. Therefore, the base 
model was used (M1).  
Table 18: Experiment 2, likelihood of fixating on the competitor object 
Fixed Effect Estimate Std. 
Error 
z-value p-value 
Intercept 1.75 0.32 5.47 -- 
GroupASD -0.25 0.44 -0.56 0.56 
ExemplarGoodYes -0.31 0.38 -0.80 0.42 
ContrastPresent Yes -0.93 0.36 -2.5 0.014 * 
GroupYes:ExemplarGoodYes -0.001 0.58 -0.003 0.99 
GroupYes:ContrastPresentYes 0.06 0.56 0.11 0.91 
ExemplarGoodYes: ContrastPresentYes -0.15 0.49 0.30 0.76 
GroupASD: ExemplarGoodYes:Contrast PresentYes -0.24 0.76 -0.31 0.76 
Significance: ‘***’0.001, ‘**’ 0.01, ‘*’0.05, ‘.’ 0.1 
To better understand the significant coefficient, it was converted to the probability 
of fixation on the competitor object: 
Contrastive Object Present Yes : Probability of fixating on competitor object= e(-0.93)/(1+e(-0.93))= 
0.39/1+0.39=0.28. 
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With regard to fixating on competitor object, there was no main effect for group 
or exemplar. Sedivy and colleagues reported a main effect of contrast (F1(1,19) = 12.83, 
p < 0.01; F2 (1,15) = 11.73, p < 0.01) and that effect was replicated in the current study 
as well. There was a main effect for contrastive object: when a contrastive object was 
present, the probability participants fixated on the competitor object was 0.28 less than 
the mean. Overall, participants had a lower probability of fixating on the competitor 
when the contrastive object was present. This indicates that participants were taking into 
account the visual context when interpreting the instructions, rather than interpreting the 
instructions literally, which would presume fixations on the competitor object. None of 
the of the interactions were significant.  
Likelihood to fixate on contrastive object 
The likelihood to fixate on the contrastive object (e.g. a short glass) is the log of 
the odds that the participant will fixate on the object from 100ms post onset of the 
adjective. The following analyses only contain trials that had a fixation on the contrastive 
object.  The models were created and compared to determine if any of the behavioral 
measures had an effect. 
Table 19: Experiment 2 comparison of models for time to fixate on contrastive object 
Model AIC BIC AIC BIC LRT comparison LRT p value 
M1 761.1 814.6 - - - - 
M2 Language 769.5 858.6 -8.4 -44 M1/M2Language 0.47 
M2 CASL_NLL 763.3 852.4 -2.2 -38.2 M1/M2CASL_NLL 0.09 . 
Significance: ‘***’0.001, ‘**’ 0.01, ‘*’0.05, ‘.’ 0.1 
 
Overall, none of the models that including a behavioral model were significantly 
different than the base model, and so M1 was used for analysis. 
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Table 20: Experiment 2: Likelihood of fixating on contrastive object 
Fixed Effect Estimate Std. Error z-value p-value 
Intercept 0.95 0.28 3.35 -- 
GroupASD -0.67 0.40 -1.65 0.09  . 
ExemplarGoodYes -0.68 0.32 -2.10 0.035* 
ContrastivePresentYes 0.74 0.37 2.00 0.045* 
GroupASD:ExemplarGoodYes 0.73 0.49 1.47 0.14 
GroupASD:ContrastPresent 0.93 0.59 1.58 0.11 
ExemplarGoodYes:ContrastPresentYes -0.08 0.48 -0.16 0.86 
GroupASD: Exemplar GoodYes:Competitor PresentYes -0.72 0.77 -0.93 0.35 
Significance: ‘***’0.001, ‘**’ 0.01, ‘*’0.05, ‘.’ 0.1 
 
 Converting the significant log-odds coefficients to probabilities reveals the 
following: 
Contrastive Object Present Yes: Probability of fixating on contrastive object = e(0.74)/(1+e(0.74)) = 
2.09/1+2.09=0.68. 
Exemplar Good Yes: ProbabilityFixContrastiveObject = e(-0.68)/(1+e(-0.68)) = 0.506/1+0.506=0.34. 
Sedivy and colleagues reported a main effect for presence the contrastive 
object (F1(1,19) = 70.29, p < 0.001; F2(1,15) = 35.96, p < 0.001), while the rest of the 
effects were not significant. In this study, there was a replication of that same effect: the 
probability of fixating on the contrastive object is 0.68 when the contrastive object is 
present versus the probability of fixating on the distractor object in its place. That is, the 
likelihood they fixate on that object is in the scene, they are less likely to fixate on that 
area than when the object is replaced by a distractor object (if it was more likely, the 
probability would be above 1.0.) In addition, there was a main effect of the goodness of 
the exemplar: participants were also much less likely to fixate on the contrastive object 
when the exemplar was good, which is expected although Sedivy and colleagues did not 
report that same effect. There was no effect for group membership, although it did 
approach significance. Lastly, none of the interactions were significant. 
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Summary  
In summary, for Experiment 2, there was a general effect of the goodness of the 
exemplar speeding overall response times for all participants, however, ASD participants 
were slower to complete the trials when the exemplar was good vs. when it was poor. 
This result cannot be accounted for by the likelihood of fixating on the competitor object, 
as there was no group effect in those analyses and will be further explored in the 
discussion section. Participants had a lower probability of fixating on the competitor 
object when the contrastive object was present, indicating pragmatic inferencing of the 
intention of the speaker based on the visual context and not on literal linguistic 
information alone. None of the behavioral measures significantly contributed to the 
model fits, indicating that language ability and non-literal language ability do not appear 
to mediate the comprehension of prosodic focus in a visual-world experiment for either 
typical or ASD children. 
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Chapter 4: Discussion, Limitations, and Conclusion 
Discussion 
This study was a replication of the experiments conducted by Sedivy et al., 1999. 
In that original study, they showed that language processing occurred in real-time and 
incrementally as the utterance unfolded. In addition, they showed that the visual context 
mediated fixations. In this study, a partial replication of their findings was found. The 
results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 21: Replication data for Sedivy et al., 1999 
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This current study partially replicates the findings of Sedivy and colleagues, but 
with children ages 9-12 rather than adults. In addition, some interesting group effects 
reveal differences in how typical children and children on the autism spectrum process 
these kinds of pragmatic language concepts in real-time. 
The current study addressed three main questions regarding the pragmatic 
language comprehension abilities of children on the autism spectrum: 
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1. Do children with autism use prosody and scalar adjectives in ambiguous 
visual contexts to interpret speaker meaning in real-time? 
2. Does language ability have an effect on response times for fixations? 
3. Does non-literal language ability have an effect on response times for 
fixations? 
Children in the ASD group utilized prosodic focus and visual context to speed 
their fixations to the contrastive target object as compared to trials without prosodic 
focus, despite being diagnosed with a “pragmatic language disorder.” These findings 
contribute to the literature on the abilities of children with ASD to understand various 
forms of prosody (Diehl et al., 2014; Korpilahti et al., 2007) and indicates that children 
with autism not only perceive but also infer speaker meaning when mediated through the 
use of prosodic focus. In addition, this shows that the comprehension of prosodic focus is 
dependent on what could be called “linguistic-pragmatic” ability rather than social-
pragmatic ability. 
Given these results, one would expect to see the same pattern of results for typical 
children, however this was not the case. The typical group of participants did not show 
the same speeded response when prosody was used but did show a speeded response 
when prosody was not used. It is highly unlikely that they could not perceive the prosodic 
contour or have otherwise not acquired the ability to understand the implicit reasons why 
prosodic focus was used as previous research shows that they can (Ito et al., 2012; 
Szendråi et al., 2018). Therefore, why didn’t typical children show the same effect? 
After the eye-tracking portion of the experiment, informal questioning conducted 
by the investigator revealed some interesting thoughts on the part of the participants. 
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Some participants (N=12, and after 14 participants had already completed the 
experiments) were asked, “What did you think?” or “Any thoughts about what you had to 
do?” Most participants commented on the relative ease of the task (“It was easy,” “It’s 
fine,” “I don’t know”) or another generic comment that they were ready for a break or to 
continue (N=8). However, four participants made comments about the stimuli. These 
participants said, “That lady is a liar,” (two ASD participants), “That lady tried to trick 
me,” (one ASD participant), “I just waited for the whole thing because she would say the 
wrong thing,” (one NT participant). These comments indicate that the participants did, 
indeed, perceive the prosodic contour and meta-linguistically understood that the 
prosodic contour was used to invoke an assumption about the target object and that its 
use (and thereby speaker giving the instructions) was unreliable. It’s possible that typical 
participants cancelled the pragmatic implicature invoked by the use of prosodic focus 
because the speaker was deemed unreliable and violated the Maxim of Quality in Grice’s 
Cooperative Principle: “Do not say what you believe to be false.” However, those 
participants still used the visual information to invoke the implicit contrast among the 
objects, which resulted in speeded fixations to the target object when there was no 
prosody, perhaps because there was no implicature to cancel. However, if this strategy 
was employed by typical participants and not ASD participants, then this might suggest 
that to cancel the locally computed implicature required skills that the typical participants 
had and that the ASD participants did not. Put another way, metalinguistic flexibility 
based on a metacognitive realization about the reliability of the speaker helped typical 
participants strategize their use of information, whereas ASD participants may have been 
unable to do so. Unfortunately, post-experimental questioning regarding the intentions of 
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the instructions was inconsistent as it was not originally planned for in the study design. 
Given that this is speculative, further investigation would be required to determine 
whether this was true and, if so, how it might inform the three main theories of autism. 
Scalar adjectives, by contrast, do not rely on an acoustic cue to invoke the 
pragmatic implicature but rather the context is created within the visual scene. 
Interestingly, typical participants were faster to complete the trial when the exemplar was 
good, but participants on the autism spectrum took the same relative amount of time 
across all conditions.  
Typical participants were fastest to interpret the scalar adjective and fixate on the 
target when it was a good exemplar and when there was a contrastive object. This 
replicated the Sedivy et al. study, but this was not seen with the ASD group. These results 
are in conflict with prior reports. Brock and colleagues reported that both ASD and 
typical participants fixated on the target object at the same rate when the target was 
semantically constrained, however poorer language ability resulted in increased fixation 
on the competitor object (Brock et al., 2008), whereas in this current investigation only 
diagnosis was implicated for the fixation to target, and not for the likelihood to fixate on 
the competitor and language ability wasn’t significant. This may be because the earlier 
study investigated semantic and phonological competition in a visual scene which relies 
on language ability, whereas the current study investigated scalar adjectives which 
requires an inference about the speaker intent and the relative meaning of the adjective 
itself. Therefore, it seems logical that language ability would mediate responses to 
language-based stimuli, and that pragmatic language ability mediates responses requiring 
a pragmatic inference for interpreting scalar adjectives.  
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Children with autism were able to utilize visual information to mediate fixations 
to the target object when prosody was used, but failed to do so with scalar adjectives 
when the exemplar was good and there was no contrastive object (that is, it was the only 
“glass” on the screen), and when the exemplar was poor and there was a contrastive 
object (e.g. it was a glass that didn’t look particularly tall.)  It is unlikely that they are 
relying on a literal interpretation of the utterance, as the likelihood of fixating on the 
competitor or contrastive objects was the same for both groups. In addition, if the slower 
time to fixate on the target was the result of slower processing of language one would 
assume effects would also be seen in measures across the dependent variables, but this is 
not the case. Perhaps, with regards to scalar implicatures, the ASD group delays compute 
the implicature later in the utterance, and the typical group computes the implicature 
rapidly when the visual context provides such information. Rather, as Sedivy and 
colleagues astutely note, “the determination of the semantic value of [scalar] adjectives 
cannot be accomplished unless variables specified by the lexical entry for a particular 
adjective are fixed on the basis of contextually-supplied information.” (p. 143). Perhaps 
children on the autism spectrum have a more fixed value for the scalar adjectives in their 
lexical entries as compared to typical children, whereas comprehension of intersective 
adjectives such as “red” is relatively preserved due to the relatively stable nature of the 
semantic value of “red”.   
This is in contrast to previously-reported findings that showed that children with 
autism do successfully interpret other scalar terms, such as scalar quantifiers such as 
“some/all” (Chevallier et al., 2010; Su & Su, 2015). Recall that scalar quantifiers entail a 
logical and a pragmatic interpretation: the logical meaning of “some” entails “all”, while 
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the pragmatic interpretation relies on the presupposition that if these speakers had meant 
“all”, they would have used the stronger term. By contrast, scalar adjectives don’t have a 
“logical” interpretation nor is there a stable meaning for the term. Perhaps the relative 
success on scalar quantifiers is due to the more concrete definition of the terms, whereas 
scalar adjectives have no central meaning until the referent is revealed. This could also 
account for the increased response times for children on the autism spectrum as compared 
to their typical counterparts. 
To what extent these data inform the three main theories of autism? As previously 
noted, children with autism have generally demonstrated delayed reaction times. 
However, in the current study, children with autism responded in the same amount of 
time as typical children in Experiment 1, but typical children were faster when the 
exemplar was good as compared to children with autism. This may be reflective of the 
differences in utilizing context to mediate the meaning of the scalar adjective, or 
differences in the information each group has in their respective lexical entries for scalar 
adjectives with no central meaning.  
This singular difference in response times doesn’t necessarily support or refute 
Theory of Mind or the Weak Central Coherence Theory of autism; one would expect to 
see delayed reaction times across the board, rather than in one experiment. Instead, 
perhaps the slower reaction time in Experiment 2 reflects the inability to rapidly infer the 
meaning of the scalar adjective based on context. Or, perhaps the delay is more subtle 
and sensitive to the type of processing required, rather than a global delay. 
However, this result could support the Executive Functioning Theory (EF) of 
autism. One of the hallmarks of the EF theory contends that individuals with autism have 
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difficulty “shifting sets” when the task demands it. However, this difficulty was not 
observed in the comparable measures in the prosodic focus investigations: group 
membership did not have an effect on time to fixate on the target or on the distractor 
object, and if the Executive Function Theory of autism were in effect, we might expect 
that the results for all measures to be affected and they were not. Instead, perhaps the 
difficulty only manifested itself with scalar adjectives because interpreting an adjective 
with no central meaning requires a more flexible frame of reference; one that individuals 
with autism might have difficulty with. These conflicting results require further 
investigation and may hint at differences in executive function or in the lexical entries for 
the ASD participants. 
Despite the fact that there are well-documented differences in the neuroanatomy 
and neuroprocessing of ASD and neurotypical individuals, it is unlikely that the current 
experimental measures can be explained by these differences. Again, one would expect to 
see more consistent differences between individuals with high and low pragmatic 
language abilities, and that was not the case. Or, it is possible that the relative success of 
the use of prosodic focus to speed fixations is the result of increased local processing 
ability at the superior temporal gyrus, where both visual attention and auditory processing 
are mediated. Or, an alternate view might state that the anatomical and activation 
differences seen in the literature were either not recruited in these tasks, or, that 
compensatory strategies were sufficient for attention and language processing that didn’t 
differ from peers. Future studies that pair eye tracking with activation measurements such 
as ERP or fMRI might shed some light on this possible connection. 
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And lastly, it is possible that not all pragmatic language components are equally 
“pragmatic.” That is, it could be that some aspects of pragmatic language, such as 
prosodic focus, have a more stable meaning and interpretation, while other aspects of 
pragmatic language that are dependent on a referent set are more difficult for children 
with autism. If this is true, it would provide an explanation for the heterogenous 
performance of children on the autism spectrum who have higher verbal skills. 
Limitations  
There are some limitations to the current study that should be taken into 
consideration. First, these experimental conditions are highly structured, and so the 
results are not sensitive to the type of pragmatic abilities that are routinely “measured” to 
determine ASD diagnoses. In addition, the power of the study falls short of the 
recommended 40 observations by 40 participants (Brysbaert & Stevens, 2018), as this 
study only had 30 participants and the recruitment of typical and ASD participants results 
in uneven numbers in each group, and the number of observations across conditions was 
unequal. In addition, the types of objects chosen as stimuli were limited, and while they 
were normed, they were normed on college-aged students and not individuals within the 
age range for this study.  
The self-reported use of strategies by participants is particularly concerning. Since 
such comments weren’t elicited from the participants in any regular or structured way, 
any conclusions to be drawn from these comments must be taken with some hesitation. 
However, these general comments indicate the possibility that participants may have 
decided that being efficient and being right was more important than just listening to the 
speaker. The unreliable nature of the instructions may have caused the participants to 
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ignore salient linguistic information presented in the prosodic contour. If this is true, it is 
a particularly interesting finding and, in the future, more robust post-experimental 
debriefing protocols may be worth developing for qualitative insight into metalinguistic 
strategies in these kinds of experiments.  
The participants in these experiments were all children with language abilities 
well within the normal range, however, the difference in receptive language abilities 
approached significance. In the future, matching participants based on behavioral 
measures, but particularly language skills, will provide more control to the experiment.  
Despite the fact that none of the behavioral measures significantly improved the fit of the 
model, in several instances that significance approached the alpha. It is possible the 
current study was underpowered and therefore these measures might help explain the 
performance patterns seen in the current study. 
Lastly, before claims can be made that a delayed reaction time and delayed 
comprehension of scalar adjectives are the result of poor executive functioning, future 
studies should include some measure of EF to quantify those abilities and incorporate 
them into the analysis. 
 Conclusions 
Autism is a disorder of pragmatic language comprehension and use. The 
heterogeneous skills of individuals with autism make identifying areas of strengths and 
weakness difficult based on diagnosis alone. The diagnostic criteria for autism are broad, 
behaviorally based, and generally focuses on deficits rather than patterns of both 
strengths and weaknesses. Equivocal results in research and clinical anecdotal experience 
reflect the heterogeneous nature of the disorder or some erroneous assumptions regarding 
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the experimental and diagnostic tasks traditionally used to measure the abilities of 
individuals with autism. Despite the limitations of the current study, there is some 
evidence to suggest that not all aspects of pragmatic language should be considered 
equal. Children with autism are as likely to interpret prosodic focus as well as their 
typical peers. However, their increased latencies to determine the referent for scalar 
adjectives may hint at a difference in how they resolve reference in ambiguous contexts. 
These experiments provide some support for the idea that perhaps pragmatic language 
can be subdivided into linguistic-pragmatic skills and social-pragmatic skills. Further 
research should be conducted to determine if language or social-pragmatic abilities 
influence success on a wider variety of pragmatic language skills, and to what extent 
lexical information plays a role in comprehending terms that have unstable meanings.  
The inclusion of behavioral measures provides a method for investigating the 
relationships among these cognitive skills. Investigations using methods such as eye 
tracking allow for a great deal of experimental control, but risk providing results that are 
sterile. The addition of behavioral measures, as well the use of mixed linear modeling 
provides researchers with a powerful method for investigation that uses variability as a 
strength of the analysis, rather than washing the variability away by collapsing the data 
into measures of centrality. In this way, hopefully experimental investigations can move 
out of the realm of equivocal results and into a richer, more nuanced understanding of the 
variability inherent in any population. 
Overall, clinicians and researchers need to be more deliberate in the types of 
abilities that are measured. Rather than using instruments that measure high-level or 
broad skills that can leverage ability in other areas, a more careful investigation into the 
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discrete cognitive profiles will aid with developing broader phenotypes of autism in 
which cognitive strengths and weaknesses. This improved understanding will help 
clinicians and families tailor interventions, supports, and adaptations to allow autistic 







Table 22: Norming study results  
Image Descriptor Answer (N= 20, except where noted) 
 
Tall Glass 0  
   
Glass 11  
   
Short Glass 8  
   
Other  1 shot glass 
    
 
Tall Glass 0  
   
Glass 2  
   
Short Glass 18  
   
Other  0  
    
 
Tall Glass 14  
   
Glass 6  
   
Short Glass 0  
   
Other  0  
    
Smooth Rock 0  
   
Rock 4  
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Image Descriptor Answer (N= 20, except where noted) 
 
Rough Rock 11  
   
Other 5 a few rocks, rough 
rocks, rocks, pebbles, 
rocks 
    
 
Smooth Rock 1  
   
Rock 6  
   
Rough Rock 12  
   
Other 1 rough rocks 
    
 
Smooth Rock 15  
   
Rock 4  
   
Rough Rock 0  
   
Other 1 smooth rocks 
    
 
Big Book 0  
   
Book 19  
   
Small Book 1  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Big Book 0  
   
Book 13  
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Image Descriptor Answer (N= 20, except where noted) 
Small Book 7  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Big Book 17  
   
Book 2  
   
Small Book 0  
   
Other 1 wide book 
    
 
Clean Shoe 2  
   
Shoe 7  
   
Dirty Shoe 10  
   
Other 1 shoes 
    
 
Clean Shoe 0  
   
Shoe 0  
   
Dirty Shoe 18  
   
Other 2 dirty shoes, dirty shoes 
    
Clean Shoe 13  
   
Shoe 7  
   
Dirty Shoe 0  
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Image Descriptor Answer (N= 20, except where noted) 
 
Other 0  
    
 
New Ball 0  
   
Ball 6  
   
Old Ball 13  
   
Other 1 baseball 
    
 
New Ball 0  
   
Ball 0  
   
Old Ball 20  
   
Other 0  
    
 
New Ball 15  
   
Ball 4  
   
Old Ball 0  
   
Other 1 baseball 
    
Shiny Spoon 8  
   
Spoon 5  
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Image Descriptor Answer (N= 20, except where noted) 
 
   
Dull Spoon 5  
   
Other 2 fancy spoon, antique 
spoon 
    
 
Shiny Spoon 0  
   
Spoon 1  
   
Dull Spoon 17  
   
Other 2 antique spoon, rusty 
spoon 
    
 
Shiny Spoon 19  
   
Spoon 1  
   
Dull Spoon 0  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Wide Noodle 5  
   
Noodle 14  
   
Narrow Noodle 1  
   
Other 0  
    
Wide Noodle 1  
   
Noodle 8  
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Image Descriptor Answer (N= 20, except where noted) 
 
   
Narrow Noodle 9  
   
Other 2 angel hair pasta, crazy 
noodles 
    
 
Wide Noodle 20  
   
Noodle 0  
   
Narrow Noodle 0  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Tall Pitcher 2  
   
Pitcher 17  
   
Short Pitcher 1  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Tall Pitcher 0  
   
Pitcher 8  
   
Short Pitcher 12  
   
Other 0  
    
Tall Pitcher 10  
   
Pitcher 9  
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Image Descriptor Answer (N= 20, except where noted) 
 
Short Pitcher 0  
   
Other 1 glass pitcher 
    
 
Big Pillow 3  
   
Pillow 15  
   
Small Pillow 2  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Big Pillow 0  
   
Pillow 7  
   
Small Pillow 13  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Big Pillow 1  
   
Pillow 16  
   
Small Pillow 3  
   
Other 0  
    
Clean Plate 0  
   
Plate 0  
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Image Descriptor Answer (N= 20, except where noted) 
 
Dirty Plate 20  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Clean Plate 0  
   
Plate 0  
   
Dirty Plate 20  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Clean Plate 12  
   
Plate 8  
   
Dirty Plate 0  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Wide Tape 14  
   
Tape 6  
   
Narrow Tape 0  
   
Other 0  
    
Wide Tape 1  
   
Tape 14  
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Image Descriptor Answer (N= 20, except where noted) 
 
   
Narrow Tape 5  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Wide Tape 16  
   
Tape 4  
   
Narrow Tape 0  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Fat Marker 0  
   
Marker 17  
   
Thin Marker 3  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Fat Marker 0  
   
Marker 4  
   
Thin Marker 15  
   
Other 1 pen 
    
Fat Marker 19  
   
Marker 1  
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Image Descriptor Answer (N= 20, except where noted) 
 
   
Thin Marker 0  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Open Box 10  
   
Box 10  
   
Closed Box 0  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Open Box 0  
   
Box 4  
   
Closed Box 16  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Open Box 18  
   
Box 2  
   
Closed Box 0  
   
Other 0  
    
Curly Ribbon 10  
   
Ribbon 10  
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Image Descriptor Answer (N= 20, except where noted) 
 
   
Straight Ribbon 0  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Curly Ribbon 0  
   
Ribbon 8  
   
Straight Ribbon 12  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Curly Ribbon 19  
   
Ribbon 1  
   
Straight Ribbon 0  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Shallow Water 14  
   
Water 2  
   
Deep Water 0  
   
Other 4 pool, pool, baby pool, 
child 
    
Shallow Water 2  
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Image Descriptor Answer (N= 20, except where noted) 
 
   
Water 9  
   
Deep Water 4  
   
Other 5 diver, scuba diver, 
swimmer, scuba diver, 
scuba diving 
    
 
Shallow Water 9  
   
Water 6  
   
Deep Water 0  
   
Other 5 puddle, splash, puddle, 
puddle, puddle 
    
 
Inflated Balloon 1  
   
Balloon 3  
   
Deflated Balloon 14  
   
Other 2 deflating balloon, 
wrinkled balloon 
    
 
Inflated Balloon 15  
   
Balloon 5  
   
Deflated Balloon 0  
   
Other 0  
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Image Descriptor Answer (N= 20, except where noted) 
 
Inflated Balloon 0  
   
Balloon 1  
   
Deflated Balloon 19  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Agree 19 This is a blue comb. 
   
Disagree 0  
   
Other 1 deep purple comb 
    
 
Agree 20 This is a red comb. 
   
Disagree 0  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Agree 20 This is a green comb. 
   
Disagree 0  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Agree 20 This is an orange comb. 
   
Disagree 0  
   
Other 0  
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Image Descriptor Answer (N= 20, except where noted) 
    
 
Agree 20 This is a yellow comb. 
   
Disagree 0  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Agree 20 This is a pink comb. 
   
Disagree 0  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Agree 14 This is a blue glass. 
(only 19 scores total for 
this picture) 
   
Disagree 3  
   
Other 2 blue cup, blue cup 
    
 
Agree 13 This is a red glass. (only 
19 scores total for this 
picture) 
   
Disagree 4  
   
Other 2 red cup, red cup 
    
 
Agree 15 This is a green glass. 
   
Disagree 3  
   
Other 2 green cup, green cup 
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Image Descriptor Answer (N= 20, except where noted) 
    
 
Agree 10 This is a yellow glass. 
   
Disagree 7  
   
Other 3 green glass, lime green 
cup, yellow cup 
    
 
Agree 16 This is a pink glass. 
   
Disagree 2  
   
Other 2 pink cup, pink cup 
    
 
Agree 16 This is an orange glass. 
   
Disagree 2  
   
Other 2 orange cup, orange cup 
    
 
Agree 19 This is a blue ball. 
   
Disagree 0  
   
Other 1 violet ball 
    
 
Agree 20 This is a red ball. 
   
Disagree 0  
   
Other 0  
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Image Descriptor Answer (N= 20, except where noted) 
 
Agree 20 This is a green ball. 
   
Disagree 0  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Agree 19 This is a yellow ball 
(only 19 scores total for 
this picture) 
   
Disagree 0  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Agree 20 This is an orange ball. 
   
Disagree 0  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Agree 20 This is a pink ball. 
   
Disagree 0  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Agree 20 This is a blue spoon. 
   
Disagree 0  
   
Other 0  
    
Agree 20 This is a red spoon. 
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Image Descriptor Answer (N= 20, except where noted) 
 
Disagree 0  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Agree 20 This is a green spoon. 
   
Disagree 0  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Agree 20 This is a yellow spoon. 
   
Disagree 0  
   
Other 0  
    
    
 
Agree 19 This is an orange spoon. 
(only 19 scores total for 
this picture) 
   
Disagree 0  
   
Other 0  
    
 
Agree 17 This is a pink spoon. 
   
Disagree 3  
   



















1 Yes 1 Yes 1 Click on the 
blue comb. 
Now, click on the 
RED comb. 
2 Yes 1 No 0 Click on the 
blue comb. 
Now, click on the 
RED ball. 
3 No 0 Yes 1 Click on the 
blue comb. 
Now, click on the 
red comb. 
4 No 0 No 0 Click on the 
blue comb. 
Now, click on the 
red ball. 
 















5 Yes 1 Good 1 Click on the tall 
glass. 
Now, click on the 
big knife. 
6 Yes 1 Poor 0 Click on the tall 
glass. 
Now, click on the 
big knife. 
7 No 0 Good 1 Click on the tall 
glass. 
Now, click on the 
big knife. 
8 No 0 Poor 0 Click on the tall 
glass. 






Table 25: Stimuli for Experiment 1 and 2 
181 
Block Adjective Object Condi-
tion 
First Inst. Second 
Instr. 
Image Sound 1 Sound 2 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Maximum Range Skew 
Age (months) 129.85 11.796 111 150 39 -0.08 
PPVT 112.08 14.807 87 133 46 -0.13 
EVT 108.85 14.282 86 130 44 -0.1 
CASLNLL 100.08 12.210 70 118 48 -0.86 
CASLPJ 88.5 17.788 58 116 58 0.08 
CCC2Composite 80.54 5.254 70 90 20 -0.21 
CCCSpeech 8.54 3.256 4 12 8 0 
CCCSyntax 9.00 2.380 3 12 9 -0.83 
CCCSemantics 7.23 2.166 4 11 6 0.25 
CCCCoherence 6.69 2.175 4 10 6 0.1 
CCCInitiation 5.92 1.706 3 8 5 -0.76 
CCCScrLang 6.46 2.696 2 10 8 -0.49 
CCCContext 7.08 1.498 5 10 5 0.29 
CCCNVComm 4.00 1.414 2 7 5 0.53 
CCCSocial 5.92 2.660 1 10 9 -0.04 
CCCInterests 5.46 3.307 1 11 10 0.14 
SIDI -8.92 9.77 -27 1 28 -0.56 
Z_PPVT 0.76 1.02 -0.87 2.2 3.07 -0.13 
Z_EVT 0.5 0.94 -0.93 2 2.93 -0.1 
Z_CASLNLL 0.01 0.85 -2 1.2 3.2 -0.86 
Z_CASLPJ -0.77 1.15 -2.8 1.07 3.87 0.08 
Z_CCCcomposite -1.32 0.35 -2 -0.67 1.33 -0.21 
Z_CCCSpeech -0.58 1.07 -2 0.67 2.67 0 
Z_CCCSyntax -0.42 0.77 -2.33 0.67 3 -0.83 
Z_CCCSemantics -1.03 0.64 -2 0 2 0.25 
Z_CCCCoherence -1.17 0.72 -2 0 2 0.1 
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Z_CCCInitiation -1.31 0.56 -2.33 -0.67 1.67 -0.76 
Z_CCCScrLang -1.14 0.93 -2.67 0 2.67 -0.49 
Z_CCCContext -0.92 0.47 -1.67 0 1.67 0.29 
Z_CCCNVComm -1.97 0.48 -2.67 -1 1.67 0.53 
Z_CCCSocial -1.42 0.9 -3 0 3 -0.04 
Z_CCCInterests -1.47 1.14 -3 0.33 3.33 0.14 
Z_Lang -0.15 0.59 -1.35 0.69 2.04 -0.41 
Z_CASLNLL 0.01 0.85 -2 1.2 3.2 -0.86 
Z_Prag -1.27 0.5 -1.86 -0.45 1.41 0.44 
 

















Age (months) 126.44 12.496 154 108 -0.08 -1.16 
PPVT 121.06 11.420 137 89 -0.13 -1.3 
EVT 113.78 10.697 137 98 -0.1 -1.45 
CASLNLL 111.94 15.077 137 87 -0.86 0.11 
CASLPJ 108.62 13.598 131 90 0.08 -1.11 
CCC2Composite 108.06 13.050 125 89 -0.21 -0.56 
CCCSpeech 10.67 2.029 12 6 0 -1.76 
CCCSyntax 11.28 1.274 12 8 -0.83 0.92 
CCCSemantics 10.78 1.987 13 8 0.25 -1.28 
CCCCoherence 10.83 2.149 13 7 0.1 -1.51 
CCCInitiation 11.67 2.787 15 8 -0.76 -0.76 
CCCScrLang 11.33 1.749 13 8 -0.49 -1.55 
CCCContext 11.28 2.740 14 4 0.29 -0.95 
CCCNVComm 9.94 3.019 13 3 0.53 -0.86 
CCCSocial 10.33 2.744 13 3 -0.04 -1.3 
CCCInterests 10.83 3.400 16 4 0.14 -1.54 
SIDI -0.78 8.24 -21 12 -0.56 -1.26 
Z_PPVT 1.4 0.76 -0.73 2.47 -0.13 -1.3 
Z_EVT 0.92 0.71 -0.13 2.47 -0.1 -1.45 
Z_CASLNLL 0.8 1.01 -0.87 2.47 -0.86 0.11 
Z_CASLPJ 0.57 0.91 -0.67 2.07 0.08 -1.11 
Z_CCCcomposite 0.54 0.87 -0.73 1.67 -0.21 -0.56 
Z_CCCSpeech 0.22 0.68 -1.33 0.67 0 -1.76 
Z_CCCSyntax 0.43 0.42 -0.67 0.67 -0.83 0.92 
Z_CCCSemantics 0.26 0.66 -0.67 1 0.25 -1.28 
Z_CCCCoherence 0.28 0.72 -1 1 0.1 -1.51 
Z_CCCInitiation 0.56 0.93 -0.67 1.67 -0.76 -0.76 
Z_CCCScrLang 0.44 0.58 -0.67 1 -0.49 -1.55 
Z_CCCContext 0.43 0.91 -2 1.33 0.29 -0.95 
Z_CCCNVComm -0.02 1.01 -2.33 1 0.53 -0.86 
Z_CCCSocial 0.11 0.91 -2.33 1 -0.04 -1.3 
Z_CCCInterests 0.28 1.13 -2 2 0.14 -1.54 
Z_Lang 0.65 0.42 -0.01 1.32 -0.41 -0.94 
Z_CASLNLL_1 0.75 0.99 -0.87 2.47 -0.86 0.11 
Z_Prag 0.34 0.7 -1.1 1.24 0.44 -1.49 
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Table 28: Significance of correlations among behavioral measures 
 PPVT EVT CASLNLL CASLPJ CCC2Composite 
PPVT - 0.0004 * 0.006 * 0.0111 * 0.0492** 
EVT 0.0004 *** - 0.0002 *** 0.0037***  0.104 
CASLNLL 0.006*** 0.0002*** - ≥0.0001 0.044** 
CASLPJ 0.0111** 0.0037*** ≥0.0001 *** - 0.0013*** 
CCC2 
Composite 0.0492* 0.104 0.044** 0.0013***  - 
Significance: ‘***’0.001, ‘**’ 0.01, ‘*’0.05, ‘.’ 0.1 
 
Table 29: Accuracy, by condition, both experiments 























Clockwise from top left: Location A: yellow comb, Location B: yellow bowl, Location C: knife, Location 
D: pink comb. 
 




Clockwise from top left: Location A: good/poor examplar, Location B: contrastive object, Location C: 
distractor, Location D: competitor. An example of a display in the contrast condition for Experiment 2. In 




Figure 3: Example of a display item from Experiment 1 
 
 
Clockwise from top left: Location A: blue comb, Location B: red comb, Location C: 
red ball, Location D: yellow spoon. 
 
Figure 4: Example of a display item from Experiment 2 
 
Clockwise from top left: Location A: knife (distractor), Location B: short glass (poor 
exemplar), Location C: tall glass (good exemplar), Location D: short pitcher 
(competitor or second distractor) 
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Figure 4: Display Images 









































































































































































































































































Altmann, G. T. M., & Kamide, Y. (1999). Incremental interpretation at verbs: Restricting 
the domain of subsequent reference. Cognition, 73, 247–264. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027799000591 
American Psychiatric Association. (2011). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (Fifth). 
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of 
mind”? Cognition, 21(1), 37–46. 
Barr, D. J., Levy, R., Scheepers, C., & Tily, H. J. (2013). Random effects structure for 
confirmatory hypothesis testing: Keep it maximal. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 68(3), 255–278. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2012.11.001 
Barton, K. (2020). Mu-MIn: Multi-model inference (1.43.17). 
Bell, N. L., Lassiter, K. S., Matthews, T. D., & Hutchinson, M. B. (2001). Comparison of 
the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Third Edition and Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale-Third Edition with university students. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 57(3), 
417–422. https://doi.org/10.1002/jclp.1024 [pii] 
Berk, R., Brown, L., Buja, A., Zhang, K., & Zhao, L. (2013). Valid post-selection 
inference. Annals of Statistics, 41(2), 802–837. https://doi.org/10.1214/12-AOS1077 
Best, C. S., Moffat, V. J., Power, M. J., Owens, D. G. C., & Johnstone, E. C. (2008). The 
boundaries of the cognitive phenotype of autism: Theory of mind, central coherence 
and ambiguous figure perception in young people with autistic traits. Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 38(5), 840–847. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-007-0451-8 
Bishop, D., & Baird, G. (2001). Parent and teacher report of pragmatic aspects of 
communication: use of the Children’s Communication Checklist in a clinical setting. 
Developmental Medicine & Child Neurology, 43(12), 809–818. 
Bishop, D. V. M. (2006). The Children’s Communication Checklist. Pearson 
Assessments. 
Bishop, D. V. (1998). Development of the Children’s Communication Checklist (CCC): a 
method for assessing qualitative aspects of communicative impairment in children. 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, and Allied Disciplines, 39(6), 879–
891. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9758196 
207 
Boersma, P., & Weenink, D. (2013). Praat: Doing Phonetics By Computer (5.3.37). 
http://www.praat.org 
Boraston, Z., & Blakemore, S. J. (2007). The application of eye-tracking technology in 
the study of autism. The Journal of Physiology, 581(Pt 3), 893–898. 
https://doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.2007.133587 
Botting, N. (2004). Children’s Communication Checklist (CCC) scores in 11-year-old 
children with communication impairments. International Journal of Language & 
Communication Disorders, 39(2), 215–227. 
Brock, J., Norbury, C., Einav, S., & Nation, K. (2008). Do individuals with autism 
process words in context ? Evidence from language-mediated eye-movements. 
Cognition, 108, 896–904. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.06.007 
Brysbaert, M., & Stevens, M. (2018). Power Analysis and Effect Size in Mixed Effects 
Models: A Tutorial. Journal of Cognition, 1(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.5334/joc.10 
Carrow-Woolfolk, E. (2008). Comprehensive Assessment of Spoken Language. Western 
Psychological Services. 
Charman, T., Jones, C. R. G., Pickles,  a., Simonoff, E., Baird, G., & Happé, F. (2011). 
Defining the cognitive phenotype of autism. Brain Research, 1380(1943), 10–21. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2010.10.075 
Chevallier, C., Noveck, I., Happé, F., & Wilson, D. (2011). What’s in a voice? Prosody 
as a test case for the Theory of Mind account of autism. Neuropsychologia, 49(3), 
507–517. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.11.042 
Chevallier, C., Wilson, D., Happé, F., & Noveck, I. (2010). Scalar inferences in Autism 
Spectrum Disorders. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 40(9), 1104–
1117. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-010-0960-8 
Colle, L., Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., & van der Lely, H. K. J. (2008). Narrative 
discourse in adults with high-functioning autism or Asperger syndrome. Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 38(1), 28–40. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-
007-0357-5 
Cooper, R. M. (1974). The control of eye fixation by the meaning of spoken language: A 
new methodology for the real-time investigation of speech perception, memory and 
language processing. Cognitive Psychology, 6, 84–107. 
Cutler, A., & Fodor, J. A. (1979). Semantic focus and sentence comprehension. 
Cognition, 7(1), 49–59. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0010-
0277(79)90010-6 
David, N., Schultz, J., Milne, E., Schunke, O., Schöttle, D., Münchau, A., Siegel, M., 
Vogeley, K., & Engel, A. K. (2014). Right temporoparietal gray matter predicts 
208 
accuracy of social perception in the autism spectrum. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 44(6), 1433–1446. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-013-
2008-3 
Dennis, M., Lazenby, A., & Lockyer, L. (2001). Inferential language in high-function 
children with autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 31(1). 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1005661613288 
Diehl, J. J., Bennetto, L., Watson, D., Gunlogson, C., & McDonough, J. (2008). 
Resolving ambiguity: a psycholinguistic approach to understanding prosody 
processing in high-functioning autism. Brain and Language, 106(2), 144–152. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandl.2008.04.002 
Diehl, J. J., Friedberg, C., Paul, R., & Snedeker, J. (2014). The use of prosody during 
syntactic processing in children and adolescents with autism spectrum disorders. 
Development and Psychopathology, 1–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0954579414000741 
Dunn, L., & Dunn, D. (2007). The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test - 4th edition. 
Pearson Assessments. 
Eberhard, K. M., Spivey-Knowlton, M. J., Sedivy, J. C., & Tanenhaus, M. K. (1995). Eye 
movements as a window into real-time spoken language comprehension in natural 
contexts. J Psycholinguist Res Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 24(6), 409–
436. 
Eisenmajer, R., & Prior, M. (1991). Cognitive linguistic correlates of theory of mind 
ability in autistic children. BJDP British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 
9(2), 351–364. 
Eskes, G., Bryson, S., & McCormick, T. (1990). Comprehension of concrete and abstract 
words in autistic children. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 20(1), 
61–73. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02206857 
Farris-Trimble, A., & McMurray, B. (2013). Test – Retest Reliability of Eye Tracking in 
the Visual World Paradigm for the Study of Real-Time Spoken Word Recognition. 
Journal of Speech, Language, and Hearing Research, 56(August), 1328–1346. 
https://doi.org/10.1044/1092-4388(2012/12-0145)group-level 
Frith, U. (2012). Cognitive explanations of autism. Acta Paediatrica. Supplementum, 
65(11), 2073–2092. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2012.697178 
Frith, U., & Snowling, M. (1983). Reading for meaning and reading for sound in autistic 
and dyslexic children. BJDP British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 1(4), 
329–342. 
Grice, P. (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press. 
209 
Grossman, R. B., Bemis, R. H., Plesa Skwerer, D., & Tager-Flusberg, H. (2010). Lexical 
and affective prosody in children with high-functioning autism. Journal of Speech, 
Language, and Hearing Research : JSLHR, 53(3), 778–793. 
https://doi.org/10.1044/1092-4388(2009/08-0127) 
Guasti, M., Chierchia, G., Crain, S., Foppolo, F., Gualmini, A., & Meroni, L. (2005). 
Why children and adults sometimes (but not always) compute implicatures. 
Language and Cognitive Processes, 20(5), 667–696. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01690960444000250 
Gundel, J. K. (1999). On different kinds of focus. In P. Bosch & R. A. van der. Sandt 
(Eds.), Focus : linguistic, cognitive, and computational perspectives (pp. 293–305). 
Cambridge University Press. 
Happé, F. (1994). An advanced test of theory of mind: Understanding of story characters’ 
thoughts and feelings by able autistic, mentally handicapped, and normal children 
and adults. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 24(2). 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02172093 
Happé, F., & Frith, U. (2006). The weak coherence account: Detail-focused cognitive 
style in autism spectrum disorders. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 
36(1), 5–25. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-005-0039-0 
Harel, D., & McAllister, T. (2019). Multilevel models for communication sciences and 
disorders. Journal of Speech, Language, and Hearing Research, 62(4), 783–801. 
https://doi.org/10.1044/2018_JSLHR-S-18-0075 
Hesling, I., Dilharreguy, B., Peppé, S., Amirault, M., Bouvard, M., & Allard, M. (2010). 
The integration of prosodic speech in high functioning autism: a preliminary FMRI 
study. PloS One, 5(7), e11571. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0011571 
Hill, E. L. (2004). Executive dysfunction in autism. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(1), 
26–32. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2003.11.003 
Hodapp, A. F., & Gerken, K. C. (1999). Correlations between scores for Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary Test-III and the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-III. 
Psychological Reports, 84(3, Pt 2), 1139–1142. 
http://silk.library.umass.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct
=true&db=psyh&AN=1999-01451-015&site=ehost-live&scope=site 
Huettig, F., Rommers, J., & Meyer, A. S. (2011). Using the visual world paradigm to 
study language processing: a review and critical evaluation. Acta Psychologica, 
137(2), 151–171. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2010.11.003 
Ito, K., Jincho, N., Minai, U., Yamane, N., & Mazuka, R. (2012). Intonation facilitates 
contrast resolution: Evidence from Japanese adults and 6-year olds. Journal of 
Memory and Language, 66(1), 265–284. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2011.09.002 
210 
Järvinen-Pasley, A., Peppé, S., King-Smith, G., & Heaton, P. (2008). The relationship 
between form and function level receptive prosodic abilities in autism. Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 38(7), 1328–1340. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-007-0520-z 
Kaland, N., Møller-nielsen, A., Callesen, K., Mortensen, E. L., Gottlieb, D., & Smith, L. 
(2002). A new ‘ advanced ’ test of theory of mind : evidence from children and 
adolescents with Asperger syndrome. 4, 517–528. 
Kaland, N., Møller-Nielsen, A., Smith, L., Mortensen, E. L., Callesen, K., & Gottlieb, D. 
(2005). The Strange Stories test--a replication study of children and adolescents with 
Asperger syndrome. European Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 14(2), 73–82. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00787-005-0434-2 
Kamide, Y., Altmann, G. T. ., & Haywood, S. L. (2003). The time-course of prediction in 
incremental sentence processing: Evidence from anticipatory eye movements. 
Journal of Memory and Language, 49(1), 133–156. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0749-
596X(03)00023-8 
Kissine, M. (2012). Pragmatics, cognitive flexibility and autism spectrum disorders. Mind 
and Language, 27(1), 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01433.x 
Klin, A., Jones, W., Schultz, R., Volkmar, F., & Cohen, D. (2002). Visual fixation 
patterns during viewing of naturalistic social situations as predictors of social 
competence in individuals with autism. Archives of General Psychiatry, 59(9), 809–
816. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12215080 
Korpilahti, P., Jansson-Verkasalo, E., Mattila, M.-L., Kuusikko, S., Suominen, K., Rytky, 
S., Pauls, D. L., & Moilanen, I. (2007). Processing of affective speech prosody is 
impaired in Asperger syndrome. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 
37(8), 1539–1549. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-006-0271-2 
Kuznetsova, A., Brockhoff, P., & Rune, H. B. (2017). lmerTest Package: Tests in Linear 
Mixed Effects Models. Journal of Statistical Software, 82(13), 1–26. 
Lombardo, M. V., Pierce, K., Eyler, L. T., Carter Barnes, C., Ahrens-Barbeau, C., Solso, 
S., Campbell, K., & Courchesne, E. (2015). Different Functional Neural Substrates 
for Good and Poor Language Outcome in Autism. Neuron, 86(2), 567–577. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2015.03.023 
Lombardo, M. V., Chakrabarti, B., Bullmore, E. T., & Baron-Cohen, S. (2011). 
Specialization of right temporo-parietal junction for mentalizing and its relation to 
social impairments in autism. NeuroImage, 56(3), 1832–1838. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.02.067 
Long, J. (2020). Package “interactions”: Comprehensive, User-Friendly Toolkit for 
Probing Interactions (1.1.3). https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327906mbr4003_5 
211 
Loukusa, S., Leinonen, E., Kuusikko, S., Jussila, K., Mattila, M.-L., Ryder, N., Ebeling, 
H., & Moilanen, I. (2007). Use of context in pragmatic language comprehension by 
children with Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 37(6), 1049–1059. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-006-
0247-2 
Maenner, M. J., Shaw, K. A., Baio, J., Washington, A., Patrick, M., DiRienzo, M., 
Christensen, D. L., Wiggins, L. D., Pettygrove, S., Andrews, J. G., Lopez, M., 
Hudson, A., Baroud, T., Schwenk, Y., White, T., Rosenberg, C. R., Lee, L. C., 
Harrington, R. A., Huston, M., … Dietz, P. M. (2020). Prevalence of autism 
spectrum disorder among children aged 8 Years-Autism and developmental 
disabilities monitoring network, 11 Sites, United States, 2016. MMWR Surveillance 
Summaries, 69(4), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.15585/MMWR.SS6904A1 
Martin, I., & McDonald, S. (2004). An Exploration of Causes of Non-Literal Language 
Problems in Individuals with Asperger Syndrome. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 34(3), 311–328. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JADD.0000029553.52889.15 
McCann, J., Peppé, S., Gibbon, F. E., O’Hare, A., & Rutherford, M. (2007). Prosody and 
its relationship to language in school-aged children with high-functioning autism. 
International Journal of Language & Communication Disorders / Royal College of 
Speech & Language Therapists, 42(6), 682–702. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13682820601170102 
McGregor, K. K., Berns, A. J., Owen, A. J., Michels, S., Duff, D., Bahnsen, A. J., & 
Lloyd, M. (2012). Associations between syntax and the lexicon among children with 
or without ASD and language impairment. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders, 42(1), 35–47. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-011-1210-4 
Moroney, K. (2015). The Quality of Life Among Adults with Autism Spectrum Disorder. 
University of Massachusetts - Amherst. 
Navab, A., Gillespie-lynch, K., Johnson, S. P., Sigman, M., & Hutman, T. (2012). Eye-
tracking as a Measure of Responsiveness to Joint Attention in Infants at Risk for 
Autism. Infancy : The Official Journal of the International Society on Infant Studies, 
17(4), 416–431. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7078.2011.00082.x 
Nelson, C. A. (2012). Facing autism: eye tracking paves the way to underlying 
mechanisms. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 
51(3), 233–234. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaac.2011.12.015 
Norbury, C. F., Brock, J., Cragg, L., Einav, S., Griffiths, H., & Nation, K. (2009). Eye-
movement patterns are associated with communicative competence in autistic 
spectrum disorders. Journal Of Child Psychology And Psychiatry, 7, 834–842. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-7610.2009.02073.x 
Norbury, C. F., Nash, M., Baird, G., & Bishop, D. V. M. (2004). Using a Parental 
212 
Checklist to Identify Diagnostic Groups in Children with Communication 
Impairment: A Validation of the Children’s Communication Checklist--2. 
International Journal of Language and Communication Disorders, 39(3), 345–364. 
Noriuchi, M., Kikuchi, Y., Yoshiura, T., Kira, R., Shigeto, H., Hara, T., Tobimatsu, S., & 
Kamio, Y. (2010). Altered white matter fractional anisotropy and social impairment 
in children with autism spectrum disorder. Brain Research, 1362, 141–149. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2010.09.051 
Noveck, I. a, & Reboul, A. (2008). Experimental pragmatics: a Gricean turn in the study 
of language. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(11), 425–431. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.07.009 
Nuske, H. J., & Bavin, E. L. (2011). Narrative comprehension in 4-7-year-old children 
with autism: testing the Weak Central Coherence account. International Journal of 
Language & Communication Disorders / Royal College of Speech & Language 
Therapists, 46(1), 108–119. https://doi.org/10.3109/13682822.2010.484847 
O’Connor, K. (2012). Auditory processing in autism spectrum disorder: A review. 
Neuroscience &amp; Biobehavioral Reviews, 36(2), 836–854. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0149763411002065 
Ozonoff, S., & McEvoy, R. E. (1994). A longitudinal study of executive function and 
theory of mind development in autism. Development and Psychopathology., 6(3), 
415. 
Pantelis, P. C., Byrge, L., Tyszka, J. M., Adolphs, R., & Kennedy, D. P. (2015). A 
specific hypoactivation of right temporo-parietal junction/posterior superior 
temporal sulcus in response to socially awkward situations in autism. Social 
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsv021 
Papp, S. (2006). A Relevance-Theoretic Account of the Development and Deficits of 
Theory of Mind in Normally Developing Children and Individuals with Autism. 
Theory & Psychology, 16(2), 141–161. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354306062532 
Pellicano, E. (2010). Individual differences in executive function and central coherence 
predict developmental changes in theory of mind in autism. Developmental 
Psychology, 46(2), 530–544. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018287 
Peppé, S., Hare, A. O., & Rutherford, M. (2007). Receptive and Expressive Prosodic 
Processing in Children With High-Functioning Autism. Hearing Research, 
50(August), 1015–1029. 
Peppé, S., & Wells, W. (1999). Profiling Elements of Prosody in Speech-Communication 
(PEPS-C). 
Pierrehumbert, J., & Hirschberg, J. (1990). The Meaning of Intonational Contours in the 
Interpretation of Discourse. In P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan, & M. E. Pollack (Eds.), 
213 
Intentions in Communication (pp. 271–311). MIT Press. 
Pijnacker, J., Hagoort, P., Buitelaar, J., Teunisse, J.-P., & Geurts, B. (2009). Pragmatic 
inferences in high-functioning adults with autism and Asperger syndrome. Journal 
of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 39(4), 607–618. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-008-0661-8 
Ploog, B. O., Banerjee, S., & Brooks, P. J. (2009). Attention to prosody (intonation) and 
content in children with autism and in typical children using spoken sentences in a 
computer game. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 3(3), 743–758. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rasd.2009.02.004 
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(04), 515–526. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00076512 
R Core Team. (2017). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R 
Foundation for Statistical Computing. 
Redcay, E. (2008). The superior temporal sulcus performs a common function for social 
and speech perception: implications for the emergence of autism. Neuroscience and 
Biobehavioral Reviews, 32(1), 123–142. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2007.06.004 
Reichow, B., Salamack, S., Paul, R., Volkmar, F. R., & Klin, A. (2008). Pragmatic 
Assessment in Autism Spectrum Disorders: A Comparison of a Standard Measure 
With Parent Report. Communication Disorders Quarterly, 29(3), 169–176. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1525740108318697 
Revelle, W. (2013). psych: Procedures for Psychological, Psychometric, and Personality 
Research. R Package Version 1.0–95. In Evanston, Illinois. 
Riby, D., & Hancock, P. J. B. (2009). Looking at movies and cartoons: eye-tracking 
evidence from Williams syndrome and autism. Journal of Intellectual Disability 
Research : JIDR, 53(2), 169–181. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2788.2008.01142.x 
Rice, K., Moriuchi, J. M., Jones, W., & Klin, A. (2012). Parsing Heterogeneity in Autism 
Spectrum Disorders: Visual Scanning of Dynamic Social Scenes in School-Aged 
Children. In Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 
(Vol. 51, Issue 3, pp. 238–248). Lippincott Williams & Wilkins. 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0890856711011798?showall=true 
Roach, P. (2009). English phonetics and phonology : a practical course. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Robinson, S., Goddard, L., Dritschel, B., Wisley, M., & Howlin, P. (2009). Executive 
functions in children with autism spectrum disorders. Brain and Cognition, 71(3), 
362–368. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2009.06.007 
214 
Russell, J., Jarrold, C., & Hood, B. (1999). Two intact executive capacities in children 
with autism: Implications for the core executive dysfunctions in the disorder. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 29(2), 103–112. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023084425406 
Russo, N., Flanagan, T., Iarocci, G., Berringer, D., Zelazo, P. D., & Burack, J. a. (2007). 
Deconstructing executive deficits among persons with autism: Implications for 
cognitive neuroscience. Brain and Cognition, 65(1), 77–86. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2006.04.007 
Saxe, R. (2006). Uniquely human social cognition. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 
16(2), 235–239. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2006.03.001 
Scheeren, A. M., de Rosnay, M., Koot, H. M., & Begeer, S. (2013). Rethinking theory of 
mind in high-functioning autism spectrum disorder. Journal of Child Psychology 
and Psychiatry, and Allied Disciplines, 54(6), 628–635. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jcpp.12007 
Sedivy, J. C., Tanenhaus, M. K., Chambers, C. C., & Carlson, G. (1999). Achieving 
incremental semantic interpretation through contextual representation. Cognition, 
71(2), 109–147. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10444906 
Semel, E., Wiig, E., & Secord, W. (2003). The Clinical Evaluation of Language 
Fundamentals - 4th edition. Pearson Assessments. 
Shriberg, L., Paul, R., & McSweeny, J. (2001). Speech and prosody characteristics of 
adolescents and adults with high-functioning autism and Asperger syndrome. 
Journal of Speech, …, 44(October), 1097–1115. 
http://jslhr.pubs.asha.org/article.aspx?articleid=1780742 
Smith, B. L., Smith, T. D., Taylor, L., & Hobby, M. (2005). Relationship Between 
Intelligence and Vocabulary. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 100(1), 101–108. 
http://silk.library.umass.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct
=true&db=psyh&AN=2005-03122-014&site=ehost-live&scope=site 
Snedeker, J., & Yuan, S. (2008). Effects of prosodic and lexical constraints on parsing in 
young children (and adults). Journal of Memory and Language, 58, 574–608. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2007.08.001 
Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (2001). Relevance : communication and cognition. Blackwell 
Publishers. 
Su, Y. E., & Su, L.-Y. (2015). Interpretation of Logical Words in Mandarin-Speaking 
Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders: Uncovering Knowledge of Semantics 
and Pragmatics. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-014-2350-0 
Swanson, M. R., & Siller, M. (2013). Patterns of gaze behavior during an eye-tracking 
215 
measure of joint attention in typically developing children and children with autism 
spectrum disorder. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 7(9), 1087–1096. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rasd.2013.05.007 
Szendråi, K., Bernard, C., Berger, F., Gervain, J., & Höhle, B. (2018). Acquisition of 





Tanenhaus, M. K., Spivey-Knowlton, M. J., Eberhard, K. M., & Sedivy, J. C. (1995). 
Integration of Visual and Linguistic Information in Spoken Language 
Comprehension. Science, 268(5217), 1632–1634. 
Trueswell, J. C., Sekerina, I., Hill, N. M., & Logrip, M. L. (1999). The kindergarten-path 
effect: studying on-line sentence processing in young children. Cognition, 73(2), 
89–134. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10580160 
Trueswell, J. C., Tanenhaus, M. K., & Kello, C. (1993). Verb-specific constraints in 
sentence processing: Separating effects of lexical preference from garden-paths. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 19(3), 
528–553. https://doi.org/10.1037//0278-7393.19.3.528 
Van Overwalle, F. (2009). Social cognition and the brain: A meta-analysis. Human Brain 
Mapping, 30(3), 829–858. https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.20547 
Vasilopoulou, E., & Nisbet, J. (2016). The quality of life of parents of children with 
autism spectrum disorder: A systematic review. Research in Autism Spectrum 
Disorders, 23, 36–49. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rasd.2015.11.008 
Venker, C., Eernisse, E., Saffran, J., & Weismer, S. E. (2013). Individual Differences in 
the Real‐Time Comprehension of Children with ASD. Autism …, 6(5), 417–432. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/aur.1304.Individual 
Weber, A., Braun, B., & Crocker, M. W. (2006). Finding referents in time: eye-tracking 
evidence for the role of contrastive accents. Language and Speech, 49(Pt 3), 367–
392. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17225671 
Weber, A., Grice, M., & Crocker, M. W. (2006). The role of prosody in the interpretation 
of structural ambiguities: a study of anticipatory eye movements. Cognition, 99(2), 
B63-72. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2005.07.001 
Wiig, E., & Secord, W. (1985). Test of Language Competence - Expanded Edition. 
Pearson Assessments. 
Williams, K. (2007). Expressive Vocabulary Test - 2nd edition. Pearson Assessments. 
216 
 
